Plaintiff, a firefighter for Defendant since 1999, was forced to retire due to disability in 2018. Under a revised city policy, she was entitled to only 24 months of health insurance, while employees with 25 or more years of service received health insurance until age 65. Plaintiff sued, alleging the policy violated the ADA and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s ADA claim, ruling that she failed to show she was a “qualified individual” under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) at the time of the adverse action (denial of retirement benefits). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed while noting that the Second and Third Circuits had held the opposite.

The Supreme Court, granting certiorari to resolve the circuit split, affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s ADA claim. In the majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch highlighted the use of present-tense verbs in § 12112(a) (“ ‘can perform the essential functions of ‘the job she ‘holds or desires’ ” [emphasis in original]). The court contrasted the statute with § 12203(a), which prohibits retaliation against “any individual” who opposes discrimination, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the “qualified individual” mandate is conditioned upon a plaintiff claiming discrimination with respect to a job he or she seeks or holds, citing Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States (2018) 585 U.S. 274 for the proposition that a “conceivable-but-convoluted” interpretation should not be preferred over an ordinary one. The Supreme Court also rejected Plaintiff’s surplusage argument based on § 12112(b)(5)(A), noting that under Marx v. General Revenue Corp. (2013) 568 U.S. 371, 385, “‘[t]he canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule.’” It noted that other laws may protect retirees from benefit-related discrimination.

Notably, the Supreme Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument (joined by the government as amicus curiae) that she was subjected to a discriminatory benefits policy while still employed and subject to a disability. It found Plaintiff did not allege in her pleadings that she suffered from a disability while still employed with Defendant and represented in her Eleventh Circuit brief that she was not impacted by Defendant’s benefits policy while still employed. However, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that future plaintiffs might successfully pursue a similar legal theory.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, after being elected police association president, took leave from the City of Santa Ana but continued to receive his police salary and various pay additives per an MOU between the city and the association. CalPERS determined these additives were not pensionable, a decision upheld by an administrative judge, except for an education incentive. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus, and Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The court held that while Gov. Code § 3505.4 mandates employers continue pay and benefits during union leave, it does not dictate pensionability. Whether compensation is pensionable is determined exclusively by the Public Employees’ Retirement Law (PERL). Therefore, pay additives received during leave must independently satisfy PERL’s definition of “compensation earnable” (Gov. Code, § 20636) to be pensionable. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s confidentiality premium was not pensionable because it failed PERL’s requirement (Gov. Code, § 20636(b)(1)) that special compensation be paid to “all persons in the group or class.” Likewise, the holiday pay was not pensionable as it did not qualify as “compensation earnable” under PERL (Gov. Code, § 20636(a)) and failed the regulatory test in Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 571.

Full opinion

Plaintiff was injured on the job, and a healthcare provider concluded he should be medically retired. However, Defendant denied Plaintiff’s application for disability retirement. Plaintiff sued, alleging a single cause of action for FEHA disability discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant because disability requirement did not qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of Plaintiff’s employment, and FEHA was not the “appropriate statutory vehicle” for pursuing Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment against Plaintiff. Citing Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 10 1150, 1162, it held that denial of disability retirement does not affect a current employee and thus is not an adverse employment action under FEHA.  Furthermore, under Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, Plaintiff was not a “qualified individual” under FEHA because he could not perform his essential job duties. While the Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred in suggesting Plaintiff could have filed a writ of administrative mandamus directly, it held this error did not warrant reversal. The court noted that Plaintiff could have appealed the denial to an administrative law judge and then, if necessary, filed a writ. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that mandamus was inadequate due to the lack of attorney’s fees.

Full opinion

Plaintiff worked for an agency that assigned him to temporary finance roles in several cities. CalPERS determined this violated its rules because he was a common law employee of those cities. After Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate, the trial court upheld the administrative ruling, finding the evidence supported Plaintiff’s status as a common law employee.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s petition. Following Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 491, it held that temporary workers for companies contracting with public agencies are “employees” under PERL if they meet the common law test for employment. Applying the ‘control of details’ test from S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, the court found that Plaintiff was co-employed by both the contracting company and the cities. Notably, the Court of Appeal found contractual language stating Plaintiff was the agency’s employee and not the cities’ immaterial to his actual employment status.

Full opinion

In 2012, Plaintiff applied for a reduced-age annuity based on estimated income. He did not inform Defendant when his actual income exceeded that estimate. In 2013, Defendant notified Plaintiff that it had recalculated his annuity based on his actual income. Defendant sent similar notices in 2014 and 2015. In 2016, Defendant demanded repayment for overpayments from August 2012 to December 2015. The Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) denied Plaintiff’s waiver request, affirming its decision on administrative appeal. Plaintiff filed a petition for review, which the Ninth Circuit granted.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the RRB’s finding that Plaintiff was at fault for overpayments from August 2012 to June 2, 2013, because he should have reported his higher income. However, the court held that Plaintiff was “without fault” for overpayments after June 3, 2013, because Defendant continued to overpay him despite notifying him of the recalculation. The court found that requiring repayment for the period after June 3, 2013 could be contrary to the purpose of the Railroad Retirement Act, given Plaintiff’s age, health, and financial difficulties. The case was remanded to the RRB for further consideration.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs repeatedly requested pension statements online but received them only after calling Defendant.  After retiring, they received monthly payments consistent with those statements, but Defendant later informed them their benefits were overcalculated. Plaintiffs sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, violation of ERISA’s disclosure requirements, and state law violations. The district court dismissed all claims. On initial appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the fiduciary duty claim, reversed dismissal of the state law claims, and vacated dismissal of the ERISA claims. On remand, the district court again dismissed the ERISA claims, ruling that the statute did not require accurate statements. Plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that a pension benefit statement with a substantially inaccurate amount does not comply with the plain language or statutory intent of ERISA’s reporting requirement. It also held that Plaintiffs’ electronic requests were “written requests” under ERISA and that they could seek statutory penalties under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) and equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit clarified that penalties under § 1132(c)(1) do not require a finding of bad faith.

Full opinion

Defendant argued that the trial court erred in applying Gov. Code § 31461(b)(2) to employees who retired after January 1, 2013, and that the statute did not require excluding excess leave cashouts.

Following the Supreme Court’s analysis in Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1032, the Court of Appeal held that while Gov. Code § 31461(b) is ambiguous, its legislative intent to eliminate pension spiking is clear. Rejecting Defendant’s argument that the Supreme Court’s statements in Alameda County were dicta, the court held that “when the Supreme Court has reached well beyond the holding necessary to its opinion to express its broader view… dicta from the high court should be followed.”

Full opinion