Plaintiff, a postmaster for the USPS, alleged harassment based on race, gender, and national origin. Subsequently, she was transferred to a lower-paying position at a different post office and replaced by a white male. After an unsuccessful appeal of her demotion, she sued for Title VII disparate treatment, hostile work environment harassment, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all claims, finding that Plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disparate treatment, failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her harassment claim, and failed to establish a causal connection between her protected activity and demotion. Plaintiff appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim but reversed the dismissal of her harassment and disparate treatment claims.  It held that plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate treatment under St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, clarifying that even if plaintiff and her replacement were not “similarly situated,” the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test is satisfied if the replacement is “a person outside the protected class.” Following Poland v. Chertoff (9th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3d 1174, the court also determined that subordinate bias may have influenced plaintiff’s demotion. Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the court held that plaintiff’s failure to address administrative exhaustion in her opening brief was “at most forfeiture, not waiver,” and exercised its discretion to address the issue. It found that notice of plaintiff’s demotion was the proper start date for the statute of limitations, and thus the hostile work environment claim was timely. Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling on the retaliation claim, remanding the disparate treatment and hostile workplace claims for further proceedings.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a deputy sheriff with a history of misconduct, was placed on leave in 2015 pending the results of Defendant’s investigation. In 2017, Defendant attempted to discharge him, but the trial court granted Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the statute of limitations had expired. Defendant reinstated Plaintiff but assigned him a less desirable position. Despite scoring high on the sergeant’s exam, Plaintiff was not promoted. He again petitioned for writ of mandate, alleging Defendant improperly relied on the time-barred 2015 investigation. The trial court denied the petition, rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that a burden-shifting test should apply and ruling that Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to establish liability. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. Plaintiff argued the trial court should have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework because confidentiality agreements hindered his ability to prove his case. The court rejected this argument, finding Plaintiff did not allege discrimination and that his situation was not analogous to discrimination. The court also noted that Plaintiff did not seek discovery on the issue, had access to circumstantial evidence, and that applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to similar matters would be contrary to the public interest.

Full opinion

Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to years of gender-based harassment and scrutiny regarding her uniform, culminating in her termination after posting photos of herself in a swimsuit and uniform on social media. After Defendant opened an investigation, Plaintiff agreed to remove the photos but complained internally that the investigation constituted gender-based harassment and discrimination. Shortly thereafter, the supervisor in charge of the investigation recommended Plaintiff’s termination. After her termination, Plaintiff sued, alleging FEHA discrimination, harassment, and retaliation along with whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and IIED. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all claims, finding no evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part, finding that the trial court improperly disregarded Plaintiff’s evidence of pretext. This included evidence defendant failed to investigate Plaintiff’s complaints, evidence of a discriminatory work environment, and comparator evidence, which (per Hawn v. Executive Jet Management, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 615 F.3d 1151, 1157 and others) the trial court incorrectly required to be identical rather than similar “in all relevant respects”. The Court of Appeal also found that Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of “severe and pervasive” harassment under Gov. Code § 12923, had plausibly engaged in a protected activity by reporting the alleged discrimination, and that her termination was plausibly linked to that activity, reversing summary adjudication of each of her FEHA claims. However, the court affirmed summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s non-FEHA claims, ruling that she forfeited them by failing to address Defendant’s Railway Labor Act preemption argument in her opening brief. It also upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, as she failed to show the individuals involved were “managing agents” under Civ. Code § 3294 (b). 

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a COO, reported potential FCA violations to his employer. He was later terminated for allegedly disclosing confidential information unrelated to those violations. He sued for FCA retaliation, breach of contract, and breach of implied covenant. The district court granted summary judgment for defendant on all claims, and plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the FCA retaliation claim. It applied the McDonnell Douglas rather than Mt. Healthy framework, following sister circuits and Stilwell v. City of Williams (9th Cir. 2016) 831 F.3d 1234. It also applied the Moore test but not the Hopper investigating requirement, finding Plaintiff engaged in protected activity. The court rejected a heightened notice standard for compliance officers, finding that Plaintiff satisfied the FCA’s notice requirement. The Ninth Circuit also reversed and remanded the breach of contract and implied covenant claims, finding the district court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, an African-American, sued for FEHA racial harassment and retaliation after a coworker used a racial slur against her. She alleged the HR manager responsible for processing her complaint failed to do so, failed to investigate a related complaint against the manager, and threatened her. Both the trial court and Court of Appeal granted summary judgment for Defendant. They concluded the single coworker slur was not severe or pervasive enough for harassment and that the manager’s alleged actions did not constitute an adverse employment action.

On review, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded Plaintiff’s harassment and retaliation claims. It found that the Court of Appeal failed to evaluate the totality of the circumstances, as required by Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446 and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17. It also found that the Court of Appeal drew too firm a distinction between racial slurs uttered by a coworker and supervisor, holding that even a coworker’s single slur can contribute to a hostile work environment. Finally, the California Supreme Court ruled that the DHR manager’s actions could constitute retaliation under Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028.

Full opinion

Plaintiff underwent egg retrieval procedures while employed by Defendant. She alleged her supervisor harassed her for requesting time off for the procedures and later terminated her. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that Plaintiff “was not pregnant and has not identified a medical condition or disability related to pregnancy.” It rejected Plaintiff’s argument that FEHA’s definition of “related medical condition” should include procedures that may lead to future pregnancies. While acknowledging that federal courts have recognized infertility as a protected condition under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the court held that without an underlying medical condition related to pregnancy, Plaintiff did not have a protected characteristic under FEHA. Finally, the court held that the 2023 amendments to § 12940, which prohibit discrimination based on “reproductive health decision-making,” were irrelevant because Plaintiff did not address their applicability or the issue of retroactivity.

Full opinion

In 2021, Plaintiff informed defendant he was ill. Defendant, following its COVID-19 guidelines, requested a third-party administered test. Plaintiff refused, and Defendant ultimately terminated him. Plaintiff sued, alleging violations of CMIA § 56.20(b) and (c). The trial court found that Defendant did not ask Plaintiff to sign a medical release authorization (§ 56.20(b)) and did not possess his “medical information” (§ 56.20(c)), and sustained Defendant’s demurrer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Citing Rossi v. Sequoia Union Elementary School (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 974, it rejected Plaintiff’s argument that refusing a COVID-19 test is equivalent to refusing to sign an authorization. The court declined to address whether the “necessary action” exemption in § 56.20(b) applied. Regarding the § 56.20(c) claim, the court held that the statute applies only to employers already possessing the employee’s medical information. Because Plaintiff conceded he never took the test, Defendant could not possess related medical information. The court declined to rule on whether the CMIA applies to individual co-defendants.

Full opinion

Plaintiff alleged to the DFEH and EEOC that his supervisor retaliated against him for reporting gender-based discrimination, leading to his termination. The EEOC found no evidence for Plaintiff’s claims and issued a right-to-sue notice. Plaintiff then sued, presenting new claims involving new individuals, a new timeframe, a different location, and a markedly different set of facts. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies under Gov. Code § 12960(c). The trial court granted the motion, and Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal cited Guzman v. NBA Automotive, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1117 and Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1615, ruling that Plaintiff’s claims “were not like, or reasonably related to, the claims in the Commission Form” and that “administrative investigation would not have uncovered the conduct that was the focus” of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court ruled against Plaintiff, denying his request for judicial notice as irrelevant. 

Full opinion