Ninth Circuit holds continued ERISA plan participation does not constitute consent to arbitration: Platt v. Sodexo, S.A.

In Platt v. Sodexo, S.A. (9th Cir. 2025) 148 F.4th 709, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an employee’s continued participation in an ERISA-governed plan does not constitute consent to a unilaterally added arbitration clause. However, it reversed the denial as to a fiduciary duty claim, finding the Plan itself was the consenting party.

Plaintiff enrolled in Defendant’s health insurance plan, governed by ERISA, which included a monthly tobacco surcharge. In 2021, Defendant unilaterally added an arbitration provision to the plan’s governing agreement. Plaintiff filed a putative class action in 2022, alleging the tobacco surcharge violated multiple sections of ERISA. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the right to unilaterally amend the plan did not extend to adding an arbitration provision and that Plaintiff had not consented. Defendant appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration for Plaintiff’s individual recovery claims under ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3), but reversed in part as to Plaintiff’s fiduciary duty claim under § 502(a)(2). The court held that ERISA does not displace the FAA’s consent requirement. For Plaintiff’s individual claims, the court found Plaintiff was the necessary consenting party and rejected Defendant’s argument that continued plan participation constituted consent after receiving email links to the new plan language. Following Jackson v. Amazon.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 65 F.4th 1093, the court held that Plaintiff would have needed to provide some indication of assent.

Regarding Plaintiff’s fiduciary duty claim (§ 502(a)(2)), the court followed Munro v. Univ. of S. Cal. (9th Cir. 2018) 896 F.3d 1088, holding the Plan itself was the relevant consenting party. Consent existed because the Plan authorized Defendant to amend its terms. However, the court ruled the agreement violated the effective vindication doctrine by including a representative action waiver that improperly barred § 409(a) relief. Finally, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case, holding that Plaintiff’s unconscionability and severability arguments were rooted in federal, not state law.

Full opinion

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