In Romero v. County of Kern (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1189, the Court of Appeal held that a public employee is not required to exhaust internal civil service remedies before filing a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit if local ordinances lack "clearly defined procedures" for resolving such complaints. Distinguishing Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, the court found that while Plaintiff did not appeal his termination to the Civil Service Commission, the County’s rules did not specifically require the Commission to address the whistleblower nature of the dispute. Because the County provided no adequate administrative path for retaliation claims, Plaintiff’s compliance with the Government Claims Act was sufficient to maintain his suit.

This decision limits the Campbell exhaustion defense, preventing public entities from blocking whistleblower litigation with vague civil service procedures that do not explicitly account for protected disclosure grievances.

In Prime Healthcare Management v. Superior Court (Gavriiloglou) (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 127, the Court of Appeal held that an arbitrator’s finding on an individual Labor Code claim does not have preclusive effect on a PAGA representative action. The court determined that the State (the real party in interest) is not in privity with an individual litigant for purposes of issue preclusion. It further clarified that Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 did not constitute an intervening change in law, as Adolph supports a plaintiff’s right to litigate "aggrieved employee" status even after individual claims are arbitrated.

This decision protects PAGA claims from being collateralized by adverse arbitration awards, ensuring that an employee’s loss in a private forum does not automatically bind the State or bar representative enforcement of the Labor Code.

In Brown v. Dave & Buster's of California (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 164, the Court of Appeal held that a PAGA plaintiff is not required to wait an additional 65-day period after amending a pre-filing notice before amending a complaint to add new claims or defendants. The court noted that the PAGA statute does not explicitly mandate a renewed waiting period for supplemental notices, and it characterized the failure to wait the full 65 days as a “harmless defect.”

This decision provides employers with greater certainty that a court-approved PAGA settlement will be treated as a final judgment on the merits despite minor procedural timing discrepancies in the pre-filing notice phase.

In Dobarro v. Kim (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 158, the Court of Appeal held that the tolling provisions for electronic filing failures (Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6) do not apply to the strict jurisdictional deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner award (Labor Code § 98.2). Affirming the dismissal of an appeal filed one day late after a clerk rejected a timely attempted e-filing, the court relied on Pressler v. Donald L. Bren Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 831 to maintain that the deadline is mandatory and cannot be extended for mistake or neglect.

This decision reinforces the unforgiving nature of § 98.2 appeals, warning counsel that technical glitches or clerk rejections offer no relief from this specific jurisdictional bar.

In Anton's Services v. Hagen (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 90, the Court of Appeal held that funds withheld by an awarding body (Lab. Code § 1727(b)) do not constitute the "payment of wages" necessary to avoid liquidated damages under § 1742.1. Affirming penalties against a public works contractor, the court ruled that because withheld funds are not actually received by workers until final review, they cannot be used to demonstrate that unpaid wages were "promptly and voluntarily corrected." Additionally, the court affirmed that overtime and weekend shifts must be included when calculating compliance with required apprentice-to-journeyman ratios under § 1777.5.

This decision prevents contractors from using agency withholdings as a shield against liquidated damages and enforces stricter compliance with apprenticeship staffing ratios across all working hours.

In Alvarado v. Wal-Mart Associates Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 156 F.4th 917, the Ninth Circuit held that a Code of Civil Procedure § 998 offer allowing fees for "individual claims" does not implicitly waive the plaintiff's right to recover fees for "inextricably intertwined" PAGA or class claims, and any such waiver must be express. However, the court vacated the $300,000 fee award because the district court's Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424 analysis was unclear and contradictory, failing to provide the reasoned explanation required by Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106.

This decision warns defense counsel to be explicit about fee exclusions in § 998 offers and reminds trial courts that they must clearly articulate their Hensley calculations to survive appeal.

In Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for a defendant and imposed $10,000 in sanctions on plaintiff's counsel for submitting briefs where "nearly all of the quotations... [had] been fabricated" using generative AI. The court rejected counsel's defense of ignorance about AI's propensity to "hallucinate," holding that relying on fabricated authority is sanctionable and that attorneys cannot delegate their fundamental duty of cite-checking.

This decision serves as a stark warning to the bar, confirming that an appeal based on AI-generated, non-existent legal authority is frivolous and that ignorance of the technology's flaws is no defense.

In Renteria-Hinojosa v. Sunsweet Growers, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1076, the Ninth Circuit held that the requirement to exhaust CBA grievance procedures for an LMRA § 301 claim is not jurisdictional, and therefore a district court's subsequent discretionary remand of supplemental state law claims is appealable. On the merits, the court affirmed the remand, finding the plaintiff's state wage and PAGA claims were not preempted under the test from Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) 898 F.3d 904, 920–21, as they did not require interpretation of the CBA's substantive provisions.

This decision confirms appellate jurisdiction over these specific remand orders and reinforces the high bar for § 301 preemption of California wage claims.

In Lister v. City of Las Vegas (2025) 148 F.4th 690, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a defense judgment, holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion by reconciling an inconsistent jury verdict itself rather than resubmitting it to the jury. The jury inconsistently awarded $150,000 after finding the plaintiff suffered harassment but not based on protected class membership. The district court correctly entered judgment for the defendant with zero damages after polling confirmed the "no race/gender basis" finding.

This decision affirms a court's discretion to resolve verdict inconsistencies based on clear jury polling.

In Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1311, the Court of Appeal held that an arbitration agreement and a separate employment agreement, when executed as parts of substantially one transaction, must be read together as one contract under Civ. Code § 1642, even without explicit cross-references.

Affirming the denial of a motion to compel, the court found the combined effect of the two agreements created "notable substantive unconscionability" by imposing nonmutual arbitration obligations and remedies. The court also affirmed the trial court's discretion to refuse to sever the unconscionable terms.

In Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 162, the Court of Appeal held that a prevailing defendant in a PAGA action cannot recover costs under C.C.P. § 1032 (b) from the LWDA when the agency did not actively participate in the litigation. The court reversed a $125,000 cost award against the LWDA, rejecting the defense argument that the PAGA plaintiff acts as the LWDA's agent.

This decision shields the LWDA from cost liability in failed PAGA suits, protecting the state from the financial risks of representative cases it does not directly manage.

In Cahill v. Nike, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 131 F.4th 933, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court has the inherent authority to order an intervenor to return or destroy confidential documents inadvertently disclosed during discovery. The court ruled that because the intervenor (a media group) did not obtain the documents "through means independent of the court's processes" (Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart (1984) 467 U.S. 20, 34), it was subject to the court's discovery orders just like any other party.

This decision confirms a court's power to enforce its protective orders and "claw back" privileged materials extends to intervenors, who cannot claim immunity from discovery rules.

In Perez v. Rose Hills Company (9th Cir. 2025) 131 F.4th 804, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant removing a class action under CAFA does not need to submit evidence to support its amount in controversy calculation, provided its calculation is a "reasonable interpretation" of the plaintiff's complaint. Following Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott (9th Cir. 2019) 936 F.3d 920, 925 the court clarified that a defendant may rely on "a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions" based solely on the complaint's allegations.

This decision lowers the bar for CAFA removal, shifting the district court's inquiry from whether the defendant proved the amount with evidence to whether the defendant's assumptions based on the complaint are reasonable.

In Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 478, the Court of Appeal held that under CCP § 437c(b)(3), a trial court has discretion to grant a summary judgment motion based solely on the opposing party's failure to file the required separate statement, even without an opposition. The court clarified that when it exercises this discretion, it is not obligated to conduct its own independent analysis of whether the moving party met its initial substantive burden.

This decision confirms that the failure to file a separate statement is not just a procedural flaw but is, by itself, a sufficient statutory ground for granting summary judgment.

In Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 317, the Court of Appeal held that a PAGA plaintiff with overlapping claims has no right to intervene in or move to vacate another's PAGA settlement. Closely following Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, the court affirmed that PAGA provides no statutory right to intervene (CCP § 387) or vacate (CCP § 663).

This decision confirms Turrieta as the controlling law and applies to pending cases, rejecting a "law of the case" argument from a prior appeal and solidifying the bar against intervention by competing PAGA plaintiffs.

In Arzate v. ACE American Insurance Company (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1191, the Court of Appeal held that a trial court's order lifting an arbitration stay and finding the defendant had waived arbitration is immediately appealable. The court ruled such an order is the "functional equivalent" of an order denying a motion to compel and that under the parties’ agreement, Plaintiff was required to initiate arbitration.

This decision confirms a defendant's right to appeal a post-stay waiver finding and clarifies that the burden of initiating arbitration remains a question of contractual interpretation.

In Chavez v. California Collision (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 298, the Court of Appeal held that a defendant in a wage and hour action cannot recover costs under Code of Civil Procedure § 998. Following Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 221, the court held that the specific, one-way cost-shifting provisions of Labor Code §§ 1194 and 218.5 displace the general, two-way framework of § 998.

This decision solidifies that employers are barred from recovering § 998 costs in wage actions, preserving the Labor Code's policy of protecting plaintiffs from cost-shifting penalties unless their claim was brought in bad faith.

In Taylor v. Tesla, Inc. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 75, the Court of Appeal held that an employer's refusal to provide statutory Labor Code records is not protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court affirmed the denial of Tesla's motion, reasoning that the refusal was "simply conduct" and not a protected statement, even though the requests were related to separate, pending litigation.

This decision prevents employers from using an anti-SLAPP motion to strike PAGA claims that are based on the failure to comply with these common statutory records requests.

In Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, the California Supreme Court held 4-3 that PAGA plaintiffs are not parties to parallel PAGA actions and thus lack intrinsic standing to intervene (CCP § 387(d)), object to, or move to vacate a settlement in a separate case against the same employer.

This decision effectively prioritizes the "first to settle" PAGA action, making it much harder for competing plaintiffs to challenge a potentially inadequate "reverse auction" settlement.

In DeFries v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (9th Cir. 2024) 104 F.4th 1091, the Ninth Circuit held that American Pipe tolling continues for a putative class member unless their exclusion from a revised class definition is "unambiguous." The court reversed summary judgment for the defendant, finding that a motion by class counsel to narrow the class definition was ambiguous as to whether it excluded the plaintiff.

This decision protects bystander plaintiffs from losing their claims due to unclear class modifications.

In Gramajo v. Joe’s Pizza on Sunset, Inc.(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1094, the Court of Appeal held that a trial court's discretion to deny costs for a low recovery under Code of Civil Procedure §1033(a) is preempted by Labor Code §1194(a)'s mandate to award fees and costs to prevailing minimum wage plaintiffs "irrespective of the amount recovered."

This decision secures a plaintiff's entitlement to fees in all successful minimum wage cases, shifting the battleground from if fees will be awarded to the reasonableness of the amount sought on remand.

In Neeble-Diamond v. Hotel California By the Sea, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 551, the Court of Appeal held a plaintiff had no duty to respond to a cost memorandum seeking discretionary costs because the defendant failed to file the required noticed motion. The court ruled the procedurally improper cost memo was "ineffective" and a nullity, meaning the plaintiff's failure to file a motion to tax costs was irrelevant.

This ruling confirms a party need not respond to a procedurally defective cost memorandum seeking discretionary costs.