Plaintiff sued under PAGA, alleging violations of the “suitable seating” provisions of IWC Wage Order No. 7-2001. After a bench trial, the trial court found for Defendant. Defendant filed a memorandum of costs, arguing it was entitled to recover costs against both the representative Plaintiff and the LWDA. The LWDA successfully moved to intervene, but the trial court awarded Defendant approximately $125,000 in costs against the LWDA, with none against the representative Plaintiff.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the cost order. It held that costs cannot be recovered from the LWDA when the agency did not participate in the litigation. The court acknowledged Defendant’s argument that Labor Code § 2699(k)(1) contains no express exception to Code of Civil Procedure § 1032(b), which under Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, could arguably permit cost recovery. However, the court declined to address whether PAGA displaces Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(b). Instead, it based its decision on the LWDA’s non-participation in the action. It rejected Defendant’s argument that a PAGA Plaintiff acts as an agent of the LWDA, finding that PAGA plaintiffs lack fiduciary obligations to the agency and the LWDA lacks control over the litigation. The court noted that Defendant failed to cite any qui tam case in which costs were awarded against a government real party in interest who did not participate.

While the Court noted that the PAGA statute explicitly provides for fees and costs to a prevailing employee (Lab. Code § 2699, subd. (k)(1)), it noted that the statute says nothing about an award to prevailing defendants. Nevertheless, the Court explicitly reserved the question regarding whether a defendant is entitled to recover costs under Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(b) in a PAGA action for another day. 

Full opinion

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging discrimination and hostile workplace harassment. After Defendant produced confidential documents under a protective order, Plaintiff’s counsel inadvertently disclosed some to an intervenor media group. The district court upheld a magistrate judge’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for return or destruction of the documents, agreeing that it lacked authority to order a non-party to do so. Plaintiff appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the order denying Plaintiff’s motion. It held it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because the requested relief “was injunctive in nature.” The Ninth Circuit rejected the intervenor’s argument that its limited purpose in the case exempted it from discovery orders, holding per S.E.C. v. Ross (9th Cir. 2007) 504 F.3d 1130, 1148 that its obligations were the same as any other party. Because district courts have an inherent power to oversee discovery and the intervenor did not obtain the documents “through means independent of the court’s processes” (Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart (1984) 467 U.S. 20, 34), the district court had the authority to order their return or destruction.

Full opinion

Plaintiff brought a class action alleging various wage and hour violations. Defendant removed the case to federal court under CAFA, alleging the amount in controversy exceeded $15 million. The district court found Defendant failed to provide evidence for the amount and remanded the case to state court. The Ninth Circuit granted Defendant permission to appeal.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the order remanding the case to state court, following Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott (9th Cir. 2019) 936 F.3d 920. It held that defendants calculating the amount in controversy under CAFA may rely on “a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions” based solely on the allegations in the complaint. (Id. at 925, internal citations omitted.) The district court should have considered whether Defendant’s calculation was a reasonable interpretation of the complaint, not whether it was supported by evidence. The court distinguished Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 775 F.3d 1193, where the defendant had to provide evidence because its interpretation of the complaint was found to be unreasonable.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued, alleging various Labor Code, common law, and FEHA causes of action. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, after receiving two continuances, failed to file an opposition, request an additional continuance, or appear at the motion hearing. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant, noting Plaintiff’s lack of opposition and finding no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred by granting summary judgment without first determining if Defendant met its initial burden of proof, despite the lack of opposition. The Court of Appeal disagreed, grounding its decision in CCP § 437c(b)(3). It held that this subdivision expressly grants the trial court discretion to grant summary judgment when the opposing party fails to file the required separate statement. The court clarified that if the trial court exercises this discretion and the moving party’s papers are sufficient on their face, the court is not obligated to conduct its own analysis of whether the moving party met its substantive burden. Instead, the failure to file the separate statement itself can be a sufficient ground for granting the motion under the statute.

Full opinion

Plaintiff (Moniz) sued under PAGA and settled with defendant. Another plaintiff with overlapping PAGA claims (Correa) unsuccessfully moved to intervene then vacate the judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed, but on remand, the trial court approved a revised settlement agreement awarded Correa only a small portion of requested attorney’s fees. It denied Correa’s motion to vacate the judgment or for a new settlement hearing. Correa appealed. 

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Correa’s motion. It held per Turrieta that nothing in PAGA expressly grants PAGA plaintiffs the authority to intervene under CCP § 387 or vacate a settlement judgment under CCP § 663. The Court of Appeal rejected Correa’s argument based on the law of the case doctrine, finding that Turrieta clarified the controlling law. It also rejected Correa’s attempt to distinguish Turrieta, finding that her personal interests arose solely from PAGA, and granting intervention based on those interests would contradict the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, three auto shop workers, sued Defendants for various wage and hour violations. Two of the plaintiffs agreed to settle, while the third plaintiff (Zarate) did not. At trial, the jury found for Zarate on two causes of action (failure to pay overtime and failure to provide rest breaks) but awarded less than the amount Defendant had offered for settlement. The trial court awarded costs to Defendants under Code Civ. Proc. § 998 while granting Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees only in part. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court’s amended February 2023 judgment, which merely added a costs and fees award, was its “comprehensive final judgment,” not its September 2022 judgment. The Court of Appeal disagreed, citing Torres v. City of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 214, 222 in its finding that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the trial court’s interlocutory rulings was not timely. The court also found no error in the trial court’s partial award of attorney’s fees because Plaintiff’s counsel failed to properly segregate time entries, and the trial court was not required to follow the Laffey matrix or apply a lodestar multiplier. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s award of costs to Defendants, agreeing with Plaintiffs that, under Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 221, Lab. Code §§ 1194 and 218.5 displace Code Civ. Proc. § 998. Section 1194 “makes no mention of prevailing employers” (Plancich v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 308, 313, internal citations omitted), while Section 218.5 requires a finding of bad faith.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, members of a separate class action against Tesla, sent a letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) alleging PAGA violations after Tesla failed to respond to their Labor Code records requests. They then filed a PAGA complaint alleging Tesla’s refusal to comply with Labor Code  §§ 1198.5, 226, and 432. Tesla filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, which the trial court denied. 

Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. It distinguished Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 757, where a written statement was an element of the claim. Here, Tesla’s refusal to respond was “simply conduct,” governed by Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(4). Applying the Geiser test (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238), the court found the connection between Tesla’s refusal and the public issue in the related litigation too attenuated for anti-SLAPP protection. Citing Wilder v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 77, 83, the court also held that Plaintiffs, regardless of their status as putative class members, were entitled to request information under the Labor Code.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs were Lyft drivers who filed separate PAGA lawsuits. After Plaintiff Turrieta settled with Lyft, Appellants moved to intervene, arguing the settlement was inadequate. The trial court denied the motions, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. 

On review, the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants lacked standing to intervene under Code of Civil Procedure § 387(d). The court found that while PAGA does not expressly address intervention, granting such power would be inconsistent with the statute’s structure and create practical problems. Examining Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2022) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, Uribe v. Crown Bldg. Maint. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 986, and Accurso v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1128, the court found none directly addressed the issue and disapproved Moniz in part. The court also rejected Appellants’ authority to vacate the judgment or object to the settlement.

Full opinion

Defendant removed Plaintiff from duty in 2018 after he failed a color-blindness test. Plaintiff joined a putative class action filed by similarly affected employees. In August 2018, class counsel moved for a narrower class definition that may have excluded Plaintiff. The court certified the narrower class in February 2019, but the Eighth Circuit reversed certification in March 2020. Plaintiff then filed suit, but the district court granted summary judgment, ruling his complaint was untimely because tolling ended when class counsel moved for the narrower definition. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined the purpose of American Pipe tolling and noted the split among district courts regarding when it ends. Considering Sawtell v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. (10th Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 248 and Smith v. Pennington (4th Cir. 2003) 352 F.3d 884, the court held that to end tolling, a plaintiff’s exclusion from a revised class definition must be unambiguous. Ending tolling without unambiguous narrowing, the court reasoned, would have negative consequences. Analyzing the August 2018 proposed class definition, the court found it ambiguous but that the better reading included color-vision plaintiffs like DeFries. The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment and remanded.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued Defendant for failing to pay approximately $15,000 in minimum wage and overtime wages and $11,000 in unreimbursed expenses. The trial court awarded Plaintiff approximately $7,500 in unpaid wages but found no evidence to support his expense claim. Plaintiff sought $300,000 in attorney’s fees and $27,000 in costs, but the trial court denied both motions under Code Civ. Proc. § 1033(a), finding he had “acted in bad faith by artificially inflating his damages figure and including equity claims he never intended to pursue.” 

Plaintiff appealed, arguing he was entitled to reasonable litigation costs under Lab. Code § 1194 (a). The Court of Appeal concurred, holding that Lab. Code § 1194 (a) and Code Civ. Proc. § 1033 (a) are irreconcilable but that the former should control because “that statute is more recently enacted and more specific.” Defendant, relying on Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, argued that the absence of a Code Civ. Proc. § 1033(a) carveout for FEHA cases precluded a similar exemption for wage and hour cases. The court disagreed, finding in Lab. Code § 1194 (a) “no analogous standard” to FEHA’s discretionary fee provision, and remanded to the trial court to determine reasonable fees and costs. 

Full opinion

After striking Plaintiff’s FEHA claims due to her independent contractor status, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees under Gov. Code § 12965. Defendant then filed a cost memorandum seeking discretionary costs without filing a motion for those costs. Plaintiff attempted to file an untimely motion to tax costs, but the court denied relief and awarded costs to Defendant. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed. Citing Anthony v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1015-1016, the court held that a cost memorandum applies only to “cost items to which a party is entitled ‘as a matter of right.’”  Because Defendant did not file the required motion for discretionary costs, its cost memorandum was ineffective, and Plaintiff had no obligation to respond.

Full opinion