Plaintiff Allison, a registered nurse, sued alleging various wage and hour violations. She moved for class certification, seeking meal and rest break subclasses based on allegations that Defendant required employees to wear work-issued communication devices during breaks. The trial court granted certification in part, denying only a “reporting time” subclass. Defendant subsequently moved for decertification, citing conflicting class member declarations, deficiencies in call logs, unreliable survey data, an unworkable trial plan, and “irreconcilable conflicts” between class members. The trial court granted decertification, agreeing with Defendant’s arguments and finding that “individual issues swamp the common issues” based on new evidence. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the order decertifying the class. It held that Plaintiffs’ post-certification declarations and statistical analysis constituted “new evidence” under Weinstat v. Dentsply lnternat., Inc. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1213, clarifying that “ ‘newly discovered’ evidence is not limited to newly existing facts” (Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 355). The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s disregard of survey data from Plaintiff’s expert, noting Plaintiffs’ failure to address self-selection bias given the low response rate (Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 630). Applying the Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58 burden-shifting framework, the court concluded that Defendant’s evidence of “idiosyncratic reasons for noncompliant meal periods” defeated class treatment. Finally, the Court of Appeal found that Plaintiffs failed to challenge the trial court’s basis for decertifying the rest break subclass, namely its determination that Plaintiffs failed to establish a uniform practice of nurses being on call during breaks or to provide reliable common proof through phone records.

Full opinion

Plaintiff filed a class action alleging various wage and hour violations. The trial court denied class certification based on a lack of numerosity, typicality, superiority, and manageability. Plaintiff appealed, and then over a year after filing the appeal, voluntarily dismissed his remaining PAGA claims in an apparent effort to invoke the death knell doctrine. See Cortez v. Doty Bros. Equipment Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1, 9 (“the death knell exception to the one final judgment rule does not apply when PAGA claim remains pending in the trial court following termination of the class claims”); See also Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 243–244 [same]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 [same]; Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291, 310–311 [same].

Here, the Court of Appeal concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, holding that Plaintiff could not appeal the class certification order until a final judgment on all claims. Since Plaintiff’s PAGA claims remained viable immediately following the denial (precluding application of the death knell doctrine) Plaintiff could not manufacture jurisdiction by later dismissing those claims. The court noted that while some putative class members might not be eligible for PAGA relief as a result of the lower court decision, there was nevertheless “significant overlap” between putative class members and aggrieved employees under PAGA. This rendered the death knell doctrine inapplicable under Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126. 

Reyes joins a line of cases that makes clear that the death knell doctrine does not apply where certification is denied in a hybrid class/PAGA action. In these cases, the death knell doctrine does not apply, even if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the PAGA claims following the denial of class certification. However, the court’s reasoning suggests that the death knell doctrine may apply if a plaintiff dismisses the PAGA claims prior to the denial of class certification.

Full opinion

Plaintiff brought a class action alleging various wage and hour violations. Defendant removed the case to federal court under CAFA, alleging the amount in controversy exceeded $15 million. The district court found Defendant failed to provide evidence for the amount and remanded the case to state court. The Ninth Circuit granted Defendant permission to appeal.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the order remanding the case to state court, following Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott (9th Cir. 2019) 936 F.3d 920. It held that defendants calculating the amount in controversy under CAFA may rely on “a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions” based solely on the allegations in the complaint. (Id. at 925, internal citations omitted.) The district court should have considered whether Defendant’s calculation was a reasonable interpretation of the complaint, not whether it was supported by evidence. The court distinguished Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 775 F.3d 1193, where the defendant had to provide evidence because its interpretation of the complaint was found to be unreasonable.

Full opinion

Defendant removed Plaintiff from duty in 2018 after he failed a color-blindness test. Plaintiff joined a putative class action filed by similarly affected employees. In August 2018, class counsel moved for a narrower class definition that may have excluded Plaintiff. The court certified the narrower class in February 2019, but the Eighth Circuit reversed certification in March 2020. Plaintiff then filed suit, but the district court granted summary judgment, ruling his complaint was untimely because tolling ended when class counsel moved for the narrower definition. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined the purpose of American Pipe tolling and noted the split among district courts regarding when it ends. Considering Sawtell v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. (10th Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 248 and Smith v. Pennington (4th Cir. 2003) 352 F.3d 884, the court held that to end tolling, a plaintiff’s exclusion from a revised class definition must be unambiguous. Ending tolling without unambiguous narrowing, the court reasoned, would have negative consequences. Analyzing the August 2018 proposed class definition, the court found it ambiguous but that the better reading included color-vision plaintiffs like DeFries. The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment and remanded.

Full opinion

Plaintiff brought putative class action claims and a representative PAGA action for Labor Code violations. The trial court initially certified a class and subclasses but later decertified two subclasses and dismissed the PAGA claim as unmanageable. The Court of Appeal reversed.

On review, the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial courts lack inherent authority to dismiss claims for manageability. Citing Lyons v. Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d 911, 916, the court emphasized that trial courts have only a “tightly circumscribed” power to dismiss with prejudice.  It found that Code Civ. Proc. §§ 583.150 and 581(m) do not grant broad discretionary dismissal power. The court held that PAGA claims are not subject to manageability considerations, disapproving Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 746. The court also rejected Defendant’s due process argument, holding that the evidentiary limitations established in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1 also apply to the defense of PAGA claims.

Full opinion