Plaintiff, a firefighter for Defendant since 1999, was forced to retire due to disability in 2018. Under a revised city policy, she was entitled to only 24 months of health insurance, while employees with 25 or more years of service received health insurance until age 65. Plaintiff sued, alleging the policy violated the ADA and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s ADA claim, ruling that she failed to show she was a “qualified individual” under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) at the time of the adverse action (denial of retirement benefits). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed while noting that the Second and Third Circuits had held the opposite.

The Supreme Court, granting certiorari to resolve the circuit split, affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s ADA claim. In the majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch highlighted the use of present-tense verbs in § 12112(a) (“ ‘can perform the essential functions of ‘the job she ‘holds or desires’ ” [emphasis in original]). The court contrasted the statute with § 12203(a), which prohibits retaliation against “any individual” who opposes discrimination, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the “qualified individual” mandate is conditioned upon a plaintiff claiming discrimination with respect to a job he or she seeks or holds, citing Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States (2018) 585 U.S. 274 for the proposition that a “conceivable-but-convoluted” interpretation should not be preferred over an ordinary one. The Supreme Court also rejected Plaintiff’s surplusage argument based on § 12112(b)(5)(A), noting that under Marx v. General Revenue Corp. (2013) 568 U.S. 371, 385, “‘[t]he canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule.’” It noted that other laws may protect retirees from benefit-related discrimination.

Notably, the Supreme Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument (joined by the government as amicus curiae) that she was subjected to a discriminatory benefits policy while still employed and subject to a disability. It found Plaintiff did not allege in her pleadings that she suffered from a disability while still employed with Defendant and represented in her Eleventh Circuit brief that she was not impacted by Defendant’s benefits policy while still employed. However, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that future plaintiffs might successfully pursue a similar legal theory.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, employees of the Grants Pass School District, initiated an online campaign expressing Christian views on gender identity after the District circulated a memo on “Gender Identity, Transgender, Name, and Pronoun Guidance.” After formal complaints from district employees, Plaintiffs were placed on administrative leave. An independent investigation found Plaintiffs violated District policies by using district resources/work time for a political campaign, failing to include a disclaimer, and disrupting the school environment via social media. One plaintiff was also found to have violated policy by allegedly describing a confidential student email in a campaign video. Plaintiffs sued, alleging religious discrimination and First and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The school board initially voted to terminate Plaintiffs but later reinstated and involuntarily transferred them to an online school. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, leading to Plaintiffs’ appeal.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Oregon state constitution claim and their First and Fourteenth Amendment damages claims against individual defendants. However, it vacated summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and related Monell liability claims against the district, as well as their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against all Defendants, claims against individual board members for termination, and their Title VII discrimination claim.

Regarding Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claims, the Ninth Circuit found genuine factual disputes under the Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205 (1968) 391 U.S. 563 balancing test, as the District failed to show sufficient actual or reasonably predicted disruption as a matter of law. For Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court held Plaintiffs did not need to allege protected class membership; their viewpoint-based disparate treatment allegations constituted a cognizable equal protection claim. However, individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on these claims due to their “heightened interest” in responsive action. The Ninth Circuit also exercised discretion to vacate summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment prior restraint and compelled speech claims, finding the district court’s ruling “too unclear for proper review” and that Plaintiffs raised merits arguments for the first time on appeal.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the Oregon Constitution claim based on forfeiture. However, it held individual board members could be liable for Plaintiffs’ terminations despite the majority vote requirement. Finally, the court found triable issues of fact regarding the first and fourth elements of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test. It held that Plaintiffs did not need to cite scripture to support their campaign views (Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla. (1987) 480 U.S. 136, 136) nor identify comparators, but could show circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a heterosexual woman and longtime employee of Defendant, applied for a newly created position in 2019, which was filled by a lesbian woman. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was demoted from her existing role and replaced by a gay man. She subsequently sued under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff failed to present evidence of “background circumstances” suggesting Defendant discriminated against a majority group, as required at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework under then-existing Sixth Circuit precedent. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that majority-group plaintiffs could satisfy this burden by demonstrating either that a member of the relevant minority group made the adverse employment decision or that a statistical pattern of discrimination existed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split concerning whether “majority-group plaintiffs are subject to a different evidentiary burden than minority-group plaintiffs at McDonnell Douglas’s first step.”

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that the text of Title VII draws no distinctions between majority and minority-group plaintiffs and, consistent with Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) 401 U. S. 424, that “the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group.” The Court further noted its consistent rejection of “ ‘inflexible formulation[s]’ of the prima facie standard in disparate-treatment cases,” citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 (1977). The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant’s argument that the “background circumstances” rule did not merely impose a heightened evidentiary standard, finding it inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit’s own application, which clearly subjected Plaintiff to an elevated burden.

Full opinion

Plaintiff was injured on the job, and a healthcare provider concluded he should be medically retired. However, Defendant denied Plaintiff’s application for disability retirement. Plaintiff sued, alleging a single cause of action for FEHA disability discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant because disability requirement did not qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of Plaintiff’s employment, and FEHA was not the “appropriate statutory vehicle” for pursuing Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment against Plaintiff. Citing Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 10 1150, 1162, it held that denial of disability retirement does not affect a current employee and thus is not an adverse employment action under FEHA.  Furthermore, under Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, Plaintiff was not a “qualified individual” under FEHA because he could not perform his essential job duties. While the Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred in suggesting Plaintiff could have filed a writ of administrative mandamus directly, it held this error did not warrant reversal. The court noted that Plaintiff could have appealed the denial to an administrative law judge and then, if necessary, filed a writ. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that mandamus was inadequate due to the lack of attorney’s fees.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a postmaster for the USPS, alleged harassment based on race, gender, and national origin. Subsequently, she was transferred to a lower-paying position at a different post office and replaced by a white male. After an unsuccessful appeal of her demotion, she sued for Title VII disparate treatment, hostile work environment harassment, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all claims, finding that Plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disparate treatment, failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her harassment claim, and failed to establish a causal connection between her protected activity and demotion. Plaintiff appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim but reversed the dismissal of her harassment and disparate treatment claims.  It held that plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate treatment under St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, clarifying that even if plaintiff and her replacement were not “similarly situated,” the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test is satisfied if the replacement is “a person outside the protected class.” Following Poland v. Chertoff (9th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3d 1174, the court also determined that subordinate bias may have influenced plaintiff’s demotion. Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the court held that plaintiff’s failure to address administrative exhaustion in her opening brief was “at most forfeiture, not waiver,” and exercised its discretion to address the issue. It found that notice of plaintiff’s demotion was the proper start date for the statute of limitations, and thus the hostile work environment claim was timely. Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling on the retaliation claim, remanding the disparate treatment and hostile workplace claims for further proceedings.

Full opinion

Plaintiff contracted COVID-19 while employed at Defendant and developed long-term health issues. Defendant terminated Plaintiff, and he sued alleging various FEHA causes of action. Defendant moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement impermissibly failed to incorporate a California Arbitration Act provision allowing third-party discovery. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of the motion to compel. While the court upheld the denial of Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the JAMS rules incorporated into the agreement, it took judicial notice of those rules itself. Following Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, the court found a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability but no substantive unconscionability,  because Rule 17(b) of the JAMS rules “provide[s] the arbitrator the authority to make available additional nonparty discovery”. Notably, the court disapproved of the contrary holding in Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360 that “the terms of Rule 17 did not authorize discovery from nonparties.” The court reasoned that Aixtron‘s holding was based on an impermissible assumption that third parties might refuse to comply with an arbitrator’s discovery order, an assumption Ramirez precludes.

Full opinion

Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to years of gender-based harassment and scrutiny regarding her uniform, culminating in her termination after posting photos of herself in a swimsuit and uniform on social media. After Defendant opened an investigation, Plaintiff agreed to remove the photos but complained internally that the investigation constituted gender-based harassment and discrimination. Shortly thereafter, the supervisor in charge of the investigation recommended Plaintiff’s termination. After her termination, Plaintiff sued, alleging FEHA discrimination, harassment, and retaliation along with whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and IIED. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all claims, finding no evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part, finding that the trial court improperly disregarded Plaintiff’s evidence of pretext. This included evidence defendant failed to investigate Plaintiff’s complaints, evidence of a discriminatory work environment, and comparator evidence, which (per Hawn v. Executive Jet Management, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 615 F.3d 1151, 1157 and others) the trial court incorrectly required to be identical rather than similar “in all relevant respects”. The Court of Appeal also found that Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of “severe and pervasive” harassment under Gov. Code § 12923, had plausibly engaged in a protected activity by reporting the alleged discrimination, and that her termination was plausibly linked to that activity, reversing summary adjudication of each of her FEHA claims. However, the court affirmed summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s non-FEHA claims, ruling that she forfeited them by failing to address Defendant’s Railway Labor Act preemption argument in her opening brief. It also upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, as she failed to show the individuals involved were “managing agents” under Civ. Code § 3294 (b). 

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a professor with bipolar disorder, disclosed his condition to defendant. After a suicide attempt and hospitalization, Defendant engaged in the interactive process and provided an accommodation. Following student complaints regarding Plaintiff’s behavior and a faculty letter, Defendant shared the letter with media outlets, who linked it to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was placed on leave and terminated following an investigation. He sued, alleging FEHA violations and invasion of privacy. The trial court granted summary adjudication on some claims, and a jury found for defendant on the rest. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the court’s discovery, summary adjudication, trial, and post-trial rulings but not the jury verdict. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s interactive process and accommodation claims because the claims overlapped with the jury’s verdict on discrimination, which Plaintiff did not challenge. However, the court reversed dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim, holding that medical or employment information linked to Plaintiff need not be “confidential” or “private” to violate the IPA and that the faculty letter and a discussion about Plaintiff during a student-faculty meeting were potentially in violation. The court upheld the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery, finding the requested communications were protected by the reporting privilege. It also upheld the denial of a retrial, finding Plaintiff forfeited the issue by not objecting to jury instructions he later alleged were defective. The case was remanded for reconsideration of attorney’s fees under Civil Code § 1798.48(b) in light of the reinstated privacy claim.

Full opinion

Plaintiff became disabled due to a work injury. After her wage replacement benefits ended, Defendant placed her on unpaid leave. Plaintiff’s doctor determined she had permanent limitations preventing her from performing essential job duties. Defendant refused her request to file for disability retirement pending exhaustion of return-to-work options. Plaintiff accepted a demotion but later informed Defendant she could not work due to mental health treatment. She sued, alleging FEHA disability discrimination and retaliation. The trial court granted summary adjudication for Defendant on all claims, and Plaintiff appealed. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim because Plaintiff could not perform her job duties, even with the offered accommodation. Regarding Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim, the court held that Defendant’s refusal to file for disability retirement was not a failure to accommodate under Gov. Code § 12940(m)(1). Even if improper, Plaintiff would need to file a writ of mandate to compel compliance under Gov. Code § 21153. The court upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s interactive process claim because Plaintiff did not identify an objectively available accommodation that Defendant failed to offer. It upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s failure-to-prevent-discrimination claim because Plaintiff lacked a viable underlying discrimination claim. Finally, the court upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, as Plaintiff incorrectly asserted that “becoming disabled” was a protected activity.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, an African-American, sued for FEHA racial harassment and retaliation after a coworker used a racial slur against her. She alleged the HR manager responsible for processing her complaint failed to do so, failed to investigate a related complaint against the manager, and threatened her. Both the trial court and Court of Appeal granted summary judgment for Defendant. They concluded the single coworker slur was not severe or pervasive enough for harassment and that the manager’s alleged actions did not constitute an adverse employment action.

On review, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded Plaintiff’s harassment and retaliation claims. It found that the Court of Appeal failed to evaluate the totality of the circumstances, as required by Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446 and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17. It also found that the Court of Appeal drew too firm a distinction between racial slurs uttered by a coworker and supervisor, holding that even a coworker’s single slur can contribute to a hostile work environment. Finally, the California Supreme Court ruled that the DHR manager’s actions could constitute retaliation under Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a prison psychologist, complained about a supervisor’s sexually offensive social media posts. The supervisor then targeted her with further posts, even after the prison ordered him to stop. Plaintiff transferred and sued for sex discrimination, alleging a hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, finding the few social media posts considered as evidence occurred offsite and that Defendant took adequate corrective action. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Citing Galdamez v. Potter (9th Cir. 2005) 415 F.3d 1015, 1023–24, the court held that offsite conduct is relevant if it affects the employee’s work environment. It also held that the district court improperly excluded evidence of non-sexual but retaliatory conduct and failed to draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. Following Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3d 1027, 1033–35, the court found the evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit further held that a reasonable juror could find the prison’s investigation and cease-and-desist letters inadequate to remedy the hostile environment.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, who had disabilities, was accepted into Defendant’s work practice apprentice (WPA) program, which provided room and board and a stipend in exchange for work duties. After experiencing PTSD symptoms and requesting accommodations, Plaintiff was terminated. He sued under the ADA, and the district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, applying the ministerial exception. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that the ministerial exception applies not only to religious leaders and teachers, but also to those performing vital religious functions, citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC (2012) 565 U.S. 171.  Because Plaintiff performed “vital religious duties” as part of the WPA program, including assisting with rituals and participating in meditations, he qualified for the exception. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that his mostly menial work disqualified him from the exception.

Full opinion

Defendant required Plaintiffs to start their computers and open timekeeping software before clocking in, and to log out and shut down their computers after clocking out. Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging unpaid overtime for this time. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the time was “integral and indispensable” to the job. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment, finding the time de minimis. Plaintiffs appealed again. 

The Ninth Circuit again reversed and remanded. It held that Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp. (2014) 571 U.S. 220 did not invalidate the de minimis doctrine. Applying the test from Lindow v. United States (9th Cir. 1984) 738 F.2d 1057, the court found factual issues remained regarding whether the time was de minimis, with the burden on Defendant to prove it was. Citing Rutti v. Lojack Corp. (9th Cir. 2010) 596 F.3d 1057 and Peterson v. Nelnet Diversified Solutions, LLC (10th Cir. 2021) 15 F.4th 1033, the court found a factual issue also remained as to whether Defendant allowed compensation for off-the-clock work. 

Full opinion

Plaintiff underwent egg retrieval procedures while employed by Defendant. She alleged her supervisor harassed her for requesting time off for the procedures and later terminated her. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that Plaintiff “was not pregnant and has not identified a medical condition or disability related to pregnancy.” It rejected Plaintiff’s argument that FEHA’s definition of “related medical condition” should include procedures that may lead to future pregnancies. While acknowledging that federal courts have recognized infertility as a protected condition under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the court held that without an underlying medical condition related to pregnancy, Plaintiff did not have a protected characteristic under FEHA. Finally, the court held that the 2023 amendments to § 12940, which prohibit discrimination based on “reproductive health decision-making,” were irrelevant because Plaintiff did not address their applicability or the issue of retroactivity.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a naturalized U.S. citizen, applied for several jobs with Defendant and was rejected each time. He filed a putative class action alleging that Defendant prefers to hire noncitizens with H-1B visas because it can pay them lower wages. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that § 1981 does not prohibit citizenship-based discrimination.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. It rejected Defendant’s argument that § 1981 merely establishes a floor for the rights of all persons and does not prohibit discrimination against U.S. citizens. Relying in part on McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. (1976) 427 U.S. 273, the court held that § 1981’s plain language establishes parity between “all persons” and “citizens,” which is violated when some persons have greater or lesser rights than citizens. The court also declined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd. (5th Cir. 1986) 798 F.2d 731, stating that while alienage discrimination differs from racial discrimination, that difference is irrelevant to the text of § 1981.

Full opinion

The Ninth Circuit had upheld summary judgment for Defendant, who terminated Plaintiff after alleged misconduct, including attending a religious leadership summit while on duty. Plaintiff sued for religious discrimination under Title VII and FEHA, citing derogatory remarks from supervisors. The district court granted Defendant summary judgment, finding that its legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing Plaintiff rebutted his discrimination claims.

On appeal, the court affirmed, finding that Plaintiff’s supervisors did not demonstrate discriminatory animus because they “did not use derogatory terms to express their own views… but rather referenced other legitimate constitutional and business concerns.” Following Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. (9th Cir. 2005) 413 F.3d 1090, 1095-1096, the court held that “circumstantial evidence requir[es] ‘specific and substantial’ evidence to defeat summary judgment”, which Plaintiff did not provide. Notably, four judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, pointing to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs. (9th Cir. 2000) 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 that “the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action need produce very little evidence in order to overcome an employer’s motion for summary judgment.” 

Full opinion

Starting in 2011, Plaintiff experienced age-related harassment and adverse actions. In 2017, Defendant terminated her, replacing her with a younger coworker. After receiving a right-to-sue notice, Plaintiff sued for FEHA violations, wrongful termination, and failure to pay overtime. The trial court granted summary adjudication for Defendant on the retaliation claim but ruled for Plaintiff on all other claims except unpaid overtime. Defendant appealed and Plaintiff cross-appealed, challenging the denial of a tax neutralization adjustment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It rejected Defendant’s argument that its actions “had acquired a degree of permanence in 2014,” finding that Defendant neither resolved Plaintiff’s issues nor communicated a refusal to do so. The court also rejected challenges to the damages award, noting that Defendant did not move for a new trial on that ground (Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 919). The court upheld the district court’s calculation of attorney’s fees based on the location of Plaintiff’s counsel, its award of a 1.5x multiplier based on contingent risk factor, and its awarding of costs. However, it denied Plaintiff’s cross-appeal for a tax neutralization adjustment, finding she failed to provide sufficient evidence to support it.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, who had a disability, alleged he experienced discrimination after disclosing his condition. In 2020, he sued under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging a hostile work environment and discrimination. The district court dismissed the hostile work environment claim, finding Plaintiff “failed to link the alleged harassment that he endured to his disability.” The court later granted partial summary judgment for Defendant on the discrimination claims. Plaintiff appealed both orders after settling his remaining discrimination claim.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the hostile work environment claim but affirmed summary adjudication of the discrimination claim. It held that hostile work environment claims are cognizable under the ADA and, by extension, the Rehabilitation Act, citing Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 247 F.3d 229, 234, and Ford v. Marion County Sheriff’s Off. (7th Cir. 2019) 942 F.3d 839, 851–52. The court found the district court correctly applied the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard but failed to construe the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

Full opinion

In 2017, Plaintiff’s new supervisor replaced her with a male officer. Defendant transferred her to a position with equal pay and rank but diminished perks, responsibilities, and a less desirable schedule.  Plaintiff sued for sex discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, ruling Plaintiff failed to show a “ ‘significant’ change in working conditions producing ‘material employment disadvantage.’ ” The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, remanding for consideration of forfeiture and proof. The court held that requiring a heightened showing of harm would “add words—and significant words, as it were—to the statute Congress enacted.” The court rejected Defendant’s argument that, based on ejusdem generis, the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” referenced in 2 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1) need cause “an equal level of harm” as refusal to hire or discharge. The court also rejected Defendant’s arguments that the significance standard applied to Title VII retaliation claims in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White (2006) 548 U. S. 53 should apply to Title VII discrimination claims and that discarding the significance standard would burden courts and employers with “insubstantial” lawsuits.

Full opinion