In Dobarro v. Kim (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 158, the Court of Appeal held that the tolling provisions for electronic filing failures (Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6) do not apply to the strict jurisdictional deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner award (Labor Code § 98.2). Affirming the dismissal of an appeal filed one day late after a clerk rejected a timely attempted e-filing, the court relied on Pressler v. Donald L. Bren Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 831 to maintain that the deadline is mandatory and cannot be extended for mistake or neglect.

This decision reinforces the unforgiving nature of § 98.2 appeals, warning counsel that technical glitches or clerk rejections offer no relief from this specific jurisdictional bar.

In Mora v. C.E. Enterprises (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 72, the Court of Appeal held that a pay plan providing a high base hourly wage (double the minimum) plus a "flag bonus" did not violate the "no borrowing" rule from Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, nor Labor Code § 226.2. Affirming a judgment for the employer, the court distinguished this "base plus bonus" model from unlawful piece-rate averaging, reasoning that because employees were paid well above minimum wage for every hour worked (productive or not), the bonus was a true incentive and not used to cover unpaid time.

This decision validates "flag bonus" structures for automotive technicians and other trades, provided the base hourly rate independently satisfies minimum wage obligations for all hours on the clock, and serves as a reminder that plaintiffs cannot rely on "manifestly deficient" records to overturn PAGA verdicts.

In Anton's Services v. Hagen (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 90, the Court of Appeal held that funds withheld by an awarding body (Lab. Code § 1727(b)) do not constitute the "payment of wages" necessary to avoid liquidated damages under § 1742.1. Affirming penalties against a public works contractor, the court ruled that because withheld funds are not actually received by workers until final review, they cannot be used to demonstrate that unpaid wages were "promptly and voluntarily corrected." Additionally, the court affirmed that overtime and weekend shifts must be included when calculating compliance with required apprentice-to-journeyman ratios under § 1777.5.

This decision prevents contractors from using agency withholdings as a shield against liquidated damages and enforces stricter compliance with apprenticeship staffing ratios across all working hours.

In Hollis v. R&R Restaurants, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 159 F.4th 677, the Ninth Circuit held that an FLSA retaliation defendant need not be the plaintiff's direct employer, provided they acted "indirectly in the interest of" the employer (29 U.S.C. § 203(d)). Reversing summary judgment, the court found that a manager of a separate club could be liable for cancelling a dancer's performances in retaliation for their wage lawsuit against a different club, and explicitly rejected the argument that "minimizing legal liability" is a legitimate business justification for such adverse action.

This decision affirms that FLSA retaliation liability extends to third parties and managers who act against workers for protected activity at related entities, and explicitly forecloses "minimizing legal liability" as a legitimate business justification for adverse actions.

In Carroll v. City and County of San Francisco (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1192, the Court of Appeal held that a public pension plan's use of imputed service years to calculate disability benefits was motivated by pension status (years of credited service), not age, and therefore did not constitute age discrimination under FEHA. Affirming a judgment for the city, the court relied on Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC (2008) 554 U.S. 135 to rule that the plan's terms were facially neutral.

This decision confirms that pension formulas tied to service eligibility are generally lawful under FEHA, even if they correlate with age, and applies the federal Kentucky Retirement Systems standard to California state law claims.

In Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 327, the Court of Appeal held an arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because it included "expansive" nonmutual carve-outs for employer claims and, when read with a concurrently signed confidentiality agreement, also prevented informal witness discovery. Affirming the denial of the motion to compel, the court held that because these multiple unconscionable provisions permeated the agreement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever them.

This decision confirms that courts will analyze all contemporaneously signed employment documents as a single contract and solidifies that a provision barring informal witness discovery is a key unconscionable term that can help void an entire agreement.

In Galarsa v. Dolgen California (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1, the Court of Appeal held that the threshold question of a PAGA plaintiff's "aggrieved employee" standing is not an arbitrable dispute subject to a private arbitration agreement. Affirming the denial of a motion to compel, the court also ruled that a "headless" PAGA action (alleging violations suffered only by other employees) is permissible under pre-2024 law. The court reasoned that standing to sue on behalf of the state is a dispute between the LWDA and the employer, not the individual employee and employer.

This decision provides an avenue for plaintiffs litigating pre-2024 PAGA claims to avoid arbitration on the gateway issue of standing, preventing employers from securing a preclusive finding in the arbitral forum that could kill the representative court action.

In Curtis v. Inslee (9th Cir. 2025) 154 F.4th 678, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of §1983 and 14th Amendment challenges to a COVID-19 vaccine mandate, issuing two key holdings. First, the court held that federal statutes governing "investigational drugs" (like the FDCA and PREP Act) do not create a private right of action enforceable under §1983. Second, it held the mandate did not violate the 14th Amendment, ruling that at-will employment is not a protected property interest (barring the procedural due process claim) and that public health concerns easily satisfy rational basis review under Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) 197 U.S. 11 (barring the substantive due process claim).

This decision reinforces the high bar for constitutional challenges to public health mandates and confirms that the emergency status of a vaccine does not provide employees with a private right to sue under federal drug laws.

In Villalobos v. Maersk, Inc. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1170, the Court of Appeal held that generally incorporating AAA rules by reference does not meet the "clear and unmistakable" standard to delegate arbitrability if the employee would need a three-step process to find the actual delegation clause. The court also affirmed that when the California Arbitration Act (CAA) governs (not the FAA), Labor Code § 229 bars arbitration of waiting time penalty claims (Lab. Code § 203), and Viking River's preemption does not apply, rendering the entire PAGA claim non-arbitrable.

This decision reinforces that vague incorporation is insufficient notice for delegation and confirms that § 229 remains a powerful tool to keep wage and PAGA claims in court when the CAA applies.

In Wilson v. Tap Worldwide, LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1077, the Court of Appeal reversed an attorney's fee award, holding that a defendant's arbitration fee payment arriving one business day late does not constitute "abandonment" under Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.98. Applying the new standard from Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, the court held that abandonment (and its fee-shifting remedy) requires the payment lapse to be "willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent."

This decision is one of the first to apply Hohenshelt, confirming that the statute's severe penalties are no longer available for minor, non-willful payment errors and effectively ending "gotcha" motions to vacate arbitration based on technical payment timing issues.

In Caldrone v. Circle K Stores Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 949, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on an ADEA/FEHA claim, issuing two key clarifications on the plaintiff's prima facie burden. First, it held that an employer's failure to notify existing employees of a job opening can satisfy the "application" element, citing Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1980) 613 F.2d 757, 761. Second, it held that while ten years is a "presumptive threshold" for a substantial age difference under the ADEA, this presumption is rebuttable, and the 9.3-year gap in this case was sufficient to proceed.

This decision lowers the prima facie burden for age discrimination plaintiffs, confirming they can proceed without a formal application if openings are kept secret and that an age gap just under ten years is not automatically fatal to their claim.

In Levy v. City and County of San Francisco (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 997, the Court of Appeal held that Labor Code § 512.1's meal and rest break protections for public healthcare workers do not apply to charter cities. Affirming a demurrer, the court ruled that the statute's text (e.g., "counties," "municipalities") does not explicitly include charter cities, and the Legislature's failure to do so (unlike in other statutes like § 1182.14 or § 555) shows no intent to override the "home rule" doctrine.

This decision solidifies the autonomy of charter cities over their labor relations, confirming they are not bound by § 512.1 and that their MOUs control healthcare worker break policies.

In Alvarado v. Wal-Mart Associates Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 156 F.4th 917, the Ninth Circuit held that a Code of Civil Procedure § 998 offer allowing fees for "individual claims" does not implicitly waive the plaintiff's right to recover fees for "inextricably intertwined" PAGA or class claims, and any such waiver must be express. However, the court vacated the $300,000 fee award because the district court's Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424 analysis was unclear and contradictory, failing to provide the reasoned explanation required by Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106.

This decision warns defense counsel to be explicit about fee exclusions in § 998 offers and reminds trial courts that they must clearly articulate their Hensley calculations to survive appeal.

In Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, (9th Cir. 2025) 156 F.4th 886, the Ninth Circuit held that a Title VII religious accommodation claim fails if the employee's objection is based on a "secular judgment" rather than a "truly religious principle." The court affirmed the dismissal of a Christian employee's claim, finding her objection to COVID-19 testing was based on her personal, secular belief that the swabs were carcinogenic. The court ruled that her broad reference to a "Christian duty" to treat her body as a "temple of God" was insufficient to "elevate [that] personal medical judgment... to the level of religious significance."

This decision creates a circuit split by explicitly rejecting the more "lenient" standard used by the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, thereby adopting a more stringent test that makes it harder for plaintiffs to plead religious accommodation claims in the Ninth Circuit.

In Bronshteyn v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 537, the Court of Appeal affirmed a $4.9 million FEHA attorney fee award, holding that a trial court has broad discretion to credit a plaintiff's fee expert over a defendant's and set high hourly rates based on its personal observation of counsel's skill. The court also confirmed that lodestar multipliers can be applied to post-judgment work, including fee litigation.

This decision reinforces a trial court's wide latitude in calculating and awarding attorney's fees under FEHA and serves as a warning that defendants who fail to provide robust counter-evidence (like their own attorneys' hours) will struggle to challenge an award on appeal.

In Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for a defendant and imposed $10,000 in sanctions on plaintiff's counsel for submitting briefs where "nearly all of the quotations... [had] been fabricated" using generative AI. The court rejected counsel's defense of ignorance about AI's propensity to "hallucinate," holding that relying on fabricated authority is sanctionable and that attorneys cannot delegate their fundamental duty of cite-checking.

This decision serves as a stark warning to the bar, confirming that an appeal based on AI-generated, non-existent legal authority is frivolous and that ignorance of the technology's flaws is no defense.

In Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 200, the Court of Appeal held that an employer's response to a complaint can independently create a hostile work environment, even if the underlying harassment was not work-related. The court found the coworker's off-site harassing conduct was not sufficiently work-related to be actionable under FEHA. However, it reversed the dismissal of the HWE claim, holding that the HR representative's mocking response to the plaintiff's complaint was a work-related event that could create a hostile environment, following Fuller v. Idaho Department of Corrections (9th Cir. 2017) 865 F.3d 1154.

This decision confirms that while employers may not have a duty to remedy purely private conduct, they have a separate duty not to create a hostile environment in their response to an employee's complaint about that conduct.

In Baker v. San Mateo County Employees Retirement Assn. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 81, the Court of Appeal held that "regular compensation" under CERL (Gov. Code § 31724) refers to an employee's regular salary or full wages, not the pay tied to a specific job position. The court affirmed a disability retirement effective date based on the employee's return to a different job that paid the same rate, following Katosh v. Sonoma County Employees’ Retirement Association (2008) 163 Cal. App.4th 56.

This decision clarifies that the statutory clock for disability retirement calculations is triggered by the employee's pay rate, preventing employees from challenging their retirement date simply because they were reassigned to a different role with equal pay.

In Asuncion v. Hegseth (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1252, the Ninth Circuit held that the 90-day statute of limitations for a Title VII / Rehabilitation Act claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff “could realistically be held responsible for having access” to the agency's final decision. The court reversed the dismissal of a complaint filed 88 days after the plaintiff received the notice via email (but 115 days after the agency filed it), because the agency's own technical error prevented access. Alternatively, the court held the agency's error was an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying equitable tolling. This decision provides important protection for plaintiffs, ensuring their claims are not barred by an agency's technological failures in providing the final notice.

In Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1211, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that accommodating unvaccinated firefighters with public-facing EMT duties would impose an undue hardship under Title VII. Applying the "substantial" burden standard from Groff v. DeJoy (2023) 600 U.S. 447, 468, the court held that an undue hardship analysis may be based on a realistic risk of hardship, not just on actual costs incurred. The court found that undisputed expert testimony on health, safety, and operational risks during the Delta/Omicron spikes met this substantial burden.

This decision provides critical post-Groff guidance for vaccine mandate cases, confirming that employers can meet the heightened undue hardship standard by demonstrating a realistic risk to public safety.

In Iloff v. LaPaille (2025) 18 Cal. 5th 551, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that an employer's mere ignorance of the law is not a "good faith" defense to liquidated damages for minimum wage violations. Modeling the defense on its FLSA counterpart, the Court ruled the employer must show they made an "attempt to determine what the law required" (e.g., investigating compliance). The Court also held that a de novo Berman appeal (Lab. Code § 98.2) allows trial courts discretion to hear new claims not raised before the Labor Commissioner, such as a Paid Sick Leave claim.

This decision requires employers to prove affirmative steps toward compliance to avoid liquidated damages and confirms the broad, de novo scope of Berman appeals, preventing them from being limited only to claims vetted by the Commissioner.

In Spatz v. Regents of the University of California (9th Cir. 2025) 151 F.4th 1068, the Ninth Circuit held that a university's medical residency ranking process is an "employment practice" and is therefore expressly excluded from the scope of the federal Age Act (42 U.S.C. § 6103 (c)(1)). The court affirmed summary judgment against an applicant alleging age discrimination, reasoning that because medical residency is a form of employment, the selection process falls squarely within the Act's "employment practice" carve-out.

This decision confirms that the federal Age Act offers no protection against age discrimination in the medical residency selection process.

In Renteria-Hinojosa v. Sunsweet Growers, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1076, the Ninth Circuit held that the requirement to exhaust CBA grievance procedures for an LMRA § 301 claim is not jurisdictional, and therefore a district court's subsequent discretionary remand of supplemental state law claims is appealable. On the merits, the court affirmed the remand, finding the plaintiff's state wage and PAGA claims were not preempted under the test from Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) 898 F.3d 904, 920–21, as they did not require interpretation of the CBA's substantive provisions.

This decision confirms appellate jurisdiction over these specific remand orders and reinforces the high bar for § 301 preemption of California wage claims.

In Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 151 F.4th 1020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer, holding that its hybrid pay plan qualified for the Labor Code § 226.2 (a)(7) safe harbor because it paid minimum wage in addition to piece-rate pay, not by "borrowing" from it. The court also held that an employer's mere access to log-in/log-out times does not, by itself, constitute constructive knowledge of off-the-clock work.

This decision validates hybrid pay structures under § 226.2 and shields employers from constructive knowledge claims based solely on their access to electronic time records.

In Munoz v. The Regents of the University of California (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 466, the Court of Appeal held that the UC's policy barring the hiring of students without federal work authorization is facially discriminatory under FEHA, finding that "lack of work authorization" is not materially distinct from protected "immigration status" (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11028 (f)(3)). The court then held that an employer's "litigation risk" is not, by itself, a sufficient justification for the discriminatory policy.

This decision prevents employers from using speculative litigation fears as a defense to discrimination, forcing them to instead demonstrate that the policy is actually required by federal law or "reasonably necessary" for business operations.

In McMahon v. World Vision, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 147 F.4th 959, the Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception barred the Title VII discrimination claims of a customer service representative (CSR) terminated for being in a same-sex marriage. Applying the functional test from Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) 591 U.S. 732, the court found the CSR performed "vital religious duties" central to the organization's mission, even if her duties were preponderantly secular.

This decision expands the ministerial exception's reach into roles traditionally viewed as secular, confirming that employees whose jobs are deemed central to a religious organization's "core mission" can be barred from bringing discrimination claims.

In Hirdman v. Charter Communications, LLC (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 376, the Court of Appeal held the term "exempt employees" in Labor Code § 246 (l)(3) (a paid sick leave calculation method) is unambiguous and includes all exempt categories, such as outside salespersons, not just A/E/P employees.

This decision confirms the broad, plain-meaning scope of this calculation method and serves as a strong reminder that when statutory text is clear, courts will reject attempts to narrow it using extrinsic evidence like legislative history or informal DLSE opinion letters.

In Platt v. Sodexo, S.A. (9th Cir. 2025) 148 F.4th 709, the Ninth Circuit held that an employee's continued participation in an ERISA plan does not constitute consent to a unilaterally added arbitration provision for their individual claims. However, for fiduciary duty claims on behalf of the Plan (§ 502 (a)(2)), the court held the Plan itself is the consenting party. Despite finding the Plan did consent via an amendment clause, the court still found the agreement unenforceable because its representative action waiver violated the effective vindication doctrine by preventing the plaintiff from seeking statutory, plan-wide relief under § 409 (a).

This decision protects ERISA plaintiffs on two fronts, requiring affirmative consent for individual claims and invalidating representative action waivers that attempt to bar plan-wide fiduciary duty claims.

In Lister v. City of Las Vegas (2025) 148 F.4th 690, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a defense judgment, holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion by reconciling an inconsistent jury verdict itself rather than resubmitting it to the jury. The jury inconsistently awarded $150,000 after finding the plaintiff suffered harassment but not based on protected class membership. The district court correctly entered judgment for the defendant with zero damages after polling confirmed the "no race/gender basis" finding.

This decision affirms a court's discretion to resolve verdict inconsistencies based on clear jury polling.

In Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 920, the Court of Appeal held that an employer's successful "same-decision" defense under Labor Code § 1102.6 provides a complete bar to all relief, including attorney's fees and costs, for a § 1102.5 whistleblower plaintiff. Reversing a substantial fee award, the court ruled that because the same-decision finding means the plaintiff obtained no relief, they did not bring a "successful action" under § 1102.5(j) and were not the prevailing party.

This decision explicitly rejects applying FEHA's "mixed-motive" framework to whistleblower claims, solidifying that the § 1102.6 defense is "all-or-nothing."

In CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (Sanchez) (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 872, the Court of Appeal held that a PAGA plaintiff can maintain standing for a representative action even after voluntarily dismissing their own individual PAGA claims. The court, applying the pre-2024 version of Labor Code § 2699, found the statute ambiguous, interpreting the phrase "on behalf of himself or herself and other... employees" disjunctively (as "and/or") to align with PAGA's enforcement purpose.

This decision deepens the appellate split on "headless" PAGA actions, directly conflicting with Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 and Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 932 by holding that the pre-2024 statute does not require a plaintiff to maintain a live individual component to pursue representative penalties.

In Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 822, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for a public employer, holding that its COVID-19 return-to-office mandate was a discretionary decision shielded by Government Tort Claims Act immunity (Gov. Code § 855.4). Critically, the court also held that an employer's engagement in the FEHA interactive process "is not an admission [the employee] was disabled," as a contrary rule would contravene public policy by discouraging employer engagement.

This decision provides public entities with a strong immunity defense for pandemic-related employment decisions and, more broadly, confirms that employers do not concede an employee's disability status simply by engaging in accommodation discussions.

In Brown v. City of Inglewood (2025) 18 Cal. 5th 33, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that elected city officials are not "employees" as defined by Lab. Code § 1102.6 and thus cannot sue for whistleblower retaliation under § 1102.5. The Court affirmed the dismissal of a city treasurer's claim, reasoning that the statute's omission of elected officials (while listing other public employees) reflects a clear legislative intent to protect "rank-and-file" employees, not public officers who answer to the electorate.

This decision clarifies that § 1102.5 protections do not extend to elected officials and confirms that the common law test for employment does not override clear legislative intent to exclude them.

In Harrington v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 142 F.4th 678, the Ninth Circuit issued two major holdings limiting FLSA collective actions. First, it held that a court abuses its discretion by authorizing notice to employees who are indisputably subject to arbitration agreements. Second, it held that the specific personal jurisdiction requirements from Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court of California (2017), 582 U.S. 255 do apply to FLSA collectives, meaning a district court lacks jurisdiction over claims from out-of-state opt-in plaintiffs who lack ties to the forum.

This decision severely curtails the ability of plaintiffs to bring nationwide FLSA collective actions, forcing such suits to be filed in the defendant's home state or limiting them to in-state plaintiffs.

In Allison v. Dignity Health (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 192, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decertification of a meal and rest break class, holding that "new evidence" justifying decertification is not limited to newly existing facts but can include the plaintiffs' own post-certification declarations and expert analysis. The court also affirmed that under the Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58 framework, the employer's evidence of "idiosyncratic reasons for noncompliant meal periods" was sufficient to show individual issues predominated.

This decision expands the definition of "new evidence" available to defendants at the decertification stage and reinforces the high bar plaintiffs face in proving class-wide liability for break violations.

In Stanley v. City of Sanford (2025) 606 U.S. 46, the U.S. Supreme Court held 8-1 that retirees are not "qualified individuals" protected by Title I of the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a)). Affirming the dismissal of a disabled retiree's benefits claim, the Court reasoned that the statute unambiguously refers to current employees or job applicants, not former employees.

This decision resolves a major circuit split and forecloses ADA Title I claims brought by individuals who are already retired. However, the Court expressly left unresolved whether a plaintiff could sue by properly alleging that (1) they were disabled while still employed and (2) the discriminatory benefits policy impacted them during that time.

In Damiano v. Grants Pass School District No. 7 (9th Cir. 2025) 140 F.4th 1117, the Ninth Circuit vacated summary judgment for a public employer, clarifying and lowering the evidentiary bar for employees on several key claims.

For First Amendment retaliation, the court held the district failed to prove sufficient actual or predicted disruption under the Pickering balance test to justify its actions as a matter of law. For the Fourteenth Amendment, the court held that alleging viewpoint-based disparate treatment is a cognizable equal protection claim, even without protected class membership. Finally, for Title VII, it held plaintiffs do not need to identify comparators at the prima facie stage and can instead show "circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination."

In Palm Springs Promenade, LLC v. Dept. of Industrial Relations (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1294, the Court of Appeal held that a development project is not a "municipal affair" exempt from the state's Prevailing Wage Law (PWL) under the "home rule" provision (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5 (a)) when it is predominantly financed, managed, and owned by a private entity. The court found that the city's minority (25%) financial contribution was insufficient to make the project a municipal affair, even though it qualified as a "public work" under Lab. Code § 1720 (a)(1).

This decision clarifies the limits of "home rule" authority, preventing charter cities from shielding private developers from the PWL on projects that are not fundamentally public in their financing and control.

In Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1311, the Court of Appeal held that an arbitration agreement and a separate employment agreement, when executed as parts of substantially one transaction, must be read together as one contract under Civ. Code § 1642, even without explicit cross-references.

Affirming the denial of a motion to compel, the court found the combined effect of the two agreements created "notable substantive unconscionability" by imposing nonmutual arbitration obligations and remedies. The court also affirmed the trial court's discretion to refuse to sever the unconscionable terms.

In Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1009, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, holding that severe procedural unconscionability can itself render the agreement unenforceable. The court found the employer's "express misleading" was so significant that it rendered the agreement unconscionable without the court needing to analyze its other substantively unfair terms.

This decision confirms that fraudulent conduct during the execution of an arbitration agreement can be a fatal flaw, voiding the entire contract regardless of its content.

In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services (2025) 605 U.S. 303, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that Title VII plaintiffs from a majority group do not face a heightened "background circumstances" evidentiary standard to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Court affirmed that the text of Title VII prohibits varying the standard based on whether the plaintiff is in a majority or minority group.

This decision resolves a Circuit split, confirming that all disparate treatment plaintiffs face the same initial evidentiary burden and eliminating the extra hurdle previously imposed on so-called "reverse discrimination" claims in some circuits.

In Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 516, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff whose own Labor Code violations are time-barred still has standing as an "aggrieved employee" under the former version of Labor Code § 2699 (c) to pursue a representative PAGA action for timely violations suffered by other employees. Reversing a demurrer, the court followed Johnson v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 924 and distinguished PAGA standing (merely suffering a violation) from the timeliness of the remedy sought.

This decision creates a direct and outcome-determinative split with Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group (2025) 110 Cal. App. 5th 932, which held the plaintiff's own claim must be timely, potentially setting the stage for review by the California Supreme Court.

In Carranza v. City of Los Angeles (2025) 111 Cal. App. 5th 388, the Court of Appeal affirmed a $4 million FEHA hostile work environment (HWE) sexual harassment verdict, holding that the "severe or pervasive" standard does not require "extreme" conduct or that the plaintiff experience direct, daily harassing interactions. The court rejected the employer's reliance on cases predating Gov. Code § 12923's clarification of FEHA, affirming that the employer's failure to stop the circulation of a nude photo resembling the plaintiff was sufficient to establish a hostile environment.

This decision confirms that an employer's failure to remedy known harassing conduct can create an actionable HWE, even if that conduct isn't directed at the plaintiff daily.

In Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 162, the Court of Appeal held that a prevailing defendant in a PAGA action cannot recover costs under C.C.P. § 1032 (b) from the LWDA when the agency did not actively participate in the litigation. The court reversed a $125,000 cost award against the LWDA, rejecting the defense argument that the PAGA plaintiff acts as the LWDA's agent.

This decision shields the LWDA from cost liability in failed PAGA suits, protecting the state from the financial risks of representative cases it does not directly manage.

In Parker v. BNSF Railway Company, (9th Cir. 2025) 137 F.4th 957, the Ninth Circuit en banc affirmed that an employer can defeat an FRSA retaliation claim using the "same decision" affirmative defense, even if the employee's protected activity was a contributing factor "in part." The court clarified that the statutory framework (49 U.S.C. § 42121 (b)) is not altered by the "in part" language. A plaintiff's showing that protected activity was a "contributing factor" merely shifts the burden, and the employer can still prevail by proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same adverse action absent that protected activity.

This decision solidifies the "same decision" standard as a complete affirmative defense to FRSA claims.

In Reyes v. Hi-Grade Materials Co. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1089, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff cannot retroactively invoke the death knell doctrine to appeal a class certification denial by later voluntarily dismissing their remaining PAGA claims.

The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that jurisdiction is determined at the time of the order being appealed. Because the plaintiff's PAGA claims were still pending when class certification was denied, the death knell doctrine was inapplicable, and the plaintiff could not "manufacture" jurisdiction over a year later by dismissing the claims that had previously blocked the interlocutory appeal.

In Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 932, the Court of Appeal held that the one-year PAGA statute of limitations applies to the plaintiff's own individual violations, which the court found are a necessary component of any PAGA action. The court affirmed a demurrer where the plaintiff failed to allege a personal violation within the one-year period, ruling that timeliness cannot be based on violations suffered by other aggrieved employees.

This decision deepens the appellate split on PAGA pleading, explicitly following Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 and rejecting Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533.

In Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 899, the Court of Appeal held that revocable, prospective waivers of meal breaks for shifts lasting between 5 and 6 hours are legally valid. The court affirmed summary adjudication for the employer, finding that the plain text of Labor Code § 512 and the relevant Wage Orders, which allow waiver by "mutual consent," do not specify the timing or form of the waiver.

This decision confirms that employers may lawfully obtain written meal break waivers (for 5-6 hour shifts) from employees in advance, such as at hiring, rather than being required to obtain that consent contemporaneously.

In Ford v. The Silver F, Inc. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 553, the Court of Appeal held that a pre-Viking River arbitration agreement carving out "representative PAGA claims" bars arbitration of all PAGA claims, including the "individual" component. The court affirmed the denial of a motion to compel, finding that at the time of drafting, PAGA claims were considered indivisible, and the parties intended a broad exclusion.

Following Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592, this decision confirms that employers cannot retroactively apply Viking River's individual/representative split to ambiguous carve-outs that were clearly intended to exclude PAGA entirely.

In Krug v. Board of Trustees of the California State University (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 234, the Court of Appeal held that Labor Code § 2802, the employee expense reimbursement statute, does not apply to public employers. Following the analytical framework from Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040, the court affirmed a demurrer, reasoning that the Legislature's practice of explicitly including public entities in other specific Labor Code provisions demonstrates its intent to exclude them from § 2802's general provisions.

This decision confirms that public employees have no statutory right under § 2802 to be reimbursed for necessary work-related expenses, including remote work costs.

In Cahill v. Nike, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 131 F.4th 933, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court has the inherent authority to order an intervenor to return or destroy confidential documents inadvertently disclosed during discovery. The court ruled that because the intervenor (a media group) did not obtain the documents "through means independent of the court's processes" (Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart (1984) 467 U.S. 20, 34), it was subject to the court's discovery orders just like any other party.

This decision confirms a court's power to enforce its protective orders and "claw back" privileged materials extends to intervenors, who cannot claim immunity from discovery rules.

In Perez v. Rose Hills Company (9th Cir. 2025) 131 F.4th 804, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant removing a class action under CAFA does not need to submit evidence to support its amount in controversy calculation, provided its calculation is a "reasonable interpretation" of the plaintiff's complaint. Following Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott (9th Cir. 2019) 936 F.3d 920, 925 the court clarified that a defendant may rely on "a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions" based solely on the complaint's allegations.

This decision lowers the bar for CAFA removal, shifting the district court's inquiry from whether the defendant proved the amount with evidence to whether the defendant's assumptions based on the complaint are reasonable.

In Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 478, the Court of Appeal held that under CCP § 437c(b)(3), a trial court has discretion to grant a summary judgment motion based solely on the opposing party's failure to file the required separate statement, even without an opposition. The court clarified that when it exercises this discretion, it is not obligated to conduct its own independent analysis of whether the moving party met its initial substantive burden.

This decision confirms that the failure to file a separate statement is not just a procedural flaw but is, by itself, a sufficient statutory ground for granting summary judgment.

In Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 317, the Court of Appeal held that a PAGA plaintiff with overlapping claims has no right to intervene in or move to vacate another's PAGA settlement. Closely following Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, the court affirmed that PAGA provides no statutory right to intervene (CCP § 387) or vacate (CCP § 663).

This decision confirms Turrieta as the controlling law and applies to pending cases, rejecting a "law of the case" argument from a prior appeal and solidifying the bar against intervention by competing PAGA plaintiffs.

In Serrano v. Public Employees' Retirement System (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 96, the Court of Appeal held that the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) does not guarantee the pensionability of pay additives received during union leave. The court clarified that while Gov. Code § 3505.4 requires an employer to continue pay, pensionability is governed exclusively by the Public Employees' Retirement Law (PERL). Pay additives must therefore independently satisfy PERL's definition of "compensation earnable" (Gov. Code § 20636).

This decision severs the link between the MMBA's pay continuation mandate and pension calculations, confirming that pay additives received during union leave are not pensionable unless they separately meet PERL's strict requirements.

In Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 56, the Court of Appeal held that an employer's denial of a disability retirement application is not an "adverse employment action" actionable under FEHA. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the alternative ground that the plaintiff was not a "qualified individual" under FEHA because he concededly could not perform his essential job duties.

This decision reinforces that the exclusive remedy to challenge a retirement denial is the administrative writ process, not a FEHA discrimination lawsuit.

In Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69, the Court of Appeal held that a court cannot compel arbitration of an individual PAGA claim if the plaintiff's complaint explicitly pleads the claim in a representative capacity only. Affirming the denial of the motion to compel, the court held that the complaint's allegations are determinative, and since no individual claim was asserted, there was nothing to arbitrate.

This decision creates a direct and explicit split with Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, which it expressly disapproved. It provides a clear roadmap for plaintiffs to avoid Viking River arbitration by pleading, though it leaves open a potential defense challenge that such a "representative only" complaint fails to state a valid PAGA claim under the statute.

In Lui v. DeJoy (9th Cir. 2025) 129 F.4th 770, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on a Title VII disparate treatment claim, holding that the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test is satisfied if the plaintiff is replaced by "a person outside the protected class," even if that replacement is not "similarly situated."

This decision clarifies and lightens the plaintiff's prima facie burden in replacement cases by separating the simple fourth-element test from the more complex "similarly situated" analysis often used to show pretext.

In Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1297, the Court of Appeal, on remand from the California Supreme Court, refused to sever unconscionable provisions from an arbitration agreement and instead affirmed the trial court's order voiding the entire agreement. The court reasoned that the agreement's "multiple defects" indicated a deliberate intent to secure an unfair advantage, and that severance would "impermissibly rewrite" the contract.

This decision confirms that California courts will not repair arbitration agreements that are permeated with unconscionability, as doing so would encourage employers to draft one-sided contracts.

In Arzate v. ACE American Insurance Company (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1191, the Court of Appeal held that a trial court's order lifting an arbitration stay and finding the defendant had waived arbitration is immediately appealable. The court ruled such an order is the "functional equivalent" of an order denying a motion to compel and that under the parties’ agreement, Plaintiff was required to initiate arbitration.

This decision confirms a defendant's right to appeal a post-stay waiver finding and clarifies that the burden of initiating arbitration remains a question of contractual interpretation.

In Sandhu v. Bd. of Admin. of CalPERS (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1048, the Court of Appeal held that a CalPERS retiree working for a private contractor was a common law employee of the public agencies he was assigned to, thus violating CalPERS post-retirement work rules. Applying the Borello "control of details" test, the court found a co-employment relationship.

This decision confirms that contractual language disclaiming an employment relationship is immaterial and that courts will look past such formalities to the realities of control when determining co-employment status in the CalPERS context.

In Vo v. Technology Credit Union (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 632, the Court of Appeal held that an arbitration agreement incorporating JAMS rules is not substantively unconscionable on the basis of discovery limitations, because JAMS Rule 17(b) provides the arbitrator with authority to order non-party discovery.

The court reversed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration and expressly disapproved the contrary holding in Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, holding that it was based on an impermissible assumption that third parties might refuse an arbitrator's discovery order.

In Casey v. Superior Court (D.R. Horton Inc.) (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 575, the Court of Appeal held that the federal EFAA preempts conflicting state law that would otherwise compel arbitration of sexual harassment claims, even if the parties' agreement contains a state law choice-of-law provision. The court found that because the dispute involved interstate commerce, the EFAA applies and cannot be sidestepped by a contractual choice-of-law clause. The court also held that the EFAA renders the arbitration agreement unenforceable as to all of the plaintiff's claims, not just the sexual harassment count.

This decision confirms that the EFAA provides a powerful bar to arbitration for an entire case, overriding contractual attempts to select state law.

In Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. v. City of Long Beach (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 540, the Court of Appeal held that a subcontractor may seek indemnity under Labor Code § 1781 from a higher-tiered contractor for prevailing wage violations, even when the underlying wage claims were resolved via an arbitration award.

The court reasoned that a confirmed arbitration award has the same force and effect as a court judgment for the purposes of the statute. However, the court also affirmed that Labor Code § 1784, which creates different indemnity rights, does not apply retroactively to conduct that occurred before its 2022 enactment.

In Hearn v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 301, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff cannot recover in tort for conduct that is inherently part of the termination process, such as an internal investigation report, if the alleged harm is the same as the harm from the termination itself. Reversing a defamation judgment, ruling that an independent tort claim requires proof of separate conduct and separate damages (e.g., reputational harm) not resulting solely from the job loss.

This decision strongly reinforces that plaintiffs cannot "plead around" wrongful termination law to recover tort damages without proving a truly independent wrong.

In Associated General Contractors v. Dept. of Industrial Relations (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 243, the Court of Appeal upheld new apprenticeship regulations (8 CCR § 202 et seq.) that require apprentices on public works projects to perform only work within their specific, approved training programs. The court affirmed this was a valid exercise of the California Apprenticeship Council's authority and, in doing so, expressly disapproved the holding in Henson v. C. Overaa & Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 184, which had previously defined an apprentice's trade more broadly by the work of journeymen.

This decision solidifies the agency's power to strictly define and limit the tasks apprentices can perform on public works jobs.

In Villalva v. Bombardier Mass Transit Corp. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 211, the Court of Appeal held that a wage and hour plaintiff who loses their claim at a Berman hearing but subsequently prevails in a trial de novo is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Labor Code §§ 218.5, 226, and 119. It ruled that the trial de novo is an independent "action," not merely an appeal governed by the fee-shifting limits of § 98.2 (c).

This decision confirms that employees do not forfeit their statutory right to attorney's fees by first pursuing, and even losing, an informal Berman hearing.

In E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera (2025) 604 U.S. 45, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that an employer must prove an employee qualifies for an FLSA exemption by a preponderance of the evidence, rejecting the Fourth Circuit's heightened "clear and convincing" standard. The Court affirmed that preponderance is the default civil standard and found no reason to apply an exception, noting the FLSA is silent on the issue and that even Title VII claims do not require a heightened burden.

This decision resolves a circuit split and clarifies that employers do not face an elevated evidentiary bar when asserting FLSA exemptions.

In Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, the Court of Appeal held that all PAGA actions necessarily include an "individual claim" subject to arbitration, even if the plaintiff only pleads a representative action. Reversing the denial of a motion to compel, the court held that Labor Code § 2699 (a) inherently bundles an individual claim within any PAGA suit.

This ruling revives a key defense argument that PAGA claims are inherently divisible for arbitration, teeing up the issue for Supreme Court review.

In Markel v. Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (9th Cir. 2024) 124 F.4th 796, the Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception bars unpaid overtime (FLSA) and fraud claims brought by a mashgiach (kosher supervisor) against a kosher certifying organization. Applying the functional test from Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe, the court found the defendant was a religious institution despite its commercial activities and the plaintiff was a minister because he performed "vital religious duties."

This decision expands the ministerial exception's reach into commercial/regulatory religious roles and confirms it bars wage-related claims.

In Winston v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 402, the Court of Appeal held that Labor Code § 1102.5(j)'s attorney fee provision applies retroactively to cases that were pending when the statute was enacted. The court affirmed the long-standing rule that fee-shifting statutes are procedural and apply to active litigation absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.

This decision confirms that plaintiffs in pending whistleblower cases can recover fees under § 1102.5(j), even if their case was filed before the fee provision existed.

In Chavez v. California Collision (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 298, the Court of Appeal held that a defendant in a wage and hour action cannot recover costs under Code of Civil Procedure § 998. Following Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 221, the court held that the specific, one-way cost-shifting provisions of Labor Code §§ 1194 and 218.5 displace the general, two-way framework of § 998.

This decision solidifies that employers are barred from recovering § 998 costs in wage actions, preserving the Labor Code's policy of protecting plaintiffs from cost-shifting penalties unless their claim was brought in bad faith.

In Quesada v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 880, the Court of Appeal held that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does not apply to non-discrimination claims, such as a public employee's writ of mandate proceeding alleging a promotion was denied based on a time-barred investigation. The court affirmed the denial of the writ, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that evidentiary difficulties (like confidentiality agreements) justified borrowing the framework.

This decision confirms that the McDonnell Douglas test is limited to discrimination cases and cannot be used by plaintiffs in other employment disputes to ease their burden of proof.

In Wawrzenski v. United Airlines (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment on FEHA claims, holding that the trial court applied too high an evidentiary standard. The court clarified that comparator evidence need only be "similar in all relevant respects," not identical, and that evidence of pretext—such as a failure to investigate the plaintiff's internal complaints—must be properly considered.

This decision lowers the evidentiary bar for FEHA plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage by confirming that courts must broadly evaluate pretext and cannot reject comparator evidence based on minor differences.

In Rodriguez v. Lawrence Equipment, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 645, the Court of Appeal held that an arbitrator's final ruling against a plaintiff on their individual Labor Code claims can preclude that plaintiff's standing to pursue a subsequent PAGA claim based on the same alleged violations. Applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, the court reasoned that if the arbitrator necessarily decided the plaintiff was not an "aggrieved employee" (i.e., suffered no violation), the plaintiff loses the necessary standing to represent the state.

This decision confirms that the procedural separation of PAGA claims does not bar the preclusive effect of an adverse arbitration award, making the outcome of the individual arbitration determinative of PAGA standing.

In Bedard v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 442, the Court of Appeal affirmed the termination of a police officer for refusing to comply with a city's COVID-19 vaccination ordinance, holding that a violation of Skelly rights does not automatically require reinstatement when the underlying conduct justifies the termination.

The decision confirms that the remedy for a pre-termination due process (Skelly) violation is typically back pay only for the period of the delay, not reversal of the termination itself. This reinforces a clear distinction between procedural defects and the substantive validity of public employee discipline.

In Ramirez v. City of Indio (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 939, the Court of Appeal affirmed the termination of a public employee despite a favorable arbitral recommendation, holding that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) granted the city manager final, non-deferential authority over the termination decision.

This decision reinforces that the explicit terms of an MOU control the disciplinary process for public employees, even when they conflict with an arbitrator's findings.

In Bath v. State of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1184, the Court of Appeal held that a public employee's right to compensation for work already performed matures into an independent contractual right that can be pursued as a breach of contract claim, even if the relevant Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) might bar parallel Labor Code claims.

This decision provides public employees with an independent, contract-based cause of action for unpaid wages that bypasses common statutory defenses like the Portal-to-Portal Act at the pleading stage.

In Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791, the Court of Appeal held that when a plaintiff asserts at least one sexual harassment claim governed by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), the entire action is rendered non-arbitrable. The court affirmed the denial of a motion to compel, finding that the EFAA's language precludes arbitration of all associated claims.

This decision significantly expands the EFAA's impact in mixed-claim lawsuits by preventing the severance and arbitration of non-sexual harassment claims.

In Wentworth v. Regents of the University of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 580, the Court of Appeal issued a key ruling on the Information Practices Act (IPA) (Civ. Code § 1798 et seq.), holding that personal information need not be "confidential" or "private" to be protected from unauthorized disclosure by a state agency. The court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim, clarifying that the IPA broadly protects records that are "linked to" an individual, regardless of their confidential status.

This decision expands the scope of the IPA, exposing state agencies to liability for the improper disclosure of a wider range of employee information.

In Mooney v. Fife (9th Cir. 2024) 118 F.4th 1081, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a False Claims Act (FCA) retaliation claim, holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies, and explicitly rejecting a heightened notice standard for compliance officers or employees whose job involves reporting misconduct. The court affirmed that the employee satisfied the FCA's notice requirement and engaged in protected activity by reporting potential violations.

This decision simplifies the path for compliance officers to bring retaliation claims by confirming they are subject to the same standard of proof as other employees.

In Miller v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 261, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment against a FEHA disability plaintiff, holding that an employee cannot sustain a disability discrimination claim if they cannot perform essential job functions even with accommodations, and that an employer's refusal to file for disability retirement is not a "failure to accommodate" under FEHA.

This decision confirms the burden on FEHA plaintiffs to prove the objective existence of an effective accommodation and clarifies that the statute cannot be used to compel an employer to initiate the retirement process.

In Kim v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 252, the Court of Appeal held that Uber was not vicariously liable for a driver's negligence when the driver was "offline" at the time of the accident. It rejected as speculative Plaintiff's argument that the driver (who struck a pedestrian four minutes after logging off) was still in the scope of employment because he merely intended to log back on later.

This decision strongly reinforces that the app's "online" status is the dispositive, bright-line test for vicarious liability, shielding rideshare companies from liability for a driver's conduct during offline periods, irrespective of the driver's intent to work later.

In Silloway v. City and County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 2024) 117 F.4th 1070, the Ninth Circuit held that an employee's FLSA "salary basis" status depends on actual pay practices, not employment contracts or official titles. Reversing summary judgment for an employer that relied on an ordinance calling nurses "salaried," the court held that post-2004 FLSA regulations require analyzing actual pay, and found evidence of improper deductions.

The court also held that a pay correction process does not provide a safe harbor (29 C.F.R. § 541.603(c)) if the improper deductions were not "isolated or inadvertent," confirming employers cannot rely on titles if their pay practices are inconsistent with exempt status.

In Parker v. BNSF Railway Company (9th Cir. 2024) 112 F.4th 687, the Ninth Circuit reversed a defense judgment in a Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) retaliation case, holding the district court applied the wrong standard for the employer's affirmative defense.

The court clarified that once a plaintiff shows their protected activity was a "contributing factor" (49 U.S.C. §20109(a)(2)), an employer cannot prevail by arguing the contribution was "very little." Instead, the employer must meet the high burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same adverse action absent the protected activity.

In Taylor v. Tesla, Inc. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 75, the Court of Appeal held that an employer's refusal to provide statutory Labor Code records is not protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court affirmed the denial of Tesla's motion, reasoning that the refusal was "simply conduct" and not a protected statement, even though the requests were related to separate, pending litigation.

This decision prevents employers from using an anti-SLAPP motion to strike PAGA claims that are based on the failure to comply with these common statutory records requests.

In Kennedy v. Las Vegas Sands Corp (9th Cir. 2024) 110 F.4th 1136, the Ninth Circuit held that corporate jet pilots are exempt from FLSA overtime, finding their duties involve significant mental complexity and specialized knowledge that satisfy the professional exemption. The court also affirmed that the pilots' on-call time was not compensable "time worked," finding that the pilots were sufficiently free to engage in personal activities.

This decision confirms the professional exemption's applicability to pilots and upholds the Owens standard for analyzing the compensability of flexible on-call arrangements.

In Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040, the California Supreme Court held that public employers are generally exempt from the Labor Code, and thus PAGA, because government entities are excluded from the statutory definition of "employer" (Labor Code § 18). The court found a clear legislative intent to exclude public entities unless a specific provision explicitly includes them, rejecting the sovereign powers doctrine and adopting a broad definition of "municipal corporation."

This decision definitively shields public sector employers from PAGA liability and most wage and hour claims, confirming they are not subject to the same statutory framework as private employers.

In Bailey v. San Francisco District Attorney's Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, the California Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for an employer, issuing two key holdings: (1) a single racial slur by a coworker (not just a supervisor) can be severe enough to support a FEHA harassment claim under the "totality of the circumstances" test from Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17; and (2) an HR manager's acts of obstructing an employee's harassment complaint can constitute an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim under Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028.

This decision lowers the summary judgment bar for single-incident harassment claims and confirms that actively obstructing an internal complaint is itself an actionable retaliatory harm.

In Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, the California Supreme Court held 4-3 that PAGA plaintiffs are not parties to parallel PAGA actions and thus lack intrinsic standing to intervene (CCP § 387(d)), object to, or move to vacate a settlement in a separate case against the same employer.

This decision effectively prioritizes the "first to settle" PAGA action, making it much harder for competing plaintiffs to challenge a potentially inadequate "reverse auction" settlement.

In Castellanos, et al. v. State of California, et al. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 588, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 22 against a key constitutional challenge, ruling that its workers' compensation provision (Bus. & Prof. Code § 7451) is valid. The court held that the Legislature's "plenary power" over workers' compensation is not exclusive and does not prevent the people from legislating on the same subject through the initiative process.

By limiting its holding to § 7451 and reserving judgment on other provisions, the court handed a major victory to app-based driver companies, ensuring Prop 22 survives while leaving the door open for future, narrower challenges.

In Ruelas v. County of Alameda et al. (9th Cir. 2024) 108 F.4th 1208, the Ninth Circuit formally adopted the California Supreme Court's recent answer to its certified question (issued Apr. 22, 2024), holding that nonconvicted county inmates are not entitled to Labor Code protections, even when working for a private contractor.

This order procedurally finalizes the California Supreme Court's dispositive ruling, confirming that pretrial detainees are exempt from state minimum wage law.

In Okonowsky v. Garland (9th Cir. 2024) 109 F.4th 1166, the Ninth Circuit held that Title VII hostile work environment (HWE) claims are not limited to the physical workplace, ruling that offsite conduct (like a supervisor's social media posts) and non-sexual retaliatory conduct must be considered in the "totality of the circumstances" (citing Galdamez v. Potter (9th Cir. 2005) 415 F.3d 1015).

This decision confirms that the HWE analysis includes online harassment and subsequent non-sexual intimidation, making it harder for employers to dispose of such claims before trial.

In Kama v. Mayorkas (9th Cir. 2024) 107 F.4th 1054, the Ninth Circuit held that temporal proximity (56 days) between an employee's EEO complaint and their termination, even coupled with supervisor awareness, was insufficient to show pretext for Title VII retaliation. The court affirmed summary judgment, holding that temporal proximity alone rarely suffices, particularly where the employer has a documented, intervening, and non-retaliatory reason for the termination (here, the employee's refusal to cooperate with a misconduct investigation).

This decision reinforces that a close timeline is not a substitute for evidence of actual retaliatory animus, especially when the employee’s own actions break the causal chain.

In Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Center, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 108 F.4th 765, the Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception barred an ADA claim brought by a "work practice apprentice" at a Zen Buddhist temple. Following Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC (2012) 565 U.S. 171, the court ruled the exception applied because the plaintiff performed "vital religious duties," such as assisting with rituals and participating in meditation, even though his other work was mostly menial.

This decision confirms a broad application of the ministerial exception, focusing on the religious function of the employee rather than their formal title or the secular nature of their other tasks.

In Cadena v. Customer Connexx LLC (9th Cir. 2024)107 F.4th 902, the Ninth Circuit held that the de minimis doctrine remains a valid defense to FLSA overtime claims after Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp. (2014) 571 U.S. 220, but confirmed that the employer bears the burden of proving the uncompensated time is de minimis. Reversing summary judgment for the employer for a second time, the court found triable issues of fact as to whether time spent booting up computers was de minimis.

This decision confirms that while the de minimis defense survives, it is an affirmative defense that presents a high factual bar for employers to clear on summary judgment.

In Musquiz v. U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (9th Cir. 2024) 106 F.4th 881, the Ninth Circuit split liability for an annuity overpayment, holding that while the employee was "at fault" for the initial period where he failed to report higher income, he was "without fault" for all overpayments made after the RRB was notified of his correct income but continued to overpay him.

This decision signals that the RRB cannot knowingly continue its own error and then seek full recovery from an annuitant, especially when equitable factors like the annuitant's age, health, and finances weigh against repayment.

In Perez v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 105 F.4th 1222, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer may use non-medical evidence, such as private surveillance, to challenge the validity of an FMLA certification and terminate an employee for faking an injury. The court affirmed judgment for the employer, explicitly rejecting the rule from Sims v. Alameda–Contra Costa Transit Dist. (N.D. Cal. 1998) 2 F. Supp. 2d 1253 that a contrary medical opinion is required.

This decision confirms that employers are not limited to a "battle of the experts" and can use evidence of an employee's actual conduct to rebut a certification they believe is fraudulent.

In Paleny v. Fireplace Products U.S., Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 199, the Court of Appeal held that an employee's egg retrieval and freezing procedures were not protected as a "pregnancy-related medical condition" under the pre-2023 version of FEHA. The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer, finding that because the plaintiff was not pregnant and had not identified an underlying related medical condition or disability, her fertility procedures did not qualify as a protected characteristic.

This decision underscores the importance of the recent amendment covering "reproductive health decision-making," which the court noted the plaintiff failed to argue was retroactive.

In Rajaram v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 105 F.4th 1179, the Ninth Circuit held 2-1 that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits hiring discrimination against U.S. citizens. Reversing a dismissal, the court ruled that § 1981's guarantee of parity between "all persons" and "citizens" is violated by an alleged practice of favoring noncitizen H-1B visa holders.

This decision creates a significant circuit split by explicitly rejecting the Fifth Circuit's contrary holding in Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd. (5th Cir. 1986) 798 F.2d 731, opening a new front for "reverse-alienage" discrimination claims against employers.

In Lusardi Construction Co v. Dept of Industrial Relations (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1329, the Court of Appeal held that under former Labor Code § 1777.7(d), a prime contractor's actual knowledge of its subcontractor's apprentice violations (former § 1777.5) was sufficient by itself to establish joint and several liability for penalties. The court affirmed the denial of the prime's writ petition, finding substantial evidence supported the administrative finding of knowledge and rejecting the argument that knowledge alone was an insufficient basis for liability.

This decision confirms that prime contractors could be held liable for known subcontractor violations under the former public works statutory scheme.

In Frayo v. Martin. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1025, the Court of Appeal held that an employer did not violate the CMIA by firing an employee who refused a mandatory COVID-19 test. The court affirmed a demurrer, finding that (1) a request to take a test is not an unlawful request for a medical authorization under § 56.20(b), and (2) § 56.20(c) did not apply because the employer never possessed the plaintiff's "medical information" since he refused the test.

This decision confirms CMIA governs the handling of possessed data, not the act of requiring a test, and does not protect an employee from termination for refusing the test itself.

In Ibarra v. Chuy Sons Labor, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 874, the Court of Appeal held that a PAGA prefiling notice (Lab. Code §2699.3) is valid as long as it nonfrivolously alleges other aggrieved employees exist, even if it does not specifically define or identify them. The court reversed a judgment on the pleadings, holding that the scope of the representative group is a matter for discovery, not a pleading requirement for the notice.

This decision lowers the barrier for PAGA notices, preventing employers from defeating claims at the pleading stage based on the notice's lack of specificity.

In DeFries v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (9th Cir. 2024) 104 F.4th 1091, the Ninth Circuit held that American Pipe tolling continues for a putative class member unless their exclusion from a revised class definition is "unambiguous." The court reversed summary judgment for the defendant, finding that a motion by class counsel to narrow the class definition was ambiguous as to whether it excluded the plaintiff.

This decision protects bystander plaintiffs from losing their claims due to unclear class modifications.

In Ververka v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 162, the Court of Appeal held that an employer’s successful "same decision" defense under Labor Code §1102.6 is a complete bar to all relief for a § 1102.5 whistleblower plaintiff. The court rejected plaintiff's attempt to import FEHA's "substantial factor" framework from Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, which can allow for declaratory relief and fees.

This decision solidifies that the § 1102.6 framework provides an "all-or-nothing" outcome, making the defense more powerful than its FEHA counterpart.

In Hittle v. City of Stockton (9th Cir. 2024) 101 F.4th 1000, the Ninth Circuit, in denying rehearing, affirmed summary judgment by holding that a FEHA/Title VII plaintiff must produce "specific and substantial" circumstantial evidence to rebut a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination.

This decision solidifies the more stringent standard from Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. (9th Cir. 2005) 413 F.3d 1090 over the more lenient "very little evidence" language from Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs. (9th Cir. 2000) 225 F.3d 1115, making it tougher for such claims to survive summary judgment.

In Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, the Court of Appeal held that an employer's "ongoing inaction" in response to harassment complaints does not trigger the permanence exception to FEHA's continuing violations doctrine. The court ruled that permanence requires a definitive act or communication from the employer (like resolving the issue or communicating a refusal to do so), not just a passive failure to act.

This decision clarifies that employers cannot establish a "permanence" defense—and thus start the statute of limitations clock—simply by ignoring an employee's complaints over a long period.

In Olson et. al v. State of California (9th Cir. 2024) 104 F.4th 66, the Ninth Circuit en banc affirmed the dismissal of an Equal Protection challenge to A.B. 5, holding the law survives rational basis review. The court found that A.B. 5's complex framework and its distinctions between different types of referral services are rationally related to legitimate state interests, such as addressing worker misclassification.

This decision effectively ends the high-profile constitutional challenge by Uber and Postmates, confirming that the Legislature's line-drawing in the economic sphere is subject to a highly deferential standard.

In Diaz v. Macy’s West Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 101 F.4th 697, the Ninth Circuit held that when an employee's individual PAGA claim is compelled to arbitration, their non-individual (representative) PAGA claims are stayed in court, not dismissed. Following the California Supreme Court's controlling decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, the court affirmed that a plaintiff retains standing to pursue the representative claims in court after the individual arbitration is complete.

This decision confirms the Adolph procedure is the rule in the Ninth Circuit, preventing the dismissal of representative PAGA claims when an individual claim is arbitrated.

In Bafford et al. v. Administrative Committee of the Northrop Grumman Pension Plan (9th Cir. 2024) 101 F.4th 641, the Ninth Circuit held that a "substantially inaccurate" pension benefit statement violates ERISA’s disclosure requirements, and that online inquiries qualify as "written requests" under the statute. The court revived the plaintiffs' claim for statutory penalties (29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)), clarifying that such penalties do not require a finding of bad faith.

This decision exposes plan administrators to penalties for the content and accuracy of their disclosures, not just their failure to provide them, even if the error was an honest mistake.

In Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056, the California Supreme Court held that an employer's good faith, but mistaken, belief that its wage statements were accurate is a valid defense to "knowing and willful" wage statement penalties under Labor Code § 226. Affirming the denial of penalties for the failure to report missed-break premiums, the court reasoned the violation was not "knowing and willful" because the law on whether such premiums were "wages" was unsettled at the time.

This decision aligns the § 226 standard with the good faith defense for waiting time penalties (§ 203), protecting employers from penalties when they misinterpret ambiguous legal requirements.

In LaMarr v. The Regents of the University of California (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 671, the Court of Appeal held that an employee is not entitled to a Skelly hearing before voluntarily accepting a demotion to avoid potential (but not yet finalized) disciplinary action. The plaintiff chose a lower-paying position rather than risk termination (which would have triggered Skelly rights).

The court, citing Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, held that due process is not required where an employee "has voluntarily surrendered the property interest" and that requiring a pre-choice hearing would improperly expand Skelly to apply merely when an employer considers an adverse action.

In Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592, the Court of Appeal held that incorporating AAA rules by reference does not "clearly and unmistakably" delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator for unsophisticated employees. The court also affirmed the denial of a motion to compel, holding that the Viking River rule does not apply when an agreement explicitly carves out all PAGA claims.

This decision confirms that courts decide arbitrability absent exceptionally clear delegation and that employers are bound by their own explicit PAGA carve-outs.

In Ruelas v. County of Alameda et al. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 968, the California Supreme Court held that nonconvicted county inmates (pretrial detainees) are not entitled to minimum wage or overtime, even when working for a private contractor in the jail. The court found that Penal Code § 4019.3, which governs inmate labor, applies to all county inmates and exempts them from the Labor Code's wage provisions.

This decision definitively closes the door on state wage claims for pretrial detainees working in county jails, regardless of whether the work program is run by a public or private entity.

In Mattioda v. Nelson (9th Cir. 2024) 98 F.4th 1164, the Ninth Circuit held that hostile work environment (HWE) claims are cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The court noted that such claims are cognizable under the ADA and held they apply "by extension" to the Rehabilitation Act. It then reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's HWE claim, finding the district court failed to construe the allegations favorably under Iqbal/Twombly.

This decision formally confirms the viability of disability-based HWE claims under the Rehabilitation Act in the Ninth Circuit.

In Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff has standing to bring a representative PAGA action without also pleading a separate "individual" PAGA claim. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal, finding it improperly relied on Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 instead of the controlling standard from Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104.

This decision reinforces that PAGA standing under Adolph merely requires the plaintiff to be an "aggrieved employee"—one who was employed by the defendant and suffered at least one violation—not to bring a distinct individual cause of action.

In Kuigoua v. Department of Veteran Affairs (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 499, the Court of Appeal held that a FEHA plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by alleging substantially different facts, individuals, and timeframes at trial than those included in his DFEH/EEOC charge. Citing Guzman v. NBA Automotive, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1117, the court affirmed summary judgment, finding the new claims were not "like, or reasonably related to" the original charge, as an investigation would not have uncovered them.

This decision reinforces the "scope of the charge" rule, preventing plaintiffs from using an administrative charge as a mere placeholder for a completely different lawsuit.

In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) 601 U.S. 346, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that a Title VII discrimination plaintiff must show "some harm" to a "term or condition of employment," but the harm "need not be significant." The Court vacated an Eighth Circuit decision that had required a "significant change in working conditions," stating that this improperly "add[ed] words...to the statute" (2 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1)).

This decision significantly lowers the bar for discrimination claims based on job transfers, schedule changes, or loss of perks, making it much easier for such cases to survive summary judgment.

In Shah v. Skillz Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 285, the Court of Appeal held that lost stock options are not "wages" under the Labor Code, thus barring related tort claims. However, for the surviving breach of contract claim, the court held that damages for lost options may be measured based on "equitable considerations," not just the strict date of breach.

This decision forecloses statutory wage and tort claims for lost options but provides a crucial "equitable" path for plaintiffs to argue for a more favorable valuation date in volatile markets.

In Silva v. Medic Ambulance Service, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 172, the Court of Appeal affirmed the retroactive application of EAESPA (Lab. Code §880 et seq.), holding its validation of "on-call" ambulance rest breaks constitutionally extinguishes pre-existing claims per the factors in In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 592. The court also affirmed $2,000 in sanctions against plaintiff's counsel for challenging this settled precedent.

This holding solidifies EAESPA's retroactive effect and serves as a reminder that challenging established appellate holdings is sanctionable.

In Gramajo v. Joe’s Pizza on Sunset, Inc.(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1094, the Court of Appeal held that a trial court's discretion to deny costs for a low recovery under Code of Civil Procedure §1033(a) is preempted by Labor Code §1194(a)'s mandate to award fees and costs to prevailing minimum wage plaintiffs "irrespective of the amount recovered."

This decision secures a plaintiff's entitlement to fees in all successful minimum wage cases, shifting the battleground from if fees will be awarded to the reasonableness of the amount sought on remand.

In Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors(2024) 15 Cal.5th 908, the California Supreme Court held: (1) time spent in mandatory exit security checks is compensable "hours worked"; (2) on-site travel after a security gate is compensable only if the employer's purpose for the gate is more than just site access; and (3) on-premises meal periods are compensable if employees cannot engage in personal activities.

This decision expands liability for security checks but creates a key factual question: what level of employer control during on-site travel, beyond ordinary rules, is sufficient to render that time compensable?

In Daramola v. Oracle Am., Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 92 F.4th 833, the Ninth Circuit held that federal (SOX, Dodd-Frank) and California (Lab. Code §1102.5) whistleblower laws do not apply extraterritorially to a foreign employee working abroad, ruling that accessing U.S. servers does not constitute sufficient domestic conduct.

This decision strongly reinforces the territorial limits of U.S. employment protections, shielding multinational corporations from suits brought by their foreign-based workforce.

In Neeble-Diamond v. Hotel California By the Sea, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 551, the Court of Appeal held a plaintiff had no duty to respond to a cost memorandum seeking discretionary costs because the defendant failed to file the required noticed motion. The court ruled the procedurally improper cost memo was "ineffective" and a nullity, meaning the plaintiff's failure to file a motion to tax costs was irrelevant.

This ruling confirms a party need not respond to a procedurally defective cost memorandum seeking discretionary costs.

In Ventura County Employees' Retirement Assn. v. Criminal Justice Attorneys Assn. of Ventura County (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1119, the Court of Appeal excluded excess leave cashouts from PEPRA pension calculations by treating the Supreme Court's extensive analysis in Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1032 as binding.

This decision reinforces PEPRA's anti-spiking goals and serves as a sharp reminder that "well-reasoned dicta" from the California Supreme Court is functionally binding.

In Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582, the California Supreme Court held trial courts lack inherent authority to dismiss PAGA claims for manageability, expressly disapproving Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 746.

This decision removes a primary hurdle for large-scale PAGA actions, forcing defendants to fight complex claims on the merits rather than procedural grounds.