In Hollis v. R&R Restaurants, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 159 F.4th 677, the Ninth Circuit held that an FLSA retaliation defendant need not be the plaintiff's direct employer, provided they acted "indirectly in the interest of" the employer (29 U.S.C. § 203(d)). Reversing summary judgment, the court found that a manager of a separate club could be liable for cancelling a dancer's performances in retaliation for their wage lawsuit against a different club, and explicitly rejected the argument that "minimizing legal liability" is a legitimate business justification for such adverse action.

This decision affirms that FLSA retaliation liability extends to third parties and managers who act against workers for protected activity at related entities, and explicitly forecloses "minimizing legal liability" as a legitimate business justification for adverse actions.

In Damiano v. Grants Pass School District No. 7 (9th Cir. 2025) 140 F.4th 1117, the Ninth Circuit vacated summary judgment for a public employer, clarifying and lowering the evidentiary bar for employees on several key claims.

For First Amendment retaliation, the court held the district failed to prove sufficient actual or predicted disruption under the Pickering balance test to justify its actions as a matter of law. For the Fourteenth Amendment, the court held that alleging viewpoint-based disparate treatment is a cognizable equal protection claim, even without protected class membership. Finally, for Title VII, it held plaintiffs do not need to identify comparators at the prima facie stage and can instead show "circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination."

In Parker v. BNSF Railway Company, (9th Cir. 2025) 137 F.4th 957, the Ninth Circuit en banc affirmed that an employer can defeat an FRSA retaliation claim using the "same decision" affirmative defense, even if the employee's protected activity was a contributing factor "in part." The court clarified that the statutory framework (49 U.S.C. § 42121 (b)) is not altered by the "in part" language. A plaintiff's showing that protected activity was a "contributing factor" merely shifts the burden, and the employer can still prevail by proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same adverse action absent that protected activity.

This decision solidifies the "same decision" standard as a complete affirmative defense to FRSA claims.

In Lui v. DeJoy (9th Cir. 2025) 129 F.4th 770, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on a Title VII disparate treatment claim, holding that the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test is satisfied if the plaintiff is replaced by "a person outside the protected class," even if that replacement is not "similarly situated."

This decision clarifies and lightens the plaintiff's prima facie burden in replacement cases by separating the simple fourth-element test from the more complex "similarly situated" analysis often used to show pretext.

In Wawrzenski v. United Airlines (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment on FEHA claims, holding that the trial court applied too high an evidentiary standard. The court clarified that comparator evidence need only be "similar in all relevant respects," not identical, and that evidence of pretext—such as a failure to investigate the plaintiff's internal complaints—must be properly considered.

This decision lowers the evidentiary bar for FEHA plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage by confirming that courts must broadly evaluate pretext and cannot reject comparator evidence based on minor differences.

In Bailey v. San Francisco District Attorney's Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, the California Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for an employer, issuing two key holdings: (1) a single racial slur by a coworker (not just a supervisor) can be severe enough to support a FEHA harassment claim under the "totality of the circumstances" test from Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17; and (2) an HR manager's acts of obstructing an employee's harassment complaint can constitute an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim under Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028.

This decision lowers the summary judgment bar for single-incident harassment claims and confirms that actively obstructing an internal complaint is itself an actionable retaliatory harm.

In Kama v. Mayorkas (9th Cir. 2024) 107 F.4th 1054, the Ninth Circuit held that temporal proximity (56 days) between an employee's EEO complaint and their termination, even coupled with supervisor awareness, was insufficient to show pretext for Title VII retaliation. The court affirmed summary judgment, holding that temporal proximity alone rarely suffices, particularly where the employer has a documented, intervening, and non-retaliatory reason for the termination (here, the employee's refusal to cooperate with a misconduct investigation).

This decision reinforces that a close timeline is not a substitute for evidence of actual retaliatory animus, especially when the employee’s own actions break the causal chain.

In Paleny v. Fireplace Products U.S., Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 199, the Court of Appeal held that an employee's egg retrieval and freezing procedures were not protected as a "pregnancy-related medical condition" under the pre-2023 version of FEHA. The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer, finding that because the plaintiff was not pregnant and had not identified an underlying related medical condition or disability, her fertility procedures did not qualify as a protected characteristic.

This decision underscores the importance of the recent amendment covering "reproductive health decision-making," which the court noted the plaintiff failed to argue was retroactive.

In Frayo v. Martin. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1025, the Court of Appeal held that an employer did not violate the CMIA by firing an employee who refused a mandatory COVID-19 test. The court affirmed a demurrer, finding that (1) a request to take a test is not an unlawful request for a medical authorization under § 56.20(b), and (2) § 56.20(c) did not apply because the employer never possessed the plaintiff's "medical information" since he refused the test.

This decision confirms CMIA governs the handling of possessed data, not the act of requiring a test, and does not protect an employee from termination for refusing the test itself.

In Kuigoua v. Department of Veteran Affairs (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 499, the Court of Appeal held that a FEHA plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by alleging substantially different facts, individuals, and timeframes at trial than those included in his DFEH/EEOC charge. Citing Guzman v. NBA Automotive, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1117, the court affirmed summary judgment, finding the new claims were not "like, or reasonably related to" the original charge, as an investigation would not have uncovered them.

This decision reinforces the "scope of the charge" rule, preventing plaintiffs from using an administrative charge as a mere placeholder for a completely different lawsuit.