Plaintiff sued under PAGA, alleging violations of the “suitable seating” provisions of IWC Wage Order No. 7-2001. After a bench trial, the trial court found for Defendant. Defendant filed a memorandum of costs, arguing it was entitled to recover costs against both the representative Plaintiff and the LWDA. The LWDA successfully moved to intervene, but the trial court awarded Defendant approximately $125,000 in costs against the LWDA, with none against the representative Plaintiff.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the cost order. It held that costs cannot be recovered from the LWDA when the agency did not participate in the litigation. The court acknowledged Defendant’s argument that Labor Code § 2699(k)(1) contains no express exception to Code of Civil Procedure § 1032(b), which under Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, could arguably permit cost recovery. However, the court declined to address whether PAGA displaces Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(b). Instead, it based its decision on the LWDA’s non-participation in the action. It rejected Defendant’s argument that a PAGA Plaintiff acts as an agent of the LWDA, finding that PAGA plaintiffs lack fiduciary obligations to the agency and the LWDA lacks control over the litigation. The court noted that Defendant failed to cite any qui tam case in which costs were awarded against a government real party in interest who did not participate.

While the Court noted that the PAGA statute explicitly provides for fees and costs to a prevailing employee (Lab. Code § 2699, subd. (k)(1)), it noted that the statute says nothing about an award to prevailing defendants. Nevertheless, the Court explicitly reserved the question regarding whether a defendant is entitled to recover costs under Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(b) in a PAGA action for another day. 

Full opinion

Plaintiff filed a class action alleging various wage and hour violations. The trial court denied class certification based on a lack of numerosity, typicality, superiority, and manageability. Plaintiff appealed, and then over a year after filing the appeal, voluntarily dismissed his remaining PAGA claims in an apparent effort to invoke the death knell doctrine. See Cortez v. Doty Bros. Equipment Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1, 9 (“the death knell exception to the one final judgment rule does not apply when PAGA claim remains pending in the trial court following termination of the class claims”); See also Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 243–244 [same]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 [same]; Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291, 310–311 [same].

Here, the Court of Appeal concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, holding that Plaintiff could not appeal the class certification order until a final judgment on all claims. Since Plaintiff’s PAGA claims remained viable immediately following the denial (precluding application of the death knell doctrine) Plaintiff could not manufacture jurisdiction by later dismissing those claims. The court noted that while some putative class members might not be eligible for PAGA relief as a result of the lower court decision, there was nevertheless “significant overlap” between putative class members and aggrieved employees under PAGA. This rendered the death knell doctrine inapplicable under Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126. 

Reyes joins a line of cases that makes clear that the death knell doctrine does not apply where certification is denied in a hybrid class/PAGA action. In these cases, the death knell doctrine does not apply, even if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the PAGA claims following the denial of class certification. However, the court’s reasoning suggests that the death knell doctrine may apply if a plaintiff dismisses the PAGA claims prior to the denial of class certification.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued Defendant under PAGA on behalf of other employees and the State of California for repeated failures to pay overtime, but did not assert any personal violations within the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court sustained Defendant’s demurrer, and Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, holding that PAGA’s one-year statute of limitations applies to a representative plaintiff’s individual claims, not violations suffered by other aggrieved employees. It agreed with Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 that PAGA claims must include an individual component, disagreeing with Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533. The court reasoned that the representative plaintiff’s individual claims are the only way to evaluate timeliness, as PAGA plaintiffs need not define “aggrieved parties” in prelitigation notices. Allowing suits for violations from potentially decades past, as suggested by Plaintiff’s reasoning, would contradict the Legislature’s intent for expeditious resolution of violations.

Full opinion

The parties’ arbitration agreement excluded representative PAGA claims. Plaintiff then brought a PAGA claim alleging off-the-clock work. Defendant moved to compel arbitration of individual PAGA claims and dismiss the representative portion. The trial court denied the motion, interpreting the parties’ arbitration agreement to exclude Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The parties disputed whether “representative” referred to all PAGA claims or just non-individual ones. Defendant argued that the court should apply the FAA’s presumption of arbitrability, while Plaintiff argued that the trial court correctly resolved the ambiguity against the drafter. The court found based on noscitur a sociis that the parties intended a broad construction of the PAGA carve-out. It also noted that when the agreement was executed (pre-Viking River), individual and representative PAGA claims were indivisible. Following Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592, the court held that Plaintiff could not be compelled to arbitrate a dispute he didn’t agree to arbitrate. Finally, the court rejected Defendant’s reliance on Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 222 to interpret contract language to avoid surplusage, reasoning that this principle is only a guideline, and similar redundancies are common in PAGA contexts.

Full opinion

Plaintiff (Moniz) sued under PAGA and settled with defendant. Another plaintiff with overlapping PAGA claims (Correa) unsuccessfully moved to intervene then vacate the judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed, but on remand, the trial court approved a revised settlement agreement awarded Correa only a small portion of requested attorney’s fees. It denied Correa’s motion to vacate the judgment or for a new settlement hearing. Correa appealed. 

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Correa’s motion. It held per Turrieta that nothing in PAGA expressly grants PAGA plaintiffs the authority to intervene under CCP § 387 or vacate a settlement judgment under CCP § 663. The Court of Appeal rejected Correa’s argument based on the law of the case doctrine, finding that Turrieta clarified the controlling law. It also rejected Correa’s attempt to distinguish Turrieta, finding that her personal interests arose solely from PAGA, and granting intervention based on those interests would contradict the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued under PAGA “in a Representative Capacity only” (emphasis in original) for various wage and hour violations. Defendant moved to compel arbitration and subsequently moved to dismiss or stay the case pending Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639. Following the decision in Viking River, Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s “individual PAGA claim” should be compelled to arbitration and his non-individual PAGA claim dismissed. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 was “current law” when the agreement was signed. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed denial of the motion to compel arbitration, finding that because  Plaintiff did not assert individual PAGA claims in the complaint, there was nothing to compel to arbitration. The court disapproved Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, which required arbitration of unasserted individual PAGA claims. Instead, the court emphasized the complaint’s contents as the determinative factor. Notably, the court declined to address Defendant’s argument regarding Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533 and its potential conflict with Labor Code § 2699(a). However, it left open the possibility that the complaint, lacking an individual component, might not comply with § 2699(a), and that Defendant could raise this issue through an appropriate pleading challenge.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a gig worker classified as an independent contractor, brought a collective PAGA action alleging misclassification. Defendant moved to compel arbitration of the individual portion of the action. The trial court denied the motion, finding no individual cause of action, and Defendant appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. Focusing on the statutory language of Lab. Code § 2699 (a), the Court of Appeal held that PAGA actions inherently include both individual and representative claims. It distinguished this case from Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, and Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533, finding that they did not address whether a PAGA action can be brought without including an individual PAGA claim. The Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to compel arbitration of the individual claim and stay the representative PAGA claim.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued for individual wage and hour violations and a related PAGA claim. After the trial court compelled arbitration of the non-PAGA claims, an arbitrator ruled against Plaintiff for all her individual Labor Code claims. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The trial court subsequently granted Defendant judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s PAGA claim due to a lack of standing. 

Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Following Rocha v. U-Haul Co. of California (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 65, 77 and Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1124, the court applied issue preclusion. It found all elements met because the arbitrator’s explicit findings that Plaintiff personally suffered no underlying violations were identical to the issue of her “aggrieved employee” status, were actually litigated, and necessarily decided. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the issues were not identical for her specific Labor Code claims. While acknowledging the general principle that arbitrators need not issue findings or reasons (Rodrigues v. Keller (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 838, 842), the court emphasized that in this case, the arbitrator did provide clear adverse findings against Plaintiff on her individual claims, which formed the basis for preclusion.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, members of a separate class action against Tesla, sent a letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) alleging PAGA violations after Tesla failed to respond to their Labor Code records requests. They then filed a PAGA complaint alleging Tesla’s refusal to comply with Labor Code  §§ 1198.5, 226, and 432. Tesla filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, which the trial court denied. 

Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. It distinguished Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 757, where a written statement was an element of the claim. Here, Tesla’s refusal to respond was “simply conduct,” governed by Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(4). Applying the Geiser test (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238), the court found the connection between Tesla’s refusal and the public issue in the related litigation too attenuated for anti-SLAPP protection. Citing Wilder v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 77, 83, the court also held that Plaintiffs, regardless of their status as putative class members, were entitled to request information under the Labor Code.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, employees of a public hospital, sued the hospital for various Labor Code wage and hour violations and sought civil penalties under PAGA. The trial court sustained the hospital’s demurrer, but the Court of Appeal reversed in part. Defendant filed a petition for review, and the California Supreme Court granted, reversing and remanding.

Referencing Wage Order No. 5 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050) and Labor Code § 18, the court held that public employers are not considered “employers” under the Labor Code because the statute excludes government entities from the definition of “person.” The court found legislative intent to exclude government employers based on their explicit inclusion in certain Labor Code provisions, the history of the Industrial Welfare Commission, and numerous case law examples. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ reliance on the sovereign powers doctrine, holding per Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, that the doctrine applies only when legislative intent is unclear. Citing Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. El Camino Hosp. Dist. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d Supp. 30, the court adopted a broad definition of “municipal corporation,” exempting the hospital from wage payment provisions. The court also found no indication that the Legislature intended public employers to be subject to PAGA suits.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs were Lyft drivers who filed separate PAGA lawsuits. After Plaintiff Turrieta settled with Lyft, Appellants moved to intervene, arguing the settlement was inadequate. The trial court denied the motions, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. 

On review, the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants lacked standing to intervene under Code of Civil Procedure § 387(d). The court found that while PAGA does not expressly address intervention, granting such power would be inconsistent with the statute’s structure and create practical problems. Examining Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2022) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, Uribe v. Crown Bldg. Maint. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 986, and Accurso v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1128, the court found none directly addressed the issue and disapproved Moniz in part. The court also rejected Appellants’ authority to vacate the judgment or object to the settlement.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a farm laborer, sent prelitigation notice to Defendants alleging Labor Code violations and then sued under PAGA. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the notice failed to identify “aggrieved employees.” The trial court granted the motion. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed. Citing Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545, the court held that nothing in Lab. Code § 2699.3 requires defining “aggrieved employees” in the notice. It also cited Santos v. El Guapos Tacos, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 363, 372, for the proposition that a notice is not deficient for failing to state the PAGA claim is on behalf of others. The court found Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Defendants employed her and other nonexempt employees and violated the Labor Code. It rejected Defendants’ argument that the notice was ambiguous for referencing entities beyond the named Defendants, holding that the scope of affected employees can be determined during discovery.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued defendant for Labor Code violations then amended her complaint to assert individual and non-individual PAGA claims. Defendant moved to compel the individual PAGA claim to arbitration and dismiss the non-individual claims. The district court compelled the individual claim but denied dismissal, instead staying the non-individual claims pending arbitration. Defendant appealed the denial of dismissal.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Relying primarily on the California Supreme Court’s clarification in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, the court held that arbitrating an individual PAGA claim does not strip a plaintiff’s standing to pursue non-individual claims in court. Thus, the district court correctly denied dismissal. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the stay of the non-individual claims pending the arbitration’s completion, consistent with Adolph‘s guidance, and found it unnecessary to address the agreement’s class action carve-out.

Full opinion

Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement with a carve-out for PAGA claims. After termination, he filed a PAGA claim alleging Labor Code violations. Defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the AAA Rules, incorporated by reference, delegated arbitrability to the arbitrator. The trial court denied the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Citing Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, the court held that incorporating AAA rules by reference does not meet the “clear and unmistakable” delegation standard for unsophisticated employees. The court also found the agreement “clearly and explicitly excluded all PAGA claims.” While Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate individual PAGA claims, that rule did not apply here because the agreement excluded all PAGA claims.

Full opinion

Plaintiff alleged defendant committed various wage and hour violations, including denying meal and rest breaks, late wage payments, inaccurate wage statements, and failure to pay final wages.  The trial court struck the complaint, finding under Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a representative PAGA action because she did not also assert an “individual action seeking PAGA relief for herself.” Plaintiff appealed. 

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred in relying on Viking River.  Instead, the court applied Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, which clarified that a Plaintiff need not file an individual PAGA claim to have standing for a representative action. The court found Plaintiff satisfied the two requirements for PAGA standing under Adolph: (1) she “was employed by the alleged violator,” and (2) “one or more of the alleged violations was committed” against her (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1120).

Full opinion

Plaintiff brought putative class action claims and a representative PAGA action for Labor Code violations. The trial court initially certified a class and subclasses but later decertified two subclasses and dismissed the PAGA claim as unmanageable. The Court of Appeal reversed.

On review, the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial courts lack inherent authority to dismiss claims for manageability. Citing Lyons v. Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d 911, 916, the court emphasized that trial courts have only a “tightly circumscribed” power to dismiss with prejudice.  It found that Code Civ. Proc. §§ 583.150 and 581(m) do not grant broad discretionary dismissal power. The court held that PAGA claims are not subject to manageability considerations, disapproving Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 746. The court also rejected Defendant’s due process argument, holding that the evidentiary limitations established in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1 also apply to the defense of PAGA claims.

Full opinion