Court of Appeal clarifies “regular compensation” under CERL: Baker v. San Mateo County Employees Retirement Assn.

In Baker v. San Mateo County Employees Retirement Assn. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 81, the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division One) clarified the definition of “regular compensation” under Gov. Code § 31724 (County Employees Retirement Law or CERL), holding that the term refers to the employee’s regular salary or full wages, irrespective of the specific job position held.

Plaintiff, a social worker for the County of San Mateo, went on disability leave from 2009 to 2015. In 2015, she returned to work for the County in a different position at the same pay rate as before. In 2017, Plaintiff applied for disability retirement. Defendant approved the application, recommending January 22, 2016, as the effective date of her retirement benefits pursuant to § 31724. Plaintiff sought administrative review, arguing that she had not received “regular compensation” in 2015 and 2016 because she had not been returned to her original position. The administrative law judge denied Plaintiff’s request, and the trial court denied her petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s petition. Noting that the statute itself did not contain a definition for the term, the Court, following Katosh v. Sonoma County Employees’ Retirement Association (2008) 163 Cal. App.4th 56, 65-66, held that “regular compensation” “includes compensation received as regular salary or full wages” and that nothing in the statute “supports an interpretation of the word ‘regular’ as a reference to a certain job position.” The court distinguished Puckett v. Orange County Bd. of Retirement (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1075, which concerned an employee reassigned to a lower-paying position. The court found no reason to invoke the rule of liberal construction and declined to address the public policy considerations raised by Plaintiff, given the unambiguous meaning of the statute. 

Full opinion

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