In Carroll v. City and County of San Francisco (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1192, the Court of Appeal held that a public pension plan's use of imputed service years to calculate disability benefits was motivated by pension status (years of credited service), not age, and therefore did not constitute age discrimination under FEHA. Affirming a judgment for the city, the court relied on Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC (2008) 554 U.S. 135 to rule that the plan's terms were facially neutral.

This decision confirms that pension formulas tied to service eligibility are generally lawful under FEHA, even if they correlate with age, and applies the federal Kentucky Retirement Systems standard to California state law claims.

In Caldrone v. Circle K Stores Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 949, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on an ADEA/FEHA claim, issuing two key clarifications on the plaintiff's prima facie burden. First, it held that an employer's failure to notify existing employees of a job opening can satisfy the "application" element, citing Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1980) 613 F.2d 757, 761. Second, it held that while ten years is a "presumptive threshold" for a substantial age difference under the ADEA, this presumption is rebuttable, and the 9.3-year gap in this case was sufficient to proceed.

This decision lowers the prima facie burden for age discrimination plaintiffs, confirming they can proceed without a formal application if openings are kept secret and that an age gap just under ten years is not automatically fatal to their claim.

In Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, (9th Cir. 2025) 156 F.4th 886, the Ninth Circuit held that a Title VII religious accommodation claim fails if the employee's objection is based on a "secular judgment" rather than a "truly religious principle." The court affirmed the dismissal of a Christian employee's claim, finding her objection to COVID-19 testing was based on her personal, secular belief that the swabs were carcinogenic. The court ruled that her broad reference to a "Christian duty" to treat her body as a "temple of God" was insufficient to "elevate [that] personal medical judgment... to the level of religious significance."

This decision creates a circuit split by explicitly rejecting the more "lenient" standard used by the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, thereby adopting a more stringent test that makes it harder for plaintiffs to plead religious accommodation claims in the Ninth Circuit.

In Asuncion v. Hegseth (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1252, the Ninth Circuit held that the 90-day statute of limitations for a Title VII / Rehabilitation Act claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff “could realistically be held responsible for having access” to the agency's final decision. The court reversed the dismissal of a complaint filed 88 days after the plaintiff received the notice via email (but 115 days after the agency filed it), because the agency's own technical error prevented access. Alternatively, the court held the agency's error was an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying equitable tolling. This decision provides important protection for plaintiffs, ensuring their claims are not barred by an agency's technological failures in providing the final notice.

In Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1211, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that accommodating unvaccinated firefighters with public-facing EMT duties would impose an undue hardship under Title VII. Applying the "substantial" burden standard from Groff v. DeJoy (2023) 600 U.S. 447, 468, the court held that an undue hardship analysis may be based on a realistic risk of hardship, not just on actual costs incurred. The court found that undisputed expert testimony on health, safety, and operational risks during the Delta/Omicron spikes met this substantial burden.

This decision provides critical post-Groff guidance for vaccine mandate cases, confirming that employers can meet the heightened undue hardship standard by demonstrating a realistic risk to public safety.

In Spatz v. Regents of the University of California (9th Cir. 2025) 151 F.4th 1068, the Ninth Circuit held that a university's medical residency ranking process is an "employment practice" and is therefore expressly excluded from the scope of the federal Age Act (42 U.S.C. § 6103 (c)(1)). The court affirmed summary judgment against an applicant alleging age discrimination, reasoning that because medical residency is a form of employment, the selection process falls squarely within the Act's "employment practice" carve-out.

This decision confirms that the federal Age Act offers no protection against age discrimination in the medical residency selection process.

In Munoz v. The Regents of the University of California (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 466, the Court of Appeal held that the UC's policy barring the hiring of students without federal work authorization is facially discriminatory under FEHA, finding that "lack of work authorization" is not materially distinct from protected "immigration status" (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11028 (f)(3)). The court then held that an employer's "litigation risk" is not, by itself, a sufficient justification for the discriminatory policy.

This decision prevents employers from using speculative litigation fears as a defense to discrimination, forcing them to instead demonstrate that the policy is actually required by federal law or "reasonably necessary" for business operations.

In McMahon v. World Vision, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 147 F.4th 959, the Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception barred the Title VII discrimination claims of a customer service representative (CSR) terminated for being in a same-sex marriage. Applying the functional test from Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) 591 U.S. 732, the court found the CSR performed "vital religious duties" central to the organization's mission, even if her duties were preponderantly secular.

This decision expands the ministerial exception's reach into roles traditionally viewed as secular, confirming that employees whose jobs are deemed central to a religious organization's "core mission" can be barred from bringing discrimination claims.

In Lister v. City of Las Vegas (2025) 148 F.4th 690, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a defense judgment, holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion by reconciling an inconsistent jury verdict itself rather than resubmitting it to the jury. The jury inconsistently awarded $150,000 after finding the plaintiff suffered harassment but not based on protected class membership. The district court correctly entered judgment for the defendant with zero damages after polling confirmed the "no race/gender basis" finding.

This decision affirms a court's discretion to resolve verdict inconsistencies based on clear jury polling.

In Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 822, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for a public employer, holding that its COVID-19 return-to-office mandate was a discretionary decision shielded by Government Tort Claims Act immunity (Gov. Code § 855.4). Critically, the court also held that an employer's engagement in the FEHA interactive process "is not an admission [the employee] was disabled," as a contrary rule would contravene public policy by discouraging employer engagement.

This decision provides public entities with a strong immunity defense for pandemic-related employment decisions and, more broadly, confirms that employers do not concede an employee's disability status simply by engaging in accommodation discussions.

In Stanley v. City of Sanford (2025) 606 U.S. 46, the U.S. Supreme Court held 8-1 that retirees are not "qualified individuals" protected by Title I of the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a)). Affirming the dismissal of a disabled retiree's benefits claim, the Court reasoned that the statute unambiguously refers to current employees or job applicants, not former employees.

This decision resolves a major circuit split and forecloses ADA Title I claims brought by individuals who are already retired. However, the Court expressly left unresolved whether a plaintiff could sue by properly alleging that (1) they were disabled while still employed and (2) the discriminatory benefits policy impacted them during that time.

In Damiano v. Grants Pass School District No. 7 (9th Cir. 2025) 140 F.4th 1117, the Ninth Circuit vacated summary judgment for a public employer, clarifying and lowering the evidentiary bar for employees on several key claims.

For First Amendment retaliation, the court held the district failed to prove sufficient actual or predicted disruption under the Pickering balance test to justify its actions as a matter of law. For the Fourteenth Amendment, the court held that alleging viewpoint-based disparate treatment is a cognizable equal protection claim, even without protected class membership. Finally, for Title VII, it held plaintiffs do not need to identify comparators at the prima facie stage and can instead show "circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination."

In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services (2025) 605 U.S. 303, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that Title VII plaintiffs from a majority group do not face a heightened "background circumstances" evidentiary standard to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Court affirmed that the text of Title VII prohibits varying the standard based on whether the plaintiff is in a majority or minority group.

This decision resolves a Circuit split, confirming that all disparate treatment plaintiffs face the same initial evidentiary burden and eliminating the extra hurdle previously imposed on so-called "reverse discrimination" claims in some circuits.

In Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 56, the Court of Appeal held that an employer's denial of a disability retirement application is not an "adverse employment action" actionable under FEHA. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the alternative ground that the plaintiff was not a "qualified individual" under FEHA because he concededly could not perform his essential job duties.

This decision reinforces that the exclusive remedy to challenge a retirement denial is the administrative writ process, not a FEHA discrimination lawsuit.

In Lui v. DeJoy (9th Cir. 2025) 129 F.4th 770, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on a Title VII disparate treatment claim, holding that the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test is satisfied if the plaintiff is replaced by "a person outside the protected class," even if that replacement is not "similarly situated."

This decision clarifies and lightens the plaintiff's prima facie burden in replacement cases by separating the simple fourth-element test from the more complex "similarly situated" analysis often used to show pretext.

In Wawrzenski v. United Airlines (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment on FEHA claims, holding that the trial court applied too high an evidentiary standard. The court clarified that comparator evidence need only be "similar in all relevant respects," not identical, and that evidence of pretext—such as a failure to investigate the plaintiff's internal complaints—must be properly considered.

This decision lowers the evidentiary bar for FEHA plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage by confirming that courts must broadly evaluate pretext and cannot reject comparator evidence based on minor differences.

In Wentworth v. Regents of the University of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 580, the Court of Appeal issued a key ruling on the Information Practices Act (IPA) (Civ. Code § 1798 et seq.), holding that personal information need not be "confidential" or "private" to be protected from unauthorized disclosure by a state agency. The court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim, clarifying that the IPA broadly protects records that are "linked to" an individual, regardless of their confidential status.

This decision expands the scope of the IPA, exposing state agencies to liability for the improper disclosure of a wider range of employee information.

In Miller v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 261, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment against a FEHA disability plaintiff, holding that an employee cannot sustain a disability discrimination claim if they cannot perform essential job functions even with accommodations, and that an employer's refusal to file for disability retirement is not a "failure to accommodate" under FEHA.

This decision confirms the burden on FEHA plaintiffs to prove the objective existence of an effective accommodation and clarifies that the statute cannot be used to compel an employer to initiate the retirement process.

In Bailey v. San Francisco District Attorney's Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, the California Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for an employer, issuing two key holdings: (1) a single racial slur by a coworker (not just a supervisor) can be severe enough to support a FEHA harassment claim under the "totality of the circumstances" test from Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17; and (2) an HR manager's acts of obstructing an employee's harassment complaint can constitute an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim under Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028.

This decision lowers the summary judgment bar for single-incident harassment claims and confirms that actively obstructing an internal complaint is itself an actionable retaliatory harm.

In Okonowsky v. Garland (9th Cir. 2024) 109 F.4th 1166, the Ninth Circuit held that Title VII hostile work environment (HWE) claims are not limited to the physical workplace, ruling that offsite conduct (like a supervisor's social media posts) and non-sexual retaliatory conduct must be considered in the "totality of the circumstances" (citing Galdamez v. Potter (9th Cir. 2005) 415 F.3d 1015).

This decision confirms that the HWE analysis includes online harassment and subsequent non-sexual intimidation, making it harder for employers to dispose of such claims before trial.

In Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Center, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 108 F.4th 765, the Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception barred an ADA claim brought by a "work practice apprentice" at a Zen Buddhist temple. Following Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC (2012) 565 U.S. 171, the court ruled the exception applied because the plaintiff performed "vital religious duties," such as assisting with rituals and participating in meditation, even though his other work was mostly menial.

This decision confirms a broad application of the ministerial exception, focusing on the religious function of the employee rather than their formal title or the secular nature of their other tasks.

In Perez v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 105 F.4th 1222, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer may use non-medical evidence, such as private surveillance, to challenge the validity of an FMLA certification and terminate an employee for faking an injury. The court affirmed judgment for the employer, explicitly rejecting the rule from Sims v. Alameda–Contra Costa Transit Dist. (N.D. Cal. 1998) 2 F. Supp. 2d 1253 that a contrary medical opinion is required.

This decision confirms that employers are not limited to a "battle of the experts" and can use evidence of an employee's actual conduct to rebut a certification they believe is fraudulent.

In Paleny v. Fireplace Products U.S., Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 199, the Court of Appeal held that an employee's egg retrieval and freezing procedures were not protected as a "pregnancy-related medical condition" under the pre-2023 version of FEHA. The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer, finding that because the plaintiff was not pregnant and had not identified an underlying related medical condition or disability, her fertility procedures did not qualify as a protected characteristic.

This decision underscores the importance of the recent amendment covering "reproductive health decision-making," which the court noted the plaintiff failed to argue was retroactive.

In Rajaram v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 105 F.4th 1179, the Ninth Circuit held 2-1 that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits hiring discrimination against U.S. citizens. Reversing a dismissal, the court ruled that § 1981's guarantee of parity between "all persons" and "citizens" is violated by an alleged practice of favoring noncitizen H-1B visa holders.

This decision creates a significant circuit split by explicitly rejecting the Fifth Circuit's contrary holding in Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd. (5th Cir. 1986) 798 F.2d 731, opening a new front for "reverse-alienage" discrimination claims against employers.

In Hittle v. City of Stockton (9th Cir. 2024) 101 F.4th 1000, the Ninth Circuit, in denying rehearing, affirmed summary judgment by holding that a FEHA/Title VII plaintiff must produce "specific and substantial" circumstantial evidence to rebut a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination.

This decision solidifies the more stringent standard from Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. (9th Cir. 2005) 413 F.3d 1090 over the more lenient "very little evidence" language from Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs. (9th Cir. 2000) 225 F.3d 1115, making it tougher for such claims to survive summary judgment.

In Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, the Court of Appeal held that an employer's "ongoing inaction" in response to harassment complaints does not trigger the permanence exception to FEHA's continuing violations doctrine. The court ruled that permanence requires a definitive act or communication from the employer (like resolving the issue or communicating a refusal to do so), not just a passive failure to act.

This decision clarifies that employers cannot establish a "permanence" defense—and thus start the statute of limitations clock—simply by ignoring an employee's complaints over a long period.

In Mattioda v. Nelson (9th Cir. 2024) 98 F.4th 1164, the Ninth Circuit held that hostile work environment (HWE) claims are cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The court noted that such claims are cognizable under the ADA and held they apply "by extension" to the Rehabilitation Act. It then reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's HWE claim, finding the district court failed to construe the allegations favorably under Iqbal/Twombly.

This decision formally confirms the viability of disability-based HWE claims under the Rehabilitation Act in the Ninth Circuit.

In Kuigoua v. Department of Veteran Affairs (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 499, the Court of Appeal held that a FEHA plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by alleging substantially different facts, individuals, and timeframes at trial than those included in his DFEH/EEOC charge. Citing Guzman v. NBA Automotive, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1117, the court affirmed summary judgment, finding the new claims were not "like, or reasonably related to" the original charge, as an investigation would not have uncovered them.

This decision reinforces the "scope of the charge" rule, preventing plaintiffs from using an administrative charge as a mere placeholder for a completely different lawsuit.

In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) 601 U.S. 346, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that a Title VII discrimination plaintiff must show "some harm" to a "term or condition of employment," but the harm "need not be significant." The Court vacated an Eighth Circuit decision that had required a "significant change in working conditions," stating that this improperly "add[ed] words...to the statute" (2 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1)).

This decision significantly lowers the bar for discrimination claims based on job transfers, schedule changes, or loss of perks, making it much easier for such cases to survive summary judgment.