Plaintiff, a postmaster for the USPS, alleged harassment based on race, gender, and national origin. Subsequently, she was transferred to a lower-paying position at a different post office and replaced by a white male. After an unsuccessful appeal of her demotion, she sued for Title VII disparate treatment, hostile work environment harassment, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all claims, finding that Plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disparate treatment, failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her harassment claim, and failed to establish a causal connection between her protected activity and demotion. Plaintiff appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim but reversed the dismissal of her harassment and disparate treatment claims.  It held that plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate treatment under St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, clarifying that even if plaintiff and her replacement were not “similarly situated,” the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test is satisfied if the replacement is “a person outside the protected class.” Following Poland v. Chertoff (9th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3d 1174, the court also determined that subordinate bias may have influenced plaintiff’s demotion. Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the court held that plaintiff’s failure to address administrative exhaustion in her opening brief was “at most forfeiture, not waiver,” and exercised its discretion to address the issue. It found that notice of plaintiff’s demotion was the proper start date for the statute of limitations, and thus the hostile work environment claim was timely. Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling on the retaliation claim, remanding the disparate treatment and hostile workplace claims for further proceedings.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued for sexual harassment after a coworker made repeated unwanted sexual remarks, causing her to take medical leave and resign from Defendant. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration based on a choice-of-law provision in the parties’ agreement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the order compelling arbitration. Finding a sufficient link to interstate commerce to bring the dispute within the EFAA’s scope (following Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232), the court held that the EFAA preempts conflicting state law under conflict preemption principles (following Keeton v. Tesla, Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 26). The court rejected Defendant’s argument that selecting state law in an arbitration agreement effectively opts out of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) even in contracts involving interstate commerce. Because Plaintiff’s claims accrued after the EFAA’s enactment, retroactivity was not an issue. Finally, citing Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791, 800 the court ruled that the EFAA rendered the parties’ arbitration agreement unenforceable as to all of Plaintiff’s claims.

Full opinion

Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to years of gender-based harassment and scrutiny regarding her uniform, culminating in her termination after posting photos of herself in a swimsuit and uniform on social media. After Defendant opened an investigation, Plaintiff agreed to remove the photos but complained internally that the investigation constituted gender-based harassment and discrimination. Shortly thereafter, the supervisor in charge of the investigation recommended Plaintiff’s termination. After her termination, Plaintiff sued, alleging FEHA discrimination, harassment, and retaliation along with whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and IIED. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all claims, finding no evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part, finding that the trial court improperly disregarded Plaintiff’s evidence of pretext. This included evidence defendant failed to investigate Plaintiff’s complaints, evidence of a discriminatory work environment, and comparator evidence, which (per Hawn v. Executive Jet Management, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 615 F.3d 1151, 1157 and others) the trial court incorrectly required to be identical rather than similar “in all relevant respects”. The Court of Appeal also found that Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of “severe and pervasive” harassment under Gov. Code § 12923, had plausibly engaged in a protected activity by reporting the alleged discrimination, and that her termination was plausibly linked to that activity, reversing summary adjudication of each of her FEHA claims. However, the court affirmed summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s non-FEHA claims, ruling that she forfeited them by failing to address Defendant’s Railway Labor Act preemption argument in her opening brief. It also upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, as she failed to show the individuals involved were “managing agents” under Civ. Code § 3294 (b). 

Full opinion

Defendant allegedly misclassified Plaintiff as exempt and subjected her to sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. Plaintiff resigned then sued, alleging FEHA and wage and hour violations and other claims. Defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing Plaintiff failed to state a claim for harassment under FEHA. The trial court denied the motion, finding plaintiff adequately stated a sexual harassment claim and that the EFAA rendered the parties’ arbitration agreement unenforceable for all claims. Defendant appealed. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. It held that the EFAA invalidates pre-dispute arbitration agreements “with respect to a case which is filed under … state law and relates to … the sexual harassment dispute” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a)). Emphasizing the word “case,” the court held that the EFAA precludes arbitration of the entire case, not just the sexual harassment claim. This interpretation, the court noted, is consistent with Doe v. Second Street Corp. (Sept. 30, 2024, B330281) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ and federal district court decisions. The court distinguished this case from KPMG LLP v. Cocchi (2011) 565 U.S. 18 and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, where the Supreme Court allowed separation of arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, an African-American, sued for FEHA racial harassment and retaliation after a coworker used a racial slur against her. She alleged the HR manager responsible for processing her complaint failed to do so, failed to investigate a related complaint against the manager, and threatened her. Both the trial court and Court of Appeal granted summary judgment for Defendant. They concluded the single coworker slur was not severe or pervasive enough for harassment and that the manager’s alleged actions did not constitute an adverse employment action.

On review, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded Plaintiff’s harassment and retaliation claims. It found that the Court of Appeal failed to evaluate the totality of the circumstances, as required by Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446 and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17. It also found that the Court of Appeal drew too firm a distinction between racial slurs uttered by a coworker and supervisor, holding that even a coworker’s single slur can contribute to a hostile work environment. Finally, the California Supreme Court ruled that the DHR manager’s actions could constitute retaliation under Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a prison psychologist, complained about a supervisor’s sexually offensive social media posts. The supervisor then targeted her with further posts, even after the prison ordered him to stop. Plaintiff transferred and sued for sex discrimination, alleging a hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, finding the few social media posts considered as evidence occurred offsite and that Defendant took adequate corrective action. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Citing Galdamez v. Potter (9th Cir. 2005) 415 F.3d 1015, 1023–24, the court held that offsite conduct is relevant if it affects the employee’s work environment. It also held that the district court improperly excluded evidence of non-sexual but retaliatory conduct and failed to draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. Following Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3d 1027, 1033–35, the court found the evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit further held that a reasonable juror could find the prison’s investigation and cease-and-desist letters inadequate to remedy the hostile environment.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, who had a disability, alleged he experienced discrimination after disclosing his condition. In 2020, he sued under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging a hostile work environment and discrimination. The district court dismissed the hostile work environment claim, finding Plaintiff “failed to link the alleged harassment that he endured to his disability.” The court later granted partial summary judgment for Defendant on the discrimination claims. Plaintiff appealed both orders after settling his remaining discrimination claim.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the hostile work environment claim but affirmed summary adjudication of the discrimination claim. It held that hostile work environment claims are cognizable under the ADA and, by extension, the Rehabilitation Act, citing Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 247 F.3d 229, 234, and Ford v. Marion County Sheriff’s Off. (7th Cir. 2019) 942 F.3d 839, 851–52. The court found the district court correctly applied the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard but failed to construe the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

Full opinion