In Caldrone v. Circle K Stores Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 949, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on an ADEA/FEHA claim, issuing two key clarifications on the plaintiff’s prima facie burden. First, it held that an employer’s failure to notify existing employees of a job opening can satisfy the “application” element, citing Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1980) 613 F.2d 757, 761. Second, it held that while ten years is a “presumptive threshold” for a substantial age difference under the ADEA, this presumption is rebuttable, and the 9.3-year gap in this case was sufficient to proceed.

This decision lowers the prima facie burden for age discrimination plaintiffs, confirming they can proceed without a formal application if openings are kept secret and that an age gap just under ten years is not automatically fatal to their claim.

In Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, (9th Cir. 2025) 156 F.4th 886, the Ninth Circuit held that a Title VII religious accommodation claim fails if the employee’s objection is based on a “secular judgment” rather than a “truly religious principle.” The court affirmed the dismissal of a Christian employee’s claim, finding her objection to COVID-19 testing was based on her personal, secular belief that the swabs were carcinogenic. The court ruled that her broad reference to a “Christian duty” to treat her body as a “temple of God” was insufficient to “elevate [that] personal medical judgment… to the level of religious significance.”

This decision creates a circuit split by explicitly rejecting the more “lenient” standard used by the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, thereby adopting a more stringent test that makes it harder for plaintiffs to plead religious accommodation claims in the Ninth Circuit.

In Asuncion v. Hegseth (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1252, the Ninth Circuit held that the 90-day statute of limitations for a Title VII / Rehabilitation Act claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff “could realistically be held responsible for having access” to the agency’s final decision. The court reversed the dismissal of a complaint filed 88 days after the plaintiff received the notice via email (but 115 days after the agency filed it), because the agency’s own technical error prevented access. Alternatively, the court held the agency’s error was an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying equitable tolling. This decision provides important protection for plaintiffs, ensuring their claims are not barred by an agency’s technological failures in providing the final notice.

In Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1211, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that accommodating unvaccinated firefighters with public-facing EMT duties would impose an undue hardship under Title VII. Applying the “substantial” burden standard from Groff v. DeJoy (2023) 600 U.S. 447, 468, the court held that an undue hardship analysis may be based on a realistic risk of hardship, not just on actual costs incurred. The court found that undisputed expert testimony on health, safety, and operational risks during the Delta/Omicron spikes met this substantial burden.

This decision provides critical post-Groff guidance for vaccine mandate cases, confirming that employers can meet the heightened undue hardship standard by demonstrating a realistic risk to public safety.

In Spatz v. Regents of the University of California (9th Cir. 2025) 151 F.4th 1068, the Ninth Circuit held that a university’s medical residency ranking process is an “employment practice” and is therefore expressly excluded from the scope of the federal Age Act (42 U.S.C. § 6103 (c)(1)). The court affirmed summary judgment against an applicant alleging age discrimination, reasoning that because medical residency is a form of employment, the selection process falls squarely within the Act’s “employment practice” carve-out.

This decision confirms that the federal Age Act offers no protection against age discrimination in the medical residency selection process.

In Munoz v. The Regents of the University of California (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 466, the Court of Appeal held that the UC’s policy barring the hiring of students without federal work authorization is facially discriminatory under FEHA, finding that “lack of work authorization” is not materially distinct from protected “immigration status” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11028 (f)(3)). The court then held that an employer’s “litigation risk” is not, by itself, a sufficient justification for the discriminatory policy.

This decision prevents employers from using speculative litigation fears as a defense to discrimination, forcing them to instead demonstrate that the policy is actually required by federal law or “reasonably necessary” for business operations.

In McMahon v. World Vision, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 147 F.4th 959, the Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception barred the Title VII discrimination claims of a customer service representative (CSR) terminated for being in a same-sex marriage. Applying the functional test from Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) 591 U.S. 732, the court found the CSR performed “vital religious duties” central to the organization’s mission, even if her duties were preponderantly secular.

This decision expands the ministerial exception’s reach into roles traditionally viewed as secular, confirming that employees whose jobs are deemed central to a religious organization’s “core mission” can be barred from bringing discrimination claims.

In Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 822, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for a public employer, holding that its COVID-19 return-to-office mandate was a discretionary decision shielded by Government Tort Claims Act immunity (Gov. Code § 855.4). Critically, the court also held that an employer’s engagement in the FEHA interactive process “is not an admission [the employee] was disabled,” as a contrary rule would contravene public policy by discouraging employer engagement.

This decision provides public entities with a strong immunity defense for pandemic-related employment decisions and, more broadly, confirms that employers do not concede an employee’s disability status simply by engaging in accommodation discussions.

In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services (2025) 605 U.S. 303, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that Title VII plaintiffs from a majority group do not face a heightened “background circumstances” evidentiary standard to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Court affirmed that the text of Title VII prohibits varying the standard based on whether the plaintiff is in a majority or minority group.

This decision resolves a Circuit split, confirming that all disparate treatment plaintiffs face the same initial evidentiary burden and eliminating the extra hurdle previously imposed on so-called “reverse discrimination” claims in some circuits.