In Dieves v. Butte Sand Trucking Co. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1129, the Court of Appeal held that the FMCSA’s preemption of California’s meal and rest break (MRB) rules applies retroactively to claims that accrued before the agency’s 2018 determination. Aligning with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Valiente v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC (2022) 54 F.4th 581 and rejecting the prospective-only holding of Garcia v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 63, the court concluded that federal law effectively voids these state rules for drivers subject to federal hours-of-service regulations regardless of timing. Additionally, following Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582, the court reversed the striking of the PAGA claim, confirming that trial courts lack the inherent authority to dismiss such claims based on manageability concerns.

This decision creates a split in California appellate authority regarding FMCSA retroactivity while reinforcing the procedural resilience of PAGA actions against manageability challenges.

In Brown v. Dave & Buster's of California (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 164, the Court of Appeal held that a PAGA plaintiff is not required to wait an additional 65-day period after amending a pre-filing notice before amending a complaint to add new claims or defendants. The court noted that the PAGA statute does not explicitly mandate a renewed waiting period for supplemental notices, and it characterized the failure to wait the full 65 days as a “harmless defect.”

This decision provides employers with greater certainty that a court-approved PAGA settlement will be treated as a final judgment on the merits despite minor procedural timing discrepancies in the pre-filing notice phase.

In Mora v. C.E. Enterprises (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 72, the Court of Appeal held that a pay plan providing a high base hourly wage (double the minimum) plus a "flag bonus" did not violate the "no borrowing" rule from Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, nor Labor Code § 226.2. Affirming a judgment for the employer, the court distinguished this "base plus bonus" model from unlawful piece-rate averaging, reasoning that because employees were paid well above minimum wage for every hour worked (productive or not), the bonus was a true incentive and not used to cover unpaid time.

This decision validates "flag bonus" structures for automotive technicians and other trades, provided the base hourly rate independently satisfies minimum wage obligations for all hours on the clock, and serves as a reminder that plaintiffs cannot rely on "manifestly deficient" records to overturn PAGA verdicts.

In Galarsa v. Dolgen California (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1, the Court of Appeal held that the threshold question of a PAGA plaintiff's "aggrieved employee" standing is not an arbitrable dispute subject to a private arbitration agreement. Affirming the denial of a motion to compel, the court also ruled that a "headless" PAGA action (alleging violations suffered only by other employees) is permissible under pre-2024 law. The court reasoned that standing to sue on behalf of the state is a dispute between the LWDA and the employer, not the individual employee and employer.

This decision provides an avenue for plaintiffs litigating pre-2024 PAGA claims to avoid arbitration on the gateway issue of standing, preventing employers from securing a preclusive finding in the arbitral forum that could kill the representative court action.

In Alvarado v. Wal-Mart Associates Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 156 F.4th 917, the Ninth Circuit held that a Code of Civil Procedure § 998 offer allowing fees for "individual claims" does not implicitly waive the plaintiff's right to recover fees for "inextricably intertwined" PAGA or class claims, and any such waiver must be express. However, the court vacated the $300,000 fee award because the district court's Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424 analysis was unclear and contradictory, failing to provide the reasoned explanation required by Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106.

This decision warns defense counsel to be explicit about fee exclusions in § 998 offers and reminds trial courts that they must clearly articulate their Hensley calculations to survive appeal.

In Renteria-Hinojosa v. Sunsweet Growers, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1076, the Ninth Circuit held that the requirement to exhaust CBA grievance procedures for an LMRA § 301 claim is not jurisdictional, and therefore a district court's subsequent discretionary remand of supplemental state law claims is appealable. On the merits, the court affirmed the remand, finding the plaintiff's state wage and PAGA claims were not preempted under the test from Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) 898 F.3d 904, 920–21, as they did not require interpretation of the CBA's substantive provisions.

This decision confirms appellate jurisdiction over these specific remand orders and reinforces the high bar for § 301 preemption of California wage claims.

In CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (Sanchez) (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 872, the Court of Appeal held that a PAGA plaintiff can maintain standing for a representative action even after voluntarily dismissing their own individual PAGA claims. The court, applying the pre-2024 version of Labor Code § 2699, found the statute ambiguous, interpreting the phrase "on behalf of himself or herself and other... employees" disjunctively (as "and/or") to align with PAGA's enforcement purpose.

This decision deepens the appellate split on "headless" PAGA actions, directly conflicting with Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 and Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 932 by holding that the pre-2024 statute does not require a plaintiff to maintain a live individual component to pursue representative penalties.

In Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 516, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff whose own Labor Code violations are time-barred still has standing as an "aggrieved employee" under the former version of Labor Code § 2699 (c) to pursue a representative PAGA action for timely violations suffered by other employees. Reversing a demurrer, the court followed Johnson v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 924 and distinguished PAGA standing (merely suffering a violation) from the timeliness of the remedy sought.

This decision creates a direct and outcome-determinative split with Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group (2025) 110 Cal. App. 5th 932, which held the plaintiff's own claim must be timely, potentially setting the stage for review by the California Supreme Court.

In Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 162, the Court of Appeal held that a prevailing defendant in a PAGA action cannot recover costs under C.C.P. § 1032 (b) from the LWDA when the agency did not actively participate in the litigation. The court reversed a $125,000 cost award against the LWDA, rejecting the defense argument that the PAGA plaintiff acts as the LWDA's agent.

This decision shields the LWDA from cost liability in failed PAGA suits, protecting the state from the financial risks of representative cases it does not directly manage.

In Reyes v. Hi-Grade Materials Co. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1089, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff cannot retroactively invoke the death knell doctrine to appeal a class certification denial by later voluntarily dismissing their remaining PAGA claims.

The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that jurisdiction is determined at the time of the order being appealed. Because the plaintiff's PAGA claims were still pending when class certification was denied, the death knell doctrine was inapplicable, and the plaintiff could not "manufacture" jurisdiction over a year later by dismissing the claims that had previously blocked the interlocutory appeal.

In Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 932, the Court of Appeal held that the one-year PAGA statute of limitations applies to the plaintiff's own individual violations, which the court found are a necessary component of any PAGA action. The court affirmed a demurrer where the plaintiff failed to allege a personal violation within the one-year period, ruling that timeliness cannot be based on violations suffered by other aggrieved employees.

This decision deepens the appellate split on PAGA pleading, explicitly following Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 and rejecting Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533.

In Ford v. The Silver F, Inc. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 553, the Court of Appeal held that a pre-Viking River arbitration agreement carving out "representative PAGA claims" bars arbitration of all PAGA claims, including the "individual" component. The court affirmed the denial of a motion to compel, finding that at the time of drafting, PAGA claims were considered indivisible, and the parties intended a broad exclusion.

Following Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592, this decision confirms that employers cannot retroactively apply Viking River's individual/representative split to ambiguous carve-outs that were clearly intended to exclude PAGA entirely.

In Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 317, the Court of Appeal held that a PAGA plaintiff with overlapping claims has no right to intervene in or move to vacate another's PAGA settlement. Closely following Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, the court affirmed that PAGA provides no statutory right to intervene (CCP § 387) or vacate (CCP § 663).

This decision confirms Turrieta as the controlling law and applies to pending cases, rejecting a "law of the case" argument from a prior appeal and solidifying the bar against intervention by competing PAGA plaintiffs.

In Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69, the Court of Appeal held that a court cannot compel arbitration of an individual PAGA claim if the plaintiff's complaint explicitly pleads the claim in a representative capacity only. Affirming the denial of the motion to compel, the court held that the complaint's allegations are determinative, and since no individual claim was asserted, there was nothing to arbitrate.

This decision creates a direct and explicit split with Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, which it expressly disapproved. It provides a clear roadmap for plaintiffs to avoid Viking River arbitration by pleading, though it leaves open a potential defense challenge that such a "representative only" complaint fails to state a valid PAGA claim under the statute.

In Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, the Court of Appeal held that all PAGA actions necessarily include an "individual claim" subject to arbitration, even if the plaintiff only pleads a representative action. Reversing the denial of a motion to compel, the court held that Labor Code § 2699 (a) inherently bundles an individual claim within any PAGA suit.

This ruling revives a key defense argument that PAGA claims are inherently divisible for arbitration, teeing up the issue for Supreme Court review.

In Rodriguez v. Lawrence Equipment, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 645, the Court of Appeal held that an arbitrator's final ruling against a plaintiff on their individual Labor Code claims can preclude that plaintiff's standing to pursue a subsequent PAGA claim based on the same alleged violations. Applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, the court reasoned that if the arbitrator necessarily decided the plaintiff was not an "aggrieved employee" (i.e., suffered no violation), the plaintiff loses the necessary standing to represent the state.

This decision confirms that the procedural separation of PAGA claims does not bar the preclusive effect of an adverse arbitration award, making the outcome of the individual arbitration determinative of PAGA standing.

In Taylor v. Tesla, Inc. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 75, the Court of Appeal held that an employer's refusal to provide statutory Labor Code records is not protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court affirmed the denial of Tesla's motion, reasoning that the refusal was "simply conduct" and not a protected statement, even though the requests were related to separate, pending litigation.

This decision prevents employers from using an anti-SLAPP motion to strike PAGA claims that are based on the failure to comply with these common statutory records requests.

In Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040, the California Supreme Court held that public employers are generally exempt from the Labor Code, and thus PAGA, because government entities are excluded from the statutory definition of "employer" (Labor Code § 18). The court found a clear legislative intent to exclude public entities unless a specific provision explicitly includes them, rejecting the sovereign powers doctrine and adopting a broad definition of "municipal corporation."

This decision definitively shields public sector employers from PAGA liability and most wage and hour claims, confirming they are not subject to the same statutory framework as private employers.

In Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, the California Supreme Court held 4-3 that PAGA plaintiffs are not parties to parallel PAGA actions and thus lack intrinsic standing to intervene (CCP § 387(d)), object to, or move to vacate a settlement in a separate case against the same employer.

This decision effectively prioritizes the "first to settle" PAGA action, making it much harder for competing plaintiffs to challenge a potentially inadequate "reverse auction" settlement.

In Ibarra v. Chuy Sons Labor, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 874, the Court of Appeal held that a PAGA prefiling notice (Lab. Code §2699.3) is valid as long as it nonfrivolously alleges other aggrieved employees exist, even if it does not specifically define or identify them. The court reversed a judgment on the pleadings, holding that the scope of the representative group is a matter for discovery, not a pleading requirement for the notice.

This decision lowers the barrier for PAGA notices, preventing employers from defeating claims at the pleading stage based on the notice's lack of specificity.

In Diaz v. Macy’s West Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 101 F.4th 697, the Ninth Circuit held that when an employee's individual PAGA claim is compelled to arbitration, their non-individual (representative) PAGA claims are stayed in court, not dismissed. Following the California Supreme Court's controlling decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, the court affirmed that a plaintiff retains standing to pursue the representative claims in court after the individual arbitration is complete.

This decision confirms the Adolph procedure is the rule in the Ninth Circuit, preventing the dismissal of representative PAGA claims when an individual claim is arbitrated.

In Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592, the Court of Appeal held that incorporating AAA rules by reference does not "clearly and unmistakably" delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator for unsophisticated employees. The court also affirmed the denial of a motion to compel, holding that the Viking River rule does not apply when an agreement explicitly carves out all PAGA claims.

This decision confirms that courts decide arbitrability absent exceptionally clear delegation and that employers are bound by their own explicit PAGA carve-outs.

In Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff has standing to bring a representative PAGA action without also pleading a separate "individual" PAGA claim. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal, finding it improperly relied on Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 instead of the controlling standard from Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104.

This decision reinforces that PAGA standing under Adolph merely requires the plaintiff to be an "aggrieved employee"—one who was employed by the defendant and suffered at least one violation—not to bring a distinct individual cause of action.

In Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582, the California Supreme Court held trial courts lack inherent authority to dismiss PAGA claims for manageability, expressly disapproving Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 746.

This decision removes a primary hurdle for large-scale PAGA actions, forcing defendants to fight complex claims on the merits rather than procedural grounds.