Ninth Circuit clarifies LMRA Section 301 exhaustion: Renteria-Hinojosa v. Sunsweet Growers, Inc.

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In Renteria-Hinojosa v. Sunsweet Growers, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1076, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the requirement to exhaust a collective bargaining agreement’s dispute resolution procedures is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) section 301 claims, thus allowing for appellate review of a district court’s remand order. It also held that a preemption determination as to one PAGA claim does not necessarily apply to the remaining ones.

Plaintiff, a union employee, filed a putative class action and a separate PAGA action in California state court for various wage and hour violations and other claims. Defendant removed both actions to federal court, arguing Plaintiff’s state law claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Defendant also sought supplemental jurisdiction over any non-preempted claims. The district court dismissed one of Plaintiff’s untimely wage claims under § 301 for failure to allege exhaustion of the CBA’s dispute resolution procedures but found Plaintiff’s remaining claims were not preempted and remanded them to state court. Defendant appealed the remand orders.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the remand of both actions. It held that the exhaustion requirement for § 301 claims is not jurisdictional, as Congress had not imposed it and the Supreme Court had created equitable exceptions, which would not be possible if the rule were jurisdictional. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction or decline and remand. Because the remand order was not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(c) and (d) did not bar the Ninth Circuit’s review.

The Ninth Circuit used the two-part inquiry from Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) 898 F.3d 904, 920–21 to determine if Plaintiff’s remaining claims were subject to § 301 preemption. At step one, it found each of Plaintiff’s state law claims alleged violations of rights that exist under California law and not only her CBAs. At step two, it found the claims did not require interpretation of “substantive provisions” of the CBAs. Notably, the Ninth Circuit held that merely referencing CBA terms does not trigger § 301 preemption. Following Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386, it rejected Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the CBAs’ dispute resolution procedures. Citing Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 654, the Ninth Circuit also rejected Defendant’s argument that the preemption finding for one of Plaintiff’s PAGA claims necessarily applied to the remaining ones. Finally, the Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s remand, holding that Plaintiff did not need to oppose supplemental jurisdiction for the court to exercise its own discretion.

Full opinion

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