Plaintiff, the elected treasurer for the City of Inglewood, reported alleged financial improprieties to the city and various officials. After experiencing alleged retaliation, she sued for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. Defendants moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing Plaintiff was not an “employee.” The trial court denied the motion, finding the claims did not arise from Defendants’ speech. The Court of Appeal reversed, however, following City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, and concluding Plaintiff was not an employee under § 1102.6. 

On review, the California Supreme Court affirmed that section 1102.5 does not cover elected officials. It observed that section 1102.6 explicitly references various public entity employees but omits elected officials, in contrast to other statutes that expressly include or exclude them from “employee” definitions. The Court held that the phrase “includes, but is not limited to” in section 1102.6 did not compel inclusion of elected officials. Instead, looking at legislative context and history, it found legislative intent to protect “rank-and-file” employees who report to managers, not elected officials who report to the electorate. The Court further noted that pre-existing whistleblower statutes and section 1104 (which provides the “employee” definition for section 1102.6) consistently distinguish government employees from public officers. Based on these findings, it concluded section 1102.6 was intended to exclude elected officials.

Regarding Plaintiff’s public policy arguments, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that providing whistleblower protections to elected officials could be “one reasonable policy approach.” However, it deemed differential treatment also reasonable, given the availability of First Amendment retaliation protections and other potential relief. Finally, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument for “employee” status under section 1102.6 based on the common law test for employment. Following People v. Superior Court (Sahlolbei) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 230, it held that outside of a tort context, the common law test does not override indicators of contrary legislative intent.

Full opinion

Plaintiff Allison, a registered nurse, sued alleging various wage and hour violations. She moved for class certification, seeking meal and rest break subclasses based on allegations that Defendant required employees to wear work-issued communication devices during breaks. The trial court granted certification in part, denying only a “reporting time” subclass. Defendant subsequently moved for decertification, citing conflicting class member declarations, deficiencies in call logs, unreliable survey data, an unworkable trial plan, and “irreconcilable conflicts” between class members. The trial court granted decertification, agreeing with Defendant’s arguments and finding that “individual issues swamp the common issues” based on new evidence. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the order decertifying the class. It held that Plaintiffs’ post-certification declarations and statistical analysis constituted “new evidence” under Weinstat v. Dentsply lnternat., Inc. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1213, clarifying that “ ‘newly discovered’ evidence is not limited to newly existing facts” (Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 355). The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s disregard of survey data from Plaintiff’s expert, noting Plaintiffs’ failure to address self-selection bias given the low response rate (Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 630). Applying the Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58 burden-shifting framework, the court concluded that Defendant’s evidence of “idiosyncratic reasons for noncompliant meal periods” defeated class treatment. Finally, the Court of Appeal found that Plaintiffs failed to challenge the trial court’s basis for decertifying the rest break subclass, namely its determination that Plaintiffs failed to establish a uniform practice of nurses being on call during breaks or to provide reliable common proof through phone records.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a firefighter for Defendant since 1999, was forced to retire due to disability in 2018. Under a revised city policy, she was entitled to only 24 months of health insurance, while employees with 25 or more years of service received health insurance until age 65. Plaintiff sued, alleging the policy violated the ADA and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s ADA claim, ruling that she failed to show she was a “qualified individual” under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) at the time of the adverse action (denial of retirement benefits). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed while noting that the Second and Third Circuits had held the opposite.

The Supreme Court, granting certiorari to resolve the circuit split, affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s ADA claim. In the majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch highlighted the use of present-tense verbs in § 12112(a) (“ ‘can perform the essential functions of ‘the job she ‘holds or desires’ ” [emphasis in original]). The court contrasted the statute with § 12203(a), which prohibits retaliation against “any individual” who opposes discrimination, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the “qualified individual” mandate is conditioned upon a plaintiff claiming discrimination with respect to a job he or she seeks or holds, citing Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States (2018) 585 U.S. 274 for the proposition that a “conceivable-but-convoluted” interpretation should not be preferred over an ordinary one. The Supreme Court also rejected Plaintiff’s surplusage argument based on § 12112(b)(5)(A), noting that under Marx v. General Revenue Corp. (2013) 568 U.S. 371, 385, “‘[t]he canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule.’” It noted that other laws may protect retirees from benefit-related discrimination.

Notably, the Supreme Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument (joined by the government as amicus curiae) that she was subjected to a discriminatory benefits policy while still employed and subject to a disability. It found Plaintiff did not allege in her pleadings that she suffered from a disability while still employed with Defendant and represented in her Eleventh Circuit brief that she was not impacted by Defendant’s benefits policy while still employed. However, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that future plaintiffs might successfully pursue a similar legal theory.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, employees of the Grants Pass School District, initiated an online campaign expressing Christian views on gender identity after the District circulated a memo on “Gender Identity, Transgender, Name, and Pronoun Guidance.” After formal complaints from district employees, Plaintiffs were placed on administrative leave. An independent investigation found Plaintiffs violated District policies by using district resources/work time for a political campaign, failing to include a disclaimer, and disrupting the school environment via social media. One plaintiff was also found to have violated policy by allegedly describing a confidential student email in a campaign video. Plaintiffs sued, alleging religious discrimination and First and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The school board initially voted to terminate Plaintiffs but later reinstated and involuntarily transferred them to an online school. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, leading to Plaintiffs’ appeal.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Oregon state constitution claim and their First and Fourteenth Amendment damages claims against individual defendants. However, it vacated summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and related Monell liability claims against the district, as well as their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against all Defendants, claims against individual board members for termination, and their Title VII discrimination claim.

Regarding Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claims, the Ninth Circuit found genuine factual disputes under the Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205 (1968) 391 U.S. 563 balancing test, as the District failed to show sufficient actual or reasonably predicted disruption as a matter of law. For Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court held Plaintiffs did not need to allege protected class membership; their viewpoint-based disparate treatment allegations constituted a cognizable equal protection claim. However, individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on these claims due to their “heightened interest” in responsive action. The Ninth Circuit also exercised discretion to vacate summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment prior restraint and compelled speech claims, finding the district court’s ruling “too unclear for proper review” and that Plaintiffs raised merits arguments for the first time on appeal.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the Oregon Constitution claim based on forfeiture. However, it held individual board members could be liable for Plaintiffs’ terminations despite the majority vote requirement. Finally, the court found triable issues of fact regarding the first and fourth elements of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test. It held that Plaintiffs did not need to cite scripture to support their campaign views (Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla. (1987) 480 U.S. 136, 136) nor identify comparators, but could show circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Full opinion

The City of Palm Springs, a charter city, entered a 2011 agreement with Defendant, a private developer, for a downtown property development. The city contributed approximately 25% of the total cost. Pursuant to the former § 7.06.030 of Palm Springs’ Municipal Code, which exempted public projects from the Prevailing Wage Law (PWL), the developer paid construction workers less than the prevailing wage. However, in 2018, the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) determined the project was subject to the PWL, a determination affirmed after an administrative appeal in 2020. Defendant then sought a writ of mandate, which the trial court denied. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the writ of mandate. As a threshold matter, it concluded that the project met the definition of “public works” under Lab. Code § 1720(a)(1) and was thus subject to the PWL unless superseded by the city’s home rule authority. Applying the framework from State Building & Construction Trades Council of California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, the Court of Appeal found that the project was not a “municipal affair” under Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5(a). This was because the developer, not the city, provided the majority of the project’s funding, selected the contractors, and owned and managed most of the improvements. Consequently, the court did not need to consider the remaining factors outlined in Vista.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, employees of a healthcare staffing company, filed a putative class action and representative PAGA suit alleging various wage and hour violations. Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration was denied by the trial court, which found the arbitration agreement, when read with the employment agreement, unconscionable and wholly unenforceable due in part to forcing employee claims into arbitration while permitting defendant to litigate. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. Following Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, it held that the arbitration and employment agreements must be read together under Civ. Code § 1642. It rejected Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to consider the parties’ subjective intent and its argument that contracts need to explicitly cross-reference or necessarily depend on each other while having the same consideration to be taken together under § 1642. The Court of Appeal also rejected a “clear and unequivocal” standard for construing instruments together under § 1642, and held that the supersession clause in the employment agreement allowed the two agreements to be read together despite apparently contradictory terms. 

The court then found “notable substantive unconscionability,” citing the combined agreement’s imbalanced arbitration obligations, nonmutual attorney fees provisions, and injunctive relief available solely to Defendant. It declined to address whether the employment agreement’s unlawful salary disclosure restriction added to unconscionability. Finally, it determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the unconscionable sections, holding that California’s severance doctrine may apply to FAA-governed arbitration agreements and that severance would not serve justice.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued alleging disability discrimination, whistleblower retaliation, and other violations following her termination. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable due to pressure on Plaintiff to sign it, and substantively unconscionable because the agreement did not allow judicial review of the arbitration award. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. It found the agreement procedurally unconscionable due to its adhesive nature, Plaintiff’s limited review opportunity, and an HR manager’s misrepresentations about the agreement. Citing OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, the Court of Appeal held that strong procedural unconscionability, particularly when combined with the defendant’s express misleading of the plaintiff, also rendered the agreement substantively unconscionable. Given these findings, the court determined it did not need to address whether the agreement unlawfully prohibited judicial review, as the agreement was already unenforceable.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a heterosexual woman and longtime employee of Defendant, applied for a newly created position in 2019, which was filled by a lesbian woman. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was demoted from her existing role and replaced by a gay man. She subsequently sued under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff failed to present evidence of “background circumstances” suggesting Defendant discriminated against a majority group, as required at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework under then-existing Sixth Circuit precedent. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that majority-group plaintiffs could satisfy this burden by demonstrating either that a member of the relevant minority group made the adverse employment decision or that a statistical pattern of discrimination existed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split concerning whether “majority-group plaintiffs are subject to a different evidentiary burden than minority-group plaintiffs at McDonnell Douglas’s first step.”

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that the text of Title VII draws no distinctions between majority and minority-group plaintiffs and, consistent with Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) 401 U. S. 424, that “the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group.” The Court further noted its consistent rejection of “ ‘inflexible formulation[s]’ of the prima facie standard in disparate-treatment cases,” citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 (1977). The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant’s argument that the “background circumstances” rule did not merely impose a heightened evidentiary standard, finding it inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit’s own application, which clearly subjected Plaintiff to an elevated burden.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued under PAGA, alleging violations of the “suitable seating” provisions of IWC Wage Order No. 7-2001. After a bench trial, the trial court found for Defendant. Defendant filed a memorandum of costs, arguing it was entitled to recover costs against both the representative Plaintiff and the LWDA. The LWDA successfully moved to intervene, but the trial court awarded Defendant approximately $125,000 in costs against the LWDA, with none against the representative Plaintiff.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the cost order. It held that costs cannot be recovered from the LWDA when the agency did not participate in the litigation. The court acknowledged Defendant’s argument that Labor Code § 2699(k)(1) contains no express exception to Code of Civil Procedure § 1032(b), which under Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, could arguably permit cost recovery. However, the court declined to address whether PAGA displaces Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(b). Instead, it based its decision on the LWDA’s non-participation in the action. It rejected Defendant’s argument that a PAGA Plaintiff acts as an agent of the LWDA, finding that PAGA plaintiffs lack fiduciary obligations to the agency and the LWDA lacks control over the litigation. The court noted that Defendant failed to cite any qui tam case in which costs were awarded against a government real party in interest who did not participate.

While the Court noted that the PAGA statute explicitly provides for fees and costs to a prevailing employee (Lab. Code § 2699, subd. (k)(1)), it noted that the statute says nothing about an award to prevailing defendants. Nevertheless, the Court explicitly reserved the question regarding whether a defendant is entitled to recover costs under Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(b) in a PAGA action for another day. 

Full opinion

Plaintiff filed a class action alleging various wage and hour violations. The trial court denied class certification based on a lack of numerosity, typicality, superiority, and manageability. Plaintiff appealed, and then over a year after filing the appeal, voluntarily dismissed his remaining PAGA claims in an apparent effort to invoke the death knell doctrine. See Cortez v. Doty Bros. Equipment Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1, 9 (“the death knell exception to the one final judgment rule does not apply when PAGA claim remains pending in the trial court following termination of the class claims”); See also Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 243–244 [same]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 [same]; Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291, 310–311 [same].

Here, the Court of Appeal concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, holding that Plaintiff could not appeal the class certification order until a final judgment on all claims. Since Plaintiff’s PAGA claims remained viable immediately following the denial (precluding application of the death knell doctrine) Plaintiff could not manufacture jurisdiction by later dismissing those claims. The court noted that while some putative class members might not be eligible for PAGA relief as a result of the lower court decision, there was nevertheless “significant overlap” between putative class members and aggrieved employees under PAGA. This rendered the death knell doctrine inapplicable under Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126. 

Reyes joins a line of cases that makes clear that the death knell doctrine does not apply where certification is denied in a hybrid class/PAGA action. In these cases, the death knell doctrine does not apply, even if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the PAGA claims following the denial of class certification. However, the court’s reasoning suggests that the death knell doctrine may apply if a plaintiff dismisses the PAGA claims prior to the denial of class certification.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued Defendant under PAGA on behalf of other employees and the State of California for repeated failures to pay overtime, but did not assert any personal violations within the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court sustained Defendant’s demurrer, and Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, holding that PAGA’s one-year statute of limitations applies to a representative plaintiff’s individual claims, not violations suffered by other aggrieved employees. It agreed with Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 that PAGA claims must include an individual component, disagreeing with Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533. The court reasoned that the representative plaintiff’s individual claims are the only way to evaluate timeliness, as PAGA plaintiffs need not define “aggrieved parties” in prelitigation notices. Allowing suits for violations from potentially decades past, as suggested by Plaintiff’s reasoning, would contradict the Legislature’s intent for expeditious resolution of violations.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs signed a meal period waiver with Defendant for shifts less than 6 hours, before being assigned shifts, and later filed a class action for missed meal periods. The trial court granted Defendant summary adjudication, determining that Lab. Code § 512 and the IWC wage orders permit prospective blanket waivers. Plaintiffs appealed. 

The Court of Appeal affirmed. It found that the plain text of Labor Code § 512 and Wage Order Nos. 4 and 5, allowing meal periods to be “waived by mutual consent,” did not specify the timing or form of the waiver. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the absence of explicit permission for prospective written waivers meant they were prohibited, citing legislative history indicating the IWC had long considered such waivers protective of both employees and employers. It also noted Plaintiffs did not challenge the conscionability of their waivers. Finally, the court distinguished Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, which did not address the timing or circumstances of waivers, and rejected Plaintiffs’ reliance on an outdated DLSE opinion letter opposing blanket waivers. 

Full opinion

The parties’ arbitration agreement excluded representative PAGA claims. Plaintiff then brought a PAGA claim alleging off-the-clock work. Defendant moved to compel arbitration of individual PAGA claims and dismiss the representative portion. The trial court denied the motion, interpreting the parties’ arbitration agreement to exclude Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The parties disputed whether “representative” referred to all PAGA claims or just non-individual ones. Defendant argued that the court should apply the FAA’s presumption of arbitrability, while Plaintiff argued that the trial court correctly resolved the ambiguity against the drafter. The court found based on noscitur a sociis that the parties intended a broad construction of the PAGA carve-out. It also noted that when the agreement was executed (pre-Viking River), individual and representative PAGA claims were indivisible. Following Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592, the court held that Plaintiff could not be compelled to arbitrate a dispute he didn’t agree to arbitrate. Finally, the court rejected Defendant’s reliance on Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 222 to interpret contract language to avoid surplusage, reasoning that this principle is only a guideline, and similar redundancies are common in PAGA contexts.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a professor required to teach remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic, purchased a replacement computer and printer after Defendant denied him access to campus to retrieve employer-provided equipment. Defendant denied reimbursement, and Plaintiff filed a class action and PAGA claims alleging violation of § 2802. The trial court sustained Defendant’s demurrer, reasoning that § 2802 does not expressly apply to public employers. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. Using the framework from Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040, it analyzed § 2802 within its statutory context, noting that some Labor Code provisions explicitly include public employers while others explicitly exclude them. The court found the explicitly inclusive sections more instructive, largely because of “a concerted legislative effort to expressly refer in Article 2 to public employers when a provision applies to them.” The court extensively reviewed the legislative history of § 2802, finding that its predecessor, 1872 Civil Code § 1969, likely applied only to private employers. It also found that a Department of Finance Report on a bill amending § 2802 did not indicate legislative intent to extend its application to public agencies. Finally, the court noted that no case law had previously applied § 2802 to public employers, despite some cases discussing public employee expenses under the statute.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging discrimination and hostile workplace harassment. After Defendant produced confidential documents under a protective order, Plaintiff’s counsel inadvertently disclosed some to an intervenor media group. The district court upheld a magistrate judge’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for return or destruction of the documents, agreeing that it lacked authority to order a non-party to do so. Plaintiff appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the order denying Plaintiff’s motion. It held it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because the requested relief “was injunctive in nature.” The Ninth Circuit rejected the intervenor’s argument that its limited purpose in the case exempted it from discovery orders, holding per S.E.C. v. Ross (9th Cir. 2007) 504 F.3d 1130, 1148 that its obligations were the same as any other party. Because district courts have an inherent power to oversee discovery and the intervenor did not obtain the documents “through means independent of the court’s processes” (Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart (1984) 467 U.S. 20, 34), the district court had the authority to order their return or destruction.

Full opinion

Plaintiff brought a class action alleging various wage and hour violations. Defendant removed the case to federal court under CAFA, alleging the amount in controversy exceeded $15 million. The district court found Defendant failed to provide evidence for the amount and remanded the case to state court. The Ninth Circuit granted Defendant permission to appeal.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the order remanding the case to state court, following Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott (9th Cir. 2019) 936 F.3d 920. It held that defendants calculating the amount in controversy under CAFA may rely on “a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions” based solely on the allegations in the complaint. (Id. at 925, internal citations omitted.) The district court should have considered whether Defendant’s calculation was a reasonable interpretation of the complaint, not whether it was supported by evidence. The court distinguished Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 775 F.3d 1193, where the defendant had to provide evidence because its interpretation of the complaint was found to be unreasonable.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued, alleging various Labor Code, common law, and FEHA causes of action. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, after receiving two continuances, failed to file an opposition, request an additional continuance, or appear at the motion hearing. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant, noting Plaintiff’s lack of opposition and finding no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred by granting summary judgment without first determining if Defendant met its initial burden of proof, despite the lack of opposition. The Court of Appeal disagreed, grounding its decision in CCP § 437c(b)(3). It held that this subdivision expressly grants the trial court discretion to grant summary judgment when the opposing party fails to file the required separate statement. The court clarified that if the trial court exercises this discretion and the moving party’s papers are sufficient on their face, the court is not obligated to conduct its own analysis of whether the moving party met its substantive burden. Instead, the failure to file the separate statement itself can be a sufficient ground for granting the motion under the statute.

Full opinion

Plaintiff (Moniz) sued under PAGA and settled with defendant. Another plaintiff with overlapping PAGA claims (Correa) unsuccessfully moved to intervene then vacate the judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed, but on remand, the trial court approved a revised settlement agreement awarded Correa only a small portion of requested attorney’s fees. It denied Correa’s motion to vacate the judgment or for a new settlement hearing. Correa appealed. 

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Correa’s motion. It held per Turrieta that nothing in PAGA expressly grants PAGA plaintiffs the authority to intervene under CCP § 387 or vacate a settlement judgment under CCP § 663. The Court of Appeal rejected Correa’s argument based on the law of the case doctrine, finding that Turrieta clarified the controlling law. It also rejected Correa’s attempt to distinguish Turrieta, finding that her personal interests arose solely from PAGA, and granting intervention based on those interests would contradict the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, after being elected police association president, took leave from the City of Santa Ana but continued to receive his police salary and various pay additives per an MOU between the city and the association. CalPERS determined these additives were not pensionable, a decision upheld by an administrative judge, except for an education incentive. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus, and Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The court held that while Gov. Code § 3505.4 mandates employers continue pay and benefits during union leave, it does not dictate pensionability. Whether compensation is pensionable is determined exclusively by the Public Employees’ Retirement Law (PERL). Therefore, pay additives received during leave must independently satisfy PERL’s definition of “compensation earnable” (Gov. Code, § 20636) to be pensionable. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s confidentiality premium was not pensionable because it failed PERL’s requirement (Gov. Code, § 20636(b)(1)) that special compensation be paid to “all persons in the group or class.” Likewise, the holiday pay was not pensionable as it did not qualify as “compensation earnable” under PERL (Gov. Code, § 20636(a)) and failed the regulatory test in Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 571.

Full opinion

Plaintiff was injured on the job, and a healthcare provider concluded he should be medically retired. However, Defendant denied Plaintiff’s application for disability retirement. Plaintiff sued, alleging a single cause of action for FEHA disability discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant because disability requirement did not qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of Plaintiff’s employment, and FEHA was not the “appropriate statutory vehicle” for pursuing Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment against Plaintiff. Citing Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 10 1150, 1162, it held that denial of disability retirement does not affect a current employee and thus is not an adverse employment action under FEHA.  Furthermore, under Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, Plaintiff was not a “qualified individual” under FEHA because he could not perform his essential job duties. While the Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred in suggesting Plaintiff could have filed a writ of administrative mandamus directly, it held this error did not warrant reversal. The court noted that Plaintiff could have appealed the denial to an administrative law judge and then, if necessary, filed a writ. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that mandamus was inadequate due to the lack of attorney’s fees.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued under PAGA “in a Representative Capacity only” (emphasis in original) for various wage and hour violations. Defendant moved to compel arbitration and subsequently moved to dismiss or stay the case pending Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639. Following the decision in Viking River, Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s “individual PAGA claim” should be compelled to arbitration and his non-individual PAGA claim dismissed. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 was “current law” when the agreement was signed. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed denial of the motion to compel arbitration, finding that because  Plaintiff did not assert individual PAGA claims in the complaint, there was nothing to compel to arbitration. The court disapproved Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, which required arbitration of unasserted individual PAGA claims. Instead, the court emphasized the complaint’s contents as the determinative factor. Notably, the court declined to address Defendant’s argument regarding Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533 and its potential conflict with Labor Code § 2699(a). However, it left open the possibility that the complaint, lacking an individual component, might not comply with § 2699(a), and that Defendant could raise this issue through an appropriate pleading challenge.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a postmaster for the USPS, alleged harassment based on race, gender, and national origin. Subsequently, she was transferred to a lower-paying position at a different post office and replaced by a white male. After an unsuccessful appeal of her demotion, she sued for Title VII disparate treatment, hostile work environment harassment, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all claims, finding that Plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disparate treatment, failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her harassment claim, and failed to establish a causal connection between her protected activity and demotion. Plaintiff appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim but reversed the dismissal of her harassment and disparate treatment claims.  It held that plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate treatment under St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, clarifying that even if plaintiff and her replacement were not “similarly situated,” the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test is satisfied if the replacement is “a person outside the protected class.” Following Poland v. Chertoff (9th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3d 1174, the court also determined that subordinate bias may have influenced plaintiff’s demotion. Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the court held that plaintiff’s failure to address administrative exhaustion in her opening brief was “at most forfeiture, not waiver,” and exercised its discretion to address the issue. It found that notice of plaintiff’s demotion was the proper start date for the statute of limitations, and thus the hostile work environment claim was timely. Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling on the retaliation claim, remanding the disparate treatment and hostile workplace claims for further proceedings.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued for various FEHA violations after being terminated. The trial court found the parties’ arbitration agreement procedurally and substantively unconscionable and refused to enforce it. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. On review, the California Supreme Court reversed in part, remanding to the Court of Appeal to determine whether to sever the objectionable portions or refuse to enforce the entire agreement. 

Following the Supreme Court’s guidance (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478), the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s refusal to enforce the agreement. It held that severing the unconscionable provisions would impermissibly rewrite the agreement and impose terms not agreed to by the parties. The court also found that the agreement’s multiple defects indicated an intent to secure an unfair advantage for the employer, making severance an “inappropriate remedy”. Allowing severance in such cases, the court reasoned, could encourage employers to draft one-sided agreements.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action, alleging various wage and hour violations, and later amended their complaint to include representative PAGA claims. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, staying Plaintiff’s remaining PAGA claim. After the deadline for initiating arbitration had passed, Plaintiffs moved to lift the stay, arguing that Defendant was required to initiate arbitration under the parties’ agreement. The trial court agreed, finding that Defendant was in material breach of the arbitration agreement, because it hadn’t filed a demand within the prescribed 30 days. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed the approval of Plaintiff’s motion to lift the stay. As a threshold matter, following Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 222, the Court of Appeal determined that the trial court’s order was functionally equivalent to an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, and thus appealable. It also found that, under 9 U.S.C. § 16, Defendants were entitled to appeal from an order refusing a stay. The court examined the parties’ agreement and found that Plaintiff, not Defendant, was required to initiate arbitration. The parties’ dispute centered on the definition of “the party who wants to start the [a]rbitration [p]rocedure.” The court found that, in the context of the entire agreement and its incorporated arbitration rules (which were generally based on the AAA rules), the phrase necessarily referred to Plaintiff.

Full opinion

Plaintiff worked for an agency that assigned him to temporary finance roles in several cities. CalPERS determined this violated its rules because he was a common law employee of those cities. After Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate, the trial court upheld the administrative ruling, finding the evidence supported Plaintiff’s status as a common law employee.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s petition. Following Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 491, it held that temporary workers for companies contracting with public agencies are “employees” under PERL if they meet the common law test for employment. Applying the ‘control of details’ test from S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, the court found that Plaintiff was co-employed by both the contracting company and the cities. Notably, the Court of Appeal found contractual language stating Plaintiff was the agency’s employee and not the cities’ immaterial to his actual employment status.

Full opinion

Plaintiff contracted COVID-19 while employed at Defendant and developed long-term health issues. Defendant terminated Plaintiff, and he sued alleging various FEHA causes of action. Defendant moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement impermissibly failed to incorporate a California Arbitration Act provision allowing third-party discovery. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of the motion to compel. While the court upheld the denial of Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the JAMS rules incorporated into the agreement, it took judicial notice of those rules itself. Following Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, the court found a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability but no substantive unconscionability,  because Rule 17(b) of the JAMS rules “provide[s] the arbitrator the authority to make available additional nonparty discovery”. Notably, the court disapproved of the contrary holding in Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360 that “the terms of Rule 17 did not authorize discovery from nonparties.” The court reasoned that Aixtron‘s holding was based on an impermissible assumption that third parties might refuse to comply with an arbitrator’s discovery order, an assumption Ramirez precludes.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued for sexual harassment after a coworker made repeated unwanted sexual remarks, causing her to take medical leave and resign from Defendant. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration based on a choice-of-law provision in the parties’ agreement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the order compelling arbitration. Finding a sufficient link to interstate commerce to bring the dispute within the EFAA’s scope (following Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232), the court held that the EFAA preempts conflicting state law under conflict preemption principles (following Keeton v. Tesla, Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 26). The court rejected Defendant’s argument that selecting state law in an arbitration agreement effectively opts out of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) even in contracts involving interstate commerce. Because Plaintiff’s claims accrued after the EFAA’s enactment, retroactivity was not an issue. Finally, citing Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791, 800 the court ruled that the EFAA rendered the parties’ arbitration agreement unenforceable as to all of Plaintiff’s claims.

Full opinion

Plaintiff entered a subcontract with Defendants, but Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff that the subcontracted work was public work subject to prevailing wage laws. Plaintiff’s employees subsequently prevailed in wage arbitrations against Plaintiff. Plaintiff then sued Defendants for indemnity under Lab. Code §§ 1784 and 1781. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the § 1784 cause of action without leave to amend, finding that the statute did not apply retroactively. It sustained the demurrer to the the § 1781 cause of action with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, but the trial court sustained Defendants’ subsequent demurrer, concluding that § 1781 does not permit losses related to arbitration awards and settlements. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the § 1784 claim but reversed dismissal of the § 1781 claim. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred in interpreting § 1781 to exclude arbitration awards. The Court of Appeal agreed, holding per NTCH-WA, Inc. v. ZTE Corp. (9th Cir. 2019) 921 F.3d 1175 that a judgment confirming an arbitration award has the same force and effect as a court judgment. However, the court rejected Plaintiff’s argument for retroactive application of § 1784, which was enacted after the conduct underlying Plaintiff’s claims. The court reasoned that § 1784 created new rights, not merely clarified existing ones, and that legislative history did not indicate an intent for retroactive application.

Full opinion

Plaintiff allegedly experienced retaliation after expressing safety concerns. Plaintiff was then suspended for potentially falsifying time cards and terminated based on the results of an internal investigation. Plaintiff sued. The jury found for Defendant on Plaintiff’s whistleblower retaliation claim, finding Defendant did not take adverse actions against him based on his protected disclosures. However, the jury found for Plaintiff on his defamation claim, finding that an investigator for Defendant published false statements about Plaintiff with malice. Defendant appealed after moving unsuccessfully for JNOV, and plaintiff cross-appealed. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the defamation judgment and affirmed the retaliation judgment. Following Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631 and Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1174, the court held that tort claims must arise from conduct separate from the termination and seek damages not solely resulting from the termination. Here, the defamation claim arose from the same report that led to the termination, and Plaintiff did not identify any damages unrelated to his termination, such as reputational damage. Defendant’s conduct did not therefore constitute an actionable tort. Regarding the retaliation claim, the court, citing Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, found that Plaintiff did not establish he was entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Even if the jury should have found that the termination was an adverse employment action, it did not address whether Plaintiff’s protected disclosures contributed to his termination. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs challenged amendments to 8 CCR § 202 et seq. requiring apprentices employed on public works under Lab. Code § 1777.5 to only perform work within their approved training programs. The trial court denied their petitions, concluding that the amendments fell within the scope of the California Apprenticeship’s authority and were consistent with relevant laws and regulations.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It found that the regulations fell within the Council’s authority under § 3071 and other statutes to address apprentices’ working conditions. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the regulations violated Lab. Code §§ 1777.5 and 3086, and conflicted with the Prevailing Wage Law or Shelley-Maloney Act. Notably, the court disapproved the holding in Henson v. C. Overaa & Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 184, 193 that “an apprentice’s craft or trade is defined by the type of work carried out by the journeymen and other members of the union”, declining to address whether the Council had the authority to interpret a key statutory term in “a manner inconsistent with an intervening judicial opinion.” While the court agreed that the regulations violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s clarity standard, it held that this did not invalidate them.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, train dispatchers, sued Defendant for unpaid wages. After a Berman hearing where their claims were denied, they prevailed in a bench trial. The trial court awarded them $200,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. Defendant appealed, arguing that § 98.2(c) only authorizes fees against unsuccessful appellants.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the award of fees and costs, following Eicher v. Advanced Business Integrators, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1363. It rejected Defendant’s argument that the superior court proceeding was a continuation of the administrative remedy, finding it to be an independent “action” or “civil action” under §§ 218.5, 226, and 119. The court distinguished this case from Sampson v. Parking Service 2000 Com, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 212, where the employee prevailed at the Berman hearing and the employer unsuccessfully pursued a trial de novo. It also declined to consider dicta from Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109 and OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111 in support of Defendant’s arguments.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, a group of sales representatives for a food distributor, sued for unpaid overtime. Defendant argued that the outside sales exemption applied to Plaintiffs, but the District Court ruled that Defendant failed to prove so under the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. Defendant appealed, but the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, noting that all other circuits had applied the preponderance standard. The Court clarified that the preponderance standard is the default in civil cases, and none of the exceptions applied here. It explained that the FLSA does not specify a burden of proof for exemptions, this case did not involve a constitutional right, and there was no “unusually coercive” government action at issue. Citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) 490 U.S. 228, the Court also reasoned that if the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is not required in Title VII cases, it should not be required in FLSA cases. Finally, the Court held that whether a right is waivable (in this case the right to overtime and minimum wage under the FLSA) does not determine the standard of proof.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a gig worker classified as an independent contractor, brought a collective PAGA action alleging misclassification. Defendant moved to compel arbitration of the individual portion of the action. The trial court denied the motion, finding no individual cause of action, and Defendant appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. Focusing on the statutory language of Lab. Code § 2699 (a), the Court of Appeal held that PAGA actions inherently include both individual and representative claims. It distinguished this case from Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, and Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533, finding that they did not address whether a PAGA action can be brought without including an individual PAGA claim. The Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to compel arbitration of the individual claim and stay the representative PAGA claim.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, responsible for overseeing the kosher certification of grape products, sued Defendant, alleging unpaid overtime and fraudulent denial of a promised promotion and raise. The district court granted Defendant summary judgment, finding that Defendant was a religious organization and Plaintiff a minister for the purpose of satisfying the ministerial exception. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Applying the functional test from Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012), and Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 644 (2020), the court found that Defendant qualified as a religious institution despite its commercial activities. It further found that Plaintiff, a mashgiach responsible for ensuring kosher compliance, functioned as a minister because he performed vital religious duties requiring specific religious qualifications. Consequently, the ministerial exception barred his overtime and fraud claims. The court distinguished Bollard v. California Province of the Soc’y of Jesus (9th Cir. 1999) 196 F.3d 940, finding Plaintiff’s claims, unlike the harassment claim in Bollard, directly implicated the employment terms protected by the exception.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued, alleging various claims including retaliation under Lab. Code § 1102.5. A jury found for Plaintiff solely on his § 1102.5 claim. Plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees under § 1102.5 (j), which was enacted while Plaintiff’s case was pending. The trial court denied the motion, because it did not find showing of retroactive application. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the trial court’s order denying attorney’s fees. Reviewing Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917 and others, it found that California courts have “consistently held” that statutory provisions involving attorney fees are “procedural in nature and apply to pending litigation” (USS-Posco Industries v. Case (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 197, 201). Notably, the Court of Appeal rejected Defendant’s argument that “retroactive application of the statute impacts its substantive rights”, distinguishing California law from the federal case law examples cited by Defendant. 

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, three auto shop workers, sued Defendants for various wage and hour violations. Two of the plaintiffs agreed to settle, while the third plaintiff (Zarate) did not. At trial, the jury found for Zarate on two causes of action (failure to pay overtime and failure to provide rest breaks) but awarded less than the amount Defendant had offered for settlement. The trial court awarded costs to Defendants under Code Civ. Proc. § 998 while granting Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees only in part. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court’s amended February 2023 judgment, which merely added a costs and fees award, was its “comprehensive final judgment,” not its September 2022 judgment. The Court of Appeal disagreed, citing Torres v. City of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 214, 222 in its finding that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the trial court’s interlocutory rulings was not timely. The court also found no error in the trial court’s partial award of attorney’s fees because Plaintiff’s counsel failed to properly segregate time entries, and the trial court was not required to follow the Laffey matrix or apply a lodestar multiplier. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s award of costs to Defendants, agreeing with Plaintiffs that, under Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 221, Lab. Code §§ 1194 and 218.5 displace Code Civ. Proc. § 998. Section 1194 “makes no mention of prevailing employers” (Plancich v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 308, 313, internal citations omitted), while Section 218.5 requires a finding of bad faith.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a deputy sheriff with a history of misconduct, was placed on leave in 2015 pending the results of Defendant’s investigation. In 2017, Defendant attempted to discharge him, but the trial court granted Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the statute of limitations had expired. Defendant reinstated Plaintiff but assigned him a less desirable position. Despite scoring high on the sergeant’s exam, Plaintiff was not promoted. He again petitioned for writ of mandate, alleging Defendant improperly relied on the time-barred 2015 investigation. The trial court denied the petition, rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that a burden-shifting test should apply and ruling that Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to establish liability. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. Plaintiff argued the trial court should have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework because confidentiality agreements hindered his ability to prove his case. The court rejected this argument, finding Plaintiff did not allege discrimination and that his situation was not analogous to discrimination. The court also noted that Plaintiff did not seek discovery on the issue, had access to circumstantial evidence, and that applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to similar matters would be contrary to the public interest.

Full opinion

Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to years of gender-based harassment and scrutiny regarding her uniform, culminating in her termination after posting photos of herself in a swimsuit and uniform on social media. After Defendant opened an investigation, Plaintiff agreed to remove the photos but complained internally that the investigation constituted gender-based harassment and discrimination. Shortly thereafter, the supervisor in charge of the investigation recommended Plaintiff’s termination. After her termination, Plaintiff sued, alleging FEHA discrimination, harassment, and retaliation along with whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and IIED. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all claims, finding no evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part, finding that the trial court improperly disregarded Plaintiff’s evidence of pretext. This included evidence defendant failed to investigate Plaintiff’s complaints, evidence of a discriminatory work environment, and comparator evidence, which (per Hawn v. Executive Jet Management, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 615 F.3d 1151, 1157 and others) the trial court incorrectly required to be identical rather than similar “in all relevant respects”. The Court of Appeal also found that Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of “severe and pervasive” harassment under Gov. Code § 12923, had plausibly engaged in a protected activity by reporting the alleged discrimination, and that her termination was plausibly linked to that activity, reversing summary adjudication of each of her FEHA claims. However, the court affirmed summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s non-FEHA claims, ruling that she forfeited them by failing to address Defendant’s Railway Labor Act preemption argument in her opening brief. It also upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, as she failed to show the individuals involved were “managing agents” under Civ. Code § 3294 (b). 

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued for individual wage and hour violations and a related PAGA claim. After the trial court compelled arbitration of the non-PAGA claims, an arbitrator ruled against Plaintiff for all her individual Labor Code claims. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The trial court subsequently granted Defendant judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s PAGA claim due to a lack of standing. 

Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Following Rocha v. U-Haul Co. of California (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 65, 77 and Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1124, the court applied issue preclusion. It found all elements met because the arbitrator’s explicit findings that Plaintiff personally suffered no underlying violations were identical to the issue of her “aggrieved employee” status, were actually litigated, and necessarily decided. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the issues were not identical for her specific Labor Code claims. While acknowledging the general principle that arbitrators need not issue findings or reasons (Rodrigues v. Keller (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 838, 842), the court emphasized that in this case, the arbitrator did provide clear adverse findings against Plaintiff on her individual claims, which formed the basis for preclusion.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, an LAPD officer, refused to sign a notice acknowledging a city ordinance requiring employee compliance with its COVID-19 vaccination policy and notified supervisors of her refusal to be vaccinated. She was relieved of duty pending an administrative hearing then terminated. Plaintiff filed for writ of mandate. The trial court found that Plaintiff’s refusal to test for COVID-19 did not violate the conditions of her employment, because Defendant required employees to pay for the testing in violation of Lab. Code § 2802. The trial court also found Plaintiff was entitled to back pay due to Defendant’s Skelly violations. However, the trial court upheld Plaintiff’s termination, ruling that her refusal to be vaccinated or sign the Notice violated her employment conditions. 

Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment against Plaintiff. It held that Plaintiff forfeited her argument that she was terminated for not signing the notice, rather than for violating the ordinance, by failing to raise it at trial. Regardless, the court found her stated refusal to be vaccinated demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with the ordinance. The court also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that termination was too harsh a penalty under Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, as she failed to argue her conduct was not severe or cite relevant authority. Finally, the court held that the Skelly violation did not require reinstatement, relying on Barber v. State Personnel Board (1975) 18 Cal.3d 395 and noting that Plaintiff cited no authority supporting reinstatement as a remedy for a due process violation.

Full opinion

Defendant placed Plaintiff, a police officer, on leave after he was charged with sexual assault. Although a jury acquitted him, Defendant issued a Notice of Intent to Terminate Plaintiff based on its internal investigation. An arbitrator found that Defendant failed to prove the alleged violations and recommended reinstatement, but the city manager upheld the termination. The trial court then denied Plaintiff’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding the parties’ MOU gave the city manager final authority to terminate Plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment against Plaintiff, finding no due process violation. Following National City Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of National City (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1279, the court held that “The language of the MOU, if clear and explicit” should govern its interpretation. It rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the MOU required the city manager to defer to the arbitrator’s evidentiary findings, concluding this interpretation would improperly alter the agreement. 

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, non-exempt hourly dental professionals working at a state prison, sued the State for unpaid wages related to pre- and post-shift activities, including security procedures and travel time. The trial court sustained the State’s demurrer, finding that the federal Portal-to-Portal Act, incorporated into the parties’ MOU, barred such claims. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part and remanded. It held that the trial court erred in resolving factual issues about the employees’ duties at the demurrer stage. Notably, the court relied on Stoetzl v. Department of Human Resources (2019) 7 Cal.5th 718 to hold that while an MOU might preclude Labor Code claims, it did not extinguish the employees’ independent contractual right to be paid for completed work. This right, the court explained, matures into a contractual obligation upon performance, allowing employees to pursue a breach of contract claim for unpaid wages. However, the court agreed with the State that Stoetzl barred plaintiffs’ claims under Lab. Code §§ 1182.11, 1182.12, and 1194. It also rejected plaintiffs’ claim under § 222, holding that the statute does not apply to public employees.

Full opinion

Defendant allegedly misclassified Plaintiff as exempt and subjected her to sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. Plaintiff resigned then sued, alleging FEHA and wage and hour violations and other claims. Defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing Plaintiff failed to state a claim for harassment under FEHA. The trial court denied the motion, finding plaintiff adequately stated a sexual harassment claim and that the EFAA rendered the parties’ arbitration agreement unenforceable for all claims. Defendant appealed. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. It held that the EFAA invalidates pre-dispute arbitration agreements “with respect to a case which is filed under … state law and relates to … the sexual harassment dispute” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a)). Emphasizing the word “case,” the court held that the EFAA precludes arbitration of the entire case, not just the sexual harassment claim. This interpretation, the court noted, is consistent with Doe v. Second Street Corp. (Sept. 30, 2024, B330281) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ and federal district court decisions. The court distinguished this case from KPMG LLP v. Cocchi (2011) 565 U.S. 18 and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, where the Supreme Court allowed separation of arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a professor with bipolar disorder, disclosed his condition to defendant. After a suicide attempt and hospitalization, Defendant engaged in the interactive process and provided an accommodation. Following student complaints regarding Plaintiff’s behavior and a faculty letter, Defendant shared the letter with media outlets, who linked it to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was placed on leave and terminated following an investigation. He sued, alleging FEHA violations and invasion of privacy. The trial court granted summary adjudication on some claims, and a jury found for defendant on the rest. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the court’s discovery, summary adjudication, trial, and post-trial rulings but not the jury verdict. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s interactive process and accommodation claims because the claims overlapped with the jury’s verdict on discrimination, which Plaintiff did not challenge. However, the court reversed dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim, holding that medical or employment information linked to Plaintiff need not be “confidential” or “private” to violate the IPA and that the faculty letter and a discussion about Plaintiff during a student-faculty meeting were potentially in violation. The court upheld the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery, finding the requested communications were protected by the reporting privilege. It also upheld the denial of a retrial, finding Plaintiff forfeited the issue by not objecting to jury instructions he later alleged were defective. The case was remanded for reconsideration of attorney’s fees under Civil Code § 1798.48(b) in light of the reinstated privacy claim.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a COO, reported potential FCA violations to his employer. He was later terminated for allegedly disclosing confidential information unrelated to those violations. He sued for FCA retaliation, breach of contract, and breach of implied covenant. The district court granted summary judgment for defendant on all claims, and plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the FCA retaliation claim. It applied the McDonnell Douglas rather than Mt. Healthy framework, following sister circuits and Stilwell v. City of Williams (9th Cir. 2016) 831 F.3d 1234. It also applied the Moore test but not the Hopper investigating requirement, finding Plaintiff engaged in protected activity. The court rejected a heightened notice standard for compliance officers, finding that Plaintiff satisfied the FCA’s notice requirement. The Ninth Circuit also reversed and remanded the breach of contract and implied covenant claims, finding the district court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

Full opinion

Plaintiff became disabled due to a work injury. After her wage replacement benefits ended, Defendant placed her on unpaid leave. Plaintiff’s doctor determined she had permanent limitations preventing her from performing essential job duties. Defendant refused her request to file for disability retirement pending exhaustion of return-to-work options. Plaintiff accepted a demotion but later informed Defendant she could not work due to mental health treatment. She sued, alleging FEHA disability discrimination and retaliation. The trial court granted summary adjudication for Defendant on all claims, and Plaintiff appealed. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim because Plaintiff could not perform her job duties, even with the offered accommodation. Regarding Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim, the court held that Defendant’s refusal to file for disability retirement was not a failure to accommodate under Gov. Code § 12940(m)(1). Even if improper, Plaintiff would need to file a writ of mandate to compel compliance under Gov. Code § 21153. The court upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s interactive process claim because Plaintiff did not identify an objectively available accommodation that Defendant failed to offer. It upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s failure-to-prevent-discrimination claim because Plaintiff lacked a viable underlying discrimination claim. Finally, the court upheld summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, as Plaintiff incorrectly asserted that “becoming disabled” was a protected activity.

Full opinion

An Uber driver struck a pedestrian with his vehicle approximately four minutes after going “offline” on the Uber app. The pedestrian sued both the driver and Uber. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding no evidence that the driver was acting as an Uber driver at the time of the accident. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It rejected plaintiff’s argument that a triable issue of fact existed because the driver had not closed the app and frequently toggled between “online” and “offline” modes in order to drive to areas with “surge” pricing. The court found these arguments speculative and held that the driver’s intent to drive later was irrelevant because he was undeniably offline at the time of the accident. The court also rejected Plaintiff’s challenge to the driver’s credibility, finding his misstatements immaterial to the central facts.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, staff nurses for the City and County of San Francisco, frequently worked overtime but did not receive overtime pay. They filed separate lawsuits alleging FLSA violations. The district court certified the first suit as a collective action and treated both cases as related. Relying on a city ordinance referring to staff nurses as “salaried employees,” the district court granted Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. It noted that a 2004 revision to the FLSA shifted the focus of the salary basis test from the employment agreement to the employee’s actual pay. While 29 C.F.R. § 541.710 permits public employers to make partial-day salary deductions for personal time off, the court found evidence of improper deductions in Defendant’s pay practices, suggesting that Defendant may not have guaranteed Plaintiffs the opportunity to work hours corresponding to their full-time equivalences. The court held that having a process for corrections did not excuse Defendant from liability under 29 C.F.R. § 541.603(c) because the discrepancies may not have been isolated or inadvertent.

Full opinion

Defendant terminated Plaintiff partly for “failure to work efficiently,” which Plaintiff alleged was connected to his refusal to skip a mandatory air-brake test. Following partial summary judgment for Plaintiff and a jury verdict in his favor, the Ninth Circuit vacated the verdict and remanded, holding Plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on the “contributing factor” element. In a subsequent bench trial, the district court found that Plaintiff’s protected activity was a contributing factor in his termination but that it “contributed very little” to the decision. The district court ruled for Defendant, and Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, The Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(2), an employer cannot discharge an employee for protected activity even “in part.” The Ninth Circuit remanded because the district court failed to determine if BNSF met its burden for the affirmative defense, which required proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated Plaintiff absent the protected activity (not just that it could have). The court also ruled that Plaintiff failed to show prejudice from the lower court’s evidentiary rulings.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, members of a separate class action against Tesla, sent a letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) alleging PAGA violations after Tesla failed to respond to their Labor Code records requests. They then filed a PAGA complaint alleging Tesla’s refusal to comply with Labor Code  §§ 1198.5, 226, and 432. Tesla filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, which the trial court denied. 

Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. It distinguished Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 757, where a written statement was an element of the claim. Here, Tesla’s refusal to respond was “simply conduct,” governed by Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(4). Applying the Geiser test (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238), the court found the connection between Tesla’s refusal and the public issue in the related litigation too attenuated for anti-SLAPP protection. Citing Wilder v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 77, 83, the court also held that Plaintiffs, regardless of their status as putative class members, were entitled to request information under the Labor Code.

Full opinion

The pilots were required to be on call even when no flights were scheduled, though they could engage in personal activities during this time. They sued for unpaid overtime, claiming they were misclassified as exempt employees. The district court ruled for Defendant, finding the pilots were properly classified and their on-call time was not compensable. Plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that the pilots were exempt because their work involved significant mental complexity and discretion, distinguishing them from manual laborers. Citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.300 and § 541.301, the court found that the pilots’ duties required them to make discretionary decisions and use specialized knowledge. Applying the two-factor test from Owens v. Loc. No. 169, Ass’n of W. Pulp and Paper Workers (9th Cir. 1992) 971 F.2d 347, 350, the court also held that the pilots’ on-call time was not “time worked” because it was virtually indistinguishable from free time and the parties’ agreement did not suggest it was compensable. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Owens test, which would have effectively required compensation for all on-call time.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs, employees of a public hospital, sued the hospital for various Labor Code wage and hour violations and sought civil penalties under PAGA. The trial court sustained the hospital’s demurrer, but the Court of Appeal reversed in part. Defendant filed a petition for review, and the California Supreme Court granted, reversing and remanding.

Referencing Wage Order No. 5 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050) and Labor Code § 18, the court held that public employers are not considered “employers” under the Labor Code because the statute excludes government entities from the definition of “person.” The court found legislative intent to exclude government employers based on their explicit inclusion in certain Labor Code provisions, the history of the Industrial Welfare Commission, and numerous case law examples. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ reliance on the sovereign powers doctrine, holding per Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, that the doctrine applies only when legislative intent is unclear. Citing Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. El Camino Hosp. Dist. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d Supp. 30, the court adopted a broad definition of “municipal corporation,” exempting the hospital from wage payment provisions. The court also found no indication that the Legislature intended public employers to be subject to PAGA suits.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, an African-American, sued for FEHA racial harassment and retaliation after a coworker used a racial slur against her. She alleged the HR manager responsible for processing her complaint failed to do so, failed to investigate a related complaint against the manager, and threatened her. Both the trial court and Court of Appeal granted summary judgment for Defendant. They concluded the single coworker slur was not severe or pervasive enough for harassment and that the manager’s alleged actions did not constitute an adverse employment action.

On review, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded Plaintiff’s harassment and retaliation claims. It found that the Court of Appeal failed to evaluate the totality of the circumstances, as required by Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446 and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17. It also found that the Court of Appeal drew too firm a distinction between racial slurs uttered by a coworker and supervisor, holding that even a coworker’s single slur can contribute to a hostile work environment. Finally, the California Supreme Court ruled that the DHR manager’s actions could constitute retaliation under Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs were Lyft drivers who filed separate PAGA lawsuits. After Plaintiff Turrieta settled with Lyft, Appellants moved to intervene, arguing the settlement was inadequate. The trial court denied the motions, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. 

On review, the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants lacked standing to intervene under Code of Civil Procedure § 387(d). The court found that while PAGA does not expressly address intervention, granting such power would be inconsistent with the statute’s structure and create practical problems. Examining Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2022) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, Uribe v. Crown Bldg. Maint. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 986, and Accurso v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1128, the court found none directly addressed the issue and disapproved Moniz in part. The court also rejected Appellants’ authority to vacate the judgment or object to the settlement.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs challenged several provisions of Proposition 22, including § 7451, arguing that they were invalid and not severable. The trial court agreed, but the Court of Appeal reversed. 

On review, limiting the issue to the constitutionality of § 7451, the California Supreme Court affirmed. Relying on Independent Energy Producers Association v. McPherson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1020 and Mathews v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board (1972) 6 Cal.3d 719, it held that the Legislature’s plenary power over workers’ compensation is not exclusive and that the people can also legislate on such matters through the initiative process. The court declined to rule on whether § 7465, together with article II, § 10(c), conflict with article XIV, § 4, reserving that issue for a case directly challenging legislation providing workers’ compensation to app-based drivers. It rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that Assembly Bill No. 1766 presented such a challenge.

Full opinion

The Ninth Circuit had previously certified to the California Supreme Court the question of whether these inmates were covered by the Labor Code. The Supreme Court answered in the negative in an opinion issued on April 22, 2024. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the inmates’ Labor Code claims.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a prison psychologist, complained about a supervisor’s sexually offensive social media posts. The supervisor then targeted her with further posts, even after the prison ordered him to stop. Plaintiff transferred and sued for sex discrimination, alleging a hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, finding the few social media posts considered as evidence occurred offsite and that Defendant took adequate corrective action. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Citing Galdamez v. Potter (9th Cir. 2005) 415 F.3d 1015, 1023–24, the court held that offsite conduct is relevant if it affects the employee’s work environment. It also held that the district court improperly excluded evidence of non-sexual but retaliatory conduct and failed to draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. Following Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3d 1027, 1033–35, the court found the evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit further held that a reasonable juror could find the prison’s investigation and cease-and-desist letters inadequate to remedy the hostile environment.

Full opinion

Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint alleging a hostile work environment.  One month later, the TSA investigated plaintiff for an alleged compensation scheme.  The U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute but allowed Defendant to issue a Kalkines warning. Plaintiff filed a second EEO complaint and was terminated 56 days later for refusing to cooperate with the investigation. He sued, alleging Title VII retaliation. The district court found Plaintiff established a prima facie case but granted summary judgment for Defendant, finding no pretext. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that temporal proximity alone, even when close, generally requires independent evidence of discrimination or retaliation to establish pretext. Here, there was also close temporal proximity between the alleged misconduct and the termination. The court further held that supervisor awareness of the complaint was insufficient to show pretext and that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate retaliatory animus.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, who had disabilities, was accepted into Defendant’s work practice apprentice (WPA) program, which provided room and board and a stipend in exchange for work duties. After experiencing PTSD symptoms and requesting accommodations, Plaintiff was terminated. He sued under the ADA, and the district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, applying the ministerial exception. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that the ministerial exception applies not only to religious leaders and teachers, but also to those performing vital religious functions, citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC (2012) 565 U.S. 171.  Because Plaintiff performed “vital religious duties” as part of the WPA program, including assisting with rituals and participating in meditations, he qualified for the exception. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that his mostly menial work disqualified him from the exception.

Full opinion

Defendant required Plaintiffs to start their computers and open timekeeping software before clocking in, and to log out and shut down their computers after clocking out. Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging unpaid overtime for this time. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the time was “integral and indispensable” to the job. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment, finding the time de minimis. Plaintiffs appealed again. 

The Ninth Circuit again reversed and remanded. It held that Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp. (2014) 571 U.S. 220 did not invalidate the de minimis doctrine. Applying the test from Lindow v. United States (9th Cir. 1984) 738 F.2d 1057, the court found factual issues remained regarding whether the time was de minimis, with the burden on Defendant to prove it was. Citing Rutti v. Lojack Corp. (9th Cir. 2010) 596 F.3d 1057 and Peterson v. Nelnet Diversified Solutions, LLC (10th Cir. 2021) 15 F.4th 1033, the court found a factual issue also remained as to whether Defendant allowed compensation for off-the-clock work. 

Full opinion

In 2012, Plaintiff applied for a reduced-age annuity based on estimated income. He did not inform Defendant when his actual income exceeded that estimate. In 2013, Defendant notified Plaintiff that it had recalculated his annuity based on his actual income. Defendant sent similar notices in 2014 and 2015. In 2016, Defendant demanded repayment for overpayments from August 2012 to December 2015. The Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) denied Plaintiff’s waiver request, affirming its decision on administrative appeal. Plaintiff filed a petition for review, which the Ninth Circuit granted.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the RRB’s finding that Plaintiff was at fault for overpayments from August 2012 to June 2, 2013, because he should have reported his higher income. However, the court held that Plaintiff was “without fault” for overpayments after June 3, 2013, because Defendant continued to overpay him despite notifying him of the recalculation. The court found that requiring repayment for the period after June 3, 2013 could be contrary to the purpose of the Railroad Retirement Act, given Plaintiff’s age, health, and financial difficulties. The case was remanded to the RRB for further consideration.

Full opinion

Plaintiff allegedly suffered an on-the-job injury, and his physician certified him for FMLA leave. Defendant found no evidence of the injury and hired a private investigator who observed Plaintiff performing physical activities without difficulty. Upon Plaintiff’s return to work, Defendant terminated him for faking an injury. Plaintiff sued, alleging FMLA interference and wrongful termination. The district court ruled for Defendant, and Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, Plaintiff argued, based on Sims v. Alameda–Contra Costa Transit Dist. (N.D. Cal. 1998) 2 F. Supp. 2d 1253, that Defendant needed a recertification or contrary medical opinion to challenge the FMLA certification. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that other circuits have rejected Sims. Analyzing the FMLA, the court held that it does not require contrary medical evidence to challenge a certification and affirmed the judgment.

Full opinion

Plaintiff underwent egg retrieval procedures while employed by Defendant. She alleged her supervisor harassed her for requesting time off for the procedures and later terminated her. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that Plaintiff “was not pregnant and has not identified a medical condition or disability related to pregnancy.” It rejected Plaintiff’s argument that FEHA’s definition of “related medical condition” should include procedures that may lead to future pregnancies. While acknowledging that federal courts have recognized infertility as a protected condition under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the court held that without an underlying medical condition related to pregnancy, Plaintiff did not have a protected characteristic under FEHA. Finally, the court held that the 2023 amendments to § 12940, which prohibit discrimination based on “reproductive health decision-making,” were irrelevant because Plaintiff did not address their applicability or the issue of retroactivity.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a naturalized U.S. citizen, applied for several jobs with Defendant and was rejected each time. He filed a putative class action alleging that Defendant prefers to hire noncitizens with H-1B visas because it can pay them lower wages. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that § 1981 does not prohibit citizenship-based discrimination.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. It rejected Defendant’s argument that § 1981 merely establishes a floor for the rights of all persons and does not prohibit discrimination against U.S. citizens. Relying in part on McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. (1976) 427 U.S. 273, the court held that § 1981’s plain language establishes parity between “all persons” and “citizens,” which is violated when some persons have greater or lesser rights than citizens. The court also declined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd. (5th Cir. 1986) 798 F.2d 731, stating that while alienage discrimination differs from racial discrimination, that difference is irrelevant to the text of § 1981.

Full opinion

In 2014, Plaintiff hired a subcontractor for a public school construction project. In 2015, the DLSE assessed penalties on Plaintiff, finding the subcontractor failed to employ apprentices and violated § 1777.5. An administrative panel found Plaintiff knew of the violations and was liable. Plaintiff sought a writ of mandate, alleging abuse of discretion and denial of due process. The trial court denied the petition, and Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It found substantial evidence supported Plaintiff’s knowledge of the violations and rejected Plaintiff’s argument that knowledge alone was insufficient for liability under § 1777.7(d). The court also rejected Plaintiff’s due process claim, finding the DLSE notices adequately informed Plaintiff of potential joint and several liability. The absence of a witness at trial did not violate due process because Plaintiff failed to enforce its subpoena or request a continuance.

Full opinion

In 2021, Plaintiff informed defendant he was ill. Defendant, following its COVID-19 guidelines, requested a third-party administered test. Plaintiff refused, and Defendant ultimately terminated him. Plaintiff sued, alleging violations of CMIA § 56.20(b) and (c). The trial court found that Defendant did not ask Plaintiff to sign a medical release authorization (§ 56.20(b)) and did not possess his “medical information” (§ 56.20(c)), and sustained Defendant’s demurrer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Citing Rossi v. Sequoia Union Elementary School (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 974, it rejected Plaintiff’s argument that refusing a COVID-19 test is equivalent to refusing to sign an authorization. The court declined to address whether the “necessary action” exemption in § 56.20(b) applied. Regarding the § 56.20(c) claim, the court held that the statute applies only to employers already possessing the employee’s medical information. Because Plaintiff conceded he never took the test, Defendant could not possess related medical information. The court declined to rule on whether the CMIA applies to individual co-defendants.

Full opinion

The Ninth Circuit had upheld summary judgment for Defendant, who terminated Plaintiff after alleged misconduct, including attending a religious leadership summit while on duty. Plaintiff sued for religious discrimination under Title VII and FEHA, citing derogatory remarks from supervisors. The district court granted Defendant summary judgment, finding that its legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing Plaintiff rebutted his discrimination claims.

On appeal, the court affirmed, finding that Plaintiff’s supervisors did not demonstrate discriminatory animus because they “did not use derogatory terms to express their own views… but rather referenced other legitimate constitutional and business concerns.” Following Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. (9th Cir. 2005) 413 F.3d 1090, 1095-1096, the court held that “circumstantial evidence requir[es] ‘specific and substantial’ evidence to defeat summary judgment”, which Plaintiff did not provide. Notably, four judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, pointing to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs. (9th Cir. 2000) 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 that “the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action need produce very little evidence in order to overcome an employer’s motion for summary judgment.” 

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a farm laborer, sent prelitigation notice to Defendants alleging Labor Code violations and then sued under PAGA. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the notice failed to identify “aggrieved employees.” The trial court granted the motion. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed. Citing Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545, the court held that nothing in Lab. Code § 2699.3 requires defining “aggrieved employees” in the notice. It also cited Santos v. El Guapos Tacos, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 363, 372, for the proposition that a notice is not deficient for failing to state the PAGA claim is on behalf of others. The court found Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Defendants employed her and other nonexempt employees and violated the Labor Code. It rejected Defendants’ argument that the notice was ambiguous for referencing entities beyond the named Defendants, holding that the scope of affected employees can be determined during discovery.

Full opinion

Defendant removed Plaintiff from duty in 2018 after he failed a color-blindness test. Plaintiff joined a putative class action filed by similarly affected employees. In August 2018, class counsel moved for a narrower class definition that may have excluded Plaintiff. The court certified the narrower class in February 2019, but the Eighth Circuit reversed certification in March 2020. Plaintiff then filed suit, but the district court granted summary judgment, ruling his complaint was untimely because tolling ended when class counsel moved for the narrower definition. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined the purpose of American Pipe tolling and noted the split among district courts regarding when it ends. Considering Sawtell v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. (10th Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 248 and Smith v. Pennington (4th Cir. 2003) 352 F.3d 884, the court held that to end tolling, a plaintiff’s exclusion from a revised class definition must be unambiguous. Ending tolling without unambiguous narrowing, the court reasoned, would have negative consequences. Analyzing the August 2018 proposed class definition, the court found it ambiguous but that the better reading included color-vision plaintiffs like DeFries. The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment and remanded.

Full opinion

Plaintiff reported safety concerns to Defendant and a state agency.  Defendant terminated him, citing performance issues. Plaintiff sued for whistleblower retaliation under Lab. Code § 1102.5 and HSC § 1278.5. The trial court found for Defendant, acknowledging Plaintiff’s protected disclosures but finding Defendant would have terminated him anyway. Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved to vacate, arguing for declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees under Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It rejected Plaintiff’s reliance on Harris, holding that FEHA’s “substantial factor” standard does not apply to § 1102.5 claims, which are governed by § 1102.6. Citing Vatalaro v. County of Sacramento (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 367, 387–388, the court held that if the employer proves it would have made the same decision regardless of the protected activity, the Plaintiff is barred from all relief. The court also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Legislature intentionally omitted language from § 1102.6 explicitly prohibiting relief in such cases.

Full opinion

Starting in 2011, Plaintiff experienced age-related harassment and adverse actions. In 2017, Defendant terminated her, replacing her with a younger coworker. After receiving a right-to-sue notice, Plaintiff sued for FEHA violations, wrongful termination, and failure to pay overtime. The trial court granted summary adjudication for Defendant on the retaliation claim but ruled for Plaintiff on all other claims except unpaid overtime. Defendant appealed and Plaintiff cross-appealed, challenging the denial of a tax neutralization adjustment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It rejected Defendant’s argument that its actions “had acquired a degree of permanence in 2014,” finding that Defendant neither resolved Plaintiff’s issues nor communicated a refusal to do so. The court also rejected challenges to the damages award, noting that Defendant did not move for a new trial on that ground (Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 919). The court upheld the district court’s calculation of attorney’s fees based on the location of Plaintiff’s counsel, its award of a 1.5x multiplier based on contingent risk factor, and its awarding of costs. However, it denied Plaintiff’s cross-appeal for a tax neutralization adjustment, finding she failed to provide sufficient evidence to support it.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs (Postmates, Uber, and two individuals) alleged that A.B. 5 violates the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Contract Clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and later dismissed their claims.  The Ninth Circuit initially reversed the dismissal of the Equal Protection claims but then granted rehearing en banc and vacated that decision.

On rehearing, the court applied rational basis review, analyzing whether A.B. 5’s distinctions between different types of referral services are rationally related to the Legislature’s purpose. Citing Mountain Water Co. v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regul. (9th Cir. 1990) 919 F.2d 593, 597, the court held that it could consider any rational purpose for the statute. After identifying several such reasons, the court held that A.B. 5 does not unconstitutionally “single out” Plaintiffs and that it provides a complex framework based on statutory criteria. The court declined to address Plaintiffs’ arguments about impermissible animus and political favoritism, citing Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden (9th Cir. 2018) 878 F.3d 1184, 1200. It upheld the dismissal of the Equal Protection claims and affirmed the denial of injunctive relief.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued defendant for Labor Code violations then amended her complaint to assert individual and non-individual PAGA claims. Defendant moved to compel the individual PAGA claim to arbitration and dismiss the non-individual claims. The district court compelled the individual claim but denied dismissal, instead staying the non-individual claims pending arbitration. Defendant appealed the denial of dismissal.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Relying primarily on the California Supreme Court’s clarification in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, the court held that arbitrating an individual PAGA claim does not strip a plaintiff’s standing to pursue non-individual claims in court. Thus, the district court correctly denied dismissal. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the stay of the non-individual claims pending the arbitration’s completion, consistent with Adolph‘s guidance, and found it unnecessary to address the agreement’s class action carve-out.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs repeatedly requested pension statements online but received them only after calling Defendant.  After retiring, they received monthly payments consistent with those statements, but Defendant later informed them their benefits were overcalculated. Plaintiffs sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, violation of ERISA’s disclosure requirements, and state law violations. The district court dismissed all claims. On initial appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the fiduciary duty claim, reversed dismissal of the state law claims, and vacated dismissal of the ERISA claims. On remand, the district court again dismissed the ERISA claims, ruling that the statute did not require accurate statements. Plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that a pension benefit statement with a substantially inaccurate amount does not comply with the plain language or statutory intent of ERISA’s reporting requirement. It also held that Plaintiffs’ electronic requests were “written requests” under ERISA and that they could seek statutory penalties under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) and equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit clarified that penalties under § 1132(c)(1) do not require a finding of bad faith.

Full opinion

Plaintiff filed a class action alleging Defendant failed to provide compliant meal breaks, pay owed premiums, and report those premiums on wage statements. The trial court found violations of Lab. Code §§ 203 and 226 but awarded penalties only under § 226. Both parties appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that Defendant did not violate either section because meal break premiums are penalties, not wages. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that missed-break premiums are wages and must be included on wage statements. On remand, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court’s finding of good faith under § 203 precluded penalties under § 226. The California Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Labor Code considers good faith a defense to penalties for both nonpayment and nonreporting of wages. The court reasoned that imposing § 226 penalties in this case, where the law was unsettled at the time of the violations, would unfairly penalize the employer for failing to predict how legal issues would be resolved years later.

Full opinion

After temporarily transferring to a different department due to friction with her manager, Defendant informed plaintiff that her new position could become permanent but that her pay would be reduced. Alternatively, she could “return to the status quo at the [old position] with her same title and with her same pay” but would be subject to a “pending action” that could lead to her termination (prior to the transfer, defendant drafted a “Letter of Intent to Dismiss” but did not issue it). Plaintiff “voluntarily chose [the] lower paying position.”

Plaintiff contended she was entitled to a Skelly hearing before “having to choose between suffering a decrease in pay rate and grade (demotion) or a dismissal.” The court found, however, that it was Plaintiff’s prerogative to “risk termination and receive a Skelly hearing” or “voluntarily accept the transfer and not have a Skelly hearing… the law did not entitle her to both.” Ruling in favor of Plaintiff “would dramatically expand Skelly” because “the proposition underlying her argument [is] that employees are afforded due process as soon as an employer considers an adverse action.” The court also cited the ruling in Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1115 that “due process is not required where ‘the employee ‘has voluntarily surrendered the property interest upon whose [sic] existence the procedural rights depend.’ ”

Full opinion

Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement with a carve-out for PAGA claims. After termination, he filed a PAGA claim alleging Labor Code violations. Defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the AAA Rules, incorporated by reference, delegated arbitrability to the arbitrator. The trial court denied the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Citing Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, the court held that incorporating AAA rules by reference does not meet the “clear and unmistakable” delegation standard for unsophisticated employees. The court also found the agreement “clearly and explicitly excluded all PAGA claims.” While Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate individual PAGA claims, that rule did not apply here because the agreement excluded all PAGA claims.

Full opinion

Plaintiffs were pretrial detainees who worked without pay for a private contractor in a county jail’s kitchen. They sued in federal court, asserting various claims, including minimum wage and overtime violations. The district court certified the wage issue for interlocutory appeal, and the Ninth Circuit certified the question to the California Supreme Court.

On review, the California Supreme Court held that Pen. Code § 4019.3, which addresses inmate labor programs, applies to all county inmates, including pretrial detainees. Therefore, these inmates are not covered by the Labor Code’s minimum wage and overtime provisions. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that § 4019.3 should not apply to public-private work programs and that the statute could coexist with minimum wage protections.  It also held that the wage requirements of the Prison Inmate Labor Initiative of 1990 do not apply to county jail inmates.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, who had a disability, alleged he experienced discrimination after disclosing his condition. In 2020, he sued under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging a hostile work environment and discrimination. The district court dismissed the hostile work environment claim, finding Plaintiff “failed to link the alleged harassment that he endured to his disability.” The court later granted partial summary judgment for Defendant on the discrimination claims. Plaintiff appealed both orders after settling his remaining discrimination claim.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the hostile work environment claim but affirmed summary adjudication of the discrimination claim. It held that hostile work environment claims are cognizable under the ADA and, by extension, the Rehabilitation Act, citing Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 247 F.3d 229, 234, and Ford v. Marion County Sheriff’s Off. (7th Cir. 2019) 942 F.3d 839, 851–52. The court found the district court correctly applied the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard but failed to construe the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

Full opinion

Plaintiff alleged defendant committed various wage and hour violations, including denying meal and rest breaks, late wage payments, inaccurate wage statements, and failure to pay final wages.  The trial court struck the complaint, finding under Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a representative PAGA action because she did not also assert an “individual action seeking PAGA relief for herself.” Plaintiff appealed. 

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred in relying on Viking River.  Instead, the court applied Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, which clarified that a Plaintiff need not file an individual PAGA claim to have standing for a representative action. The court found Plaintiff satisfied the two requirements for PAGA standing under Adolph: (1) she “was employed by the alleged violator,” and (2) “one or more of the alleged violations was committed” against her (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1120).

Full opinion

Plaintiff alleged to the DFEH and EEOC that his supervisor retaliated against him for reporting gender-based discrimination, leading to his termination. The EEOC found no evidence for Plaintiff’s claims and issued a right-to-sue notice. Plaintiff then sued, presenting new claims involving new individuals, a new timeframe, a different location, and a markedly different set of facts. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies under Gov. Code § 12960(c). The trial court granted the motion, and Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal cited Guzman v. NBA Automotive, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1117 and Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1615, ruling that Plaintiff’s claims “were not like, or reasonably related to, the claims in the Commission Form” and that “administrative investigation would not have uncovered the conduct that was the focus” of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court ruled against Plaintiff, denying his request for judicial notice as irrelevant. 

Full opinion

In 2017, Plaintiff’s new supervisor replaced her with a male officer. Defendant transferred her to a position with equal pay and rank but diminished perks, responsibilities, and a less desirable schedule.  Plaintiff sued for sex discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, ruling Plaintiff failed to show a “ ‘significant’ change in working conditions producing ‘material employment disadvantage.’ ” The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, remanding for consideration of forfeiture and proof. The court held that requiring a heightened showing of harm would “add words—and significant words, as it were—to the statute Congress enacted.” The court rejected Defendant’s argument that, based on ejusdem generis, the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” referenced in 2 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1) need cause “an equal level of harm” as refusal to hire or discharge. The court also rejected Defendant’s arguments that the significance standard applied to Title VII retaliation claims in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White (2006) 548 U. S. 53 should apply to Title VII discrimination claims and that discarding the significance standard would burden courts and employers with “insubstantial” lawsuits.

Full opinion

Defendant terminated Plaintiff for cause in 2018, voiding his stock options. Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant, wrongful termination, retaliation, and conversion, alleging he was terminated in retaliation for “asserting his rights to his vested benefits.” The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s tort claims, ruling that the voided stock options were not “wages,” but a jury found Defendant liable for breach of contract and awarded Plaintiff approximately $11.5 million. The court conditionally granted Defendant’s motions for JNOV and a new trial, contingent on Plaintiff accepting a $4.3 million remittitur. Plaintiff accepted, Defendant appealed, and Plaintiff cross-appealed.

On appeal, the court held that “under both California and Delaware law, damages for lost stock options in a breach of contract action may be measured from a date other than the date of breach based on equitable considerations.” It upheld the trial court’s remittitur, finding the jury verdict excessive. However, the court found the trial court erred in excluding damages for breach of a performance grant and entered a new judgment for $6.7 million.  Finally, the court affirmed dismissal of the tort claims, holding, per International Business Machines Corp. v. Bajorek (9th Cir. 1999) 191 F.3d 1033, 1039, that “stock options are not wages because they ‘are not’ ‘amounts.’”

Full opinion

In 2017, Plaintiff filed a class action alleging defendant violated Lab. Code § 226.7 by requiring ambulance drivers to remain on call during rest breaks. EAESPA subsequently took effect, requiring ambulance workers to “remain reachable” during all shifts, including breaks.  Relying on Calleros v. Rural Metro of San Diego, Inc. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 660, which affirmed EAESPA’s retroactive provision, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for sanctions.

Plaintiff appealed, arguing that Calleros was decided improperly. While Defendant contended that EAESPA merely clarified existing law, the Court of Appeal followed the Calleros precedent and directly addressed the constitutionality of EAESPA’s retroactivity. Applying the factors from In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 592, the court analyzed whether retroactive application was permissible. It concluded that retroactivity was justified because EAESPA advances an important state interest, and Plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient detrimental reliance under Bouquet to render it unconstitutional. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on the pleadings based on EAESPA’s valid retroactive effect. It also upheld the $2,000 sanctions award against Plaintiff’s counsel for unreasonably contesting settled law.

Full opinion

Plaintiff sued Defendant for failing to pay approximately $15,000 in minimum wage and overtime wages and $11,000 in unreimbursed expenses. The trial court awarded Plaintiff approximately $7,500 in unpaid wages but found no evidence to support his expense claim. Plaintiff sought $300,000 in attorney’s fees and $27,000 in costs, but the trial court denied both motions under Code Civ. Proc. § 1033(a), finding he had “acted in bad faith by artificially inflating his damages figure and including equity claims he never intended to pursue.” 

Plaintiff appealed, arguing he was entitled to reasonable litigation costs under Lab. Code § 1194 (a). The Court of Appeal concurred, holding that Lab. Code § 1194 (a) and Code Civ. Proc. § 1033 (a) are irreconcilable but that the former should control because “that statute is more recently enacted and more specific.” Defendant, relying on Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, argued that the absence of a Code Civ. Proc. § 1033(a) carveout for FEHA cases precluded a similar exemption for wage and hour cases. The court disagreed, finding in Lab. Code § 1194 (a) “no analogous standard” to FEHA’s discretionary fee provision, and remanded to the trial court to determine reasonable fees and costs. 

Full opinion

Plaintiff, who worked at Defendant’s solar power facility, underwent mandatory security inspections at a gate several miles from his worksite and had to follow strict rules when driving between the gate and the parking lot. He also had to spend his unpaid meal periods in a designated area on defendant’s premises. He filed a class action seeking payment for unpaid hours worked. The trial court granted class certification but later granted summary judgment for Defendant. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified three questions to the California Supreme Court regarding the meaning of “hours worked.”

In its review, the California Supreme Court relied heavily on Frlekin v. Apple Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038 and analyzed relevant provisions of Wage Order No. 16 and Labor Code section 512. The court held: (1) Time spent on an employer’s premises awaiting and undergoing mandatory exit procedures is “hours worked” ; (2) Time spent traveling between a security gate and parking lot is “hours worked” if the employer requires the employee’s presence at the gate for a reason other than accessing the worksite. Enforcing ordinary workplace rules during this travel does not, by itself, make it “hours worked” ; and (3) Meal periods provided through a collective bargaining agreement are compensable at least at minimum wage if the employee cannot leave the premises and is prevented from engaging in personal activities.

Full opinion

Plaintiff, a Canadian citizen working in Canada for a Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. company, alleged retaliation after reporting fraud to Defendant and the SEC. He sued under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5, and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The district court dismissed all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) based on extraterritoriality.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, applying the presumption against extraterritoriality and the two-step framework from Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc. (2023) 600 U.S. 412, 417, and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty. (2016) 579 U.S. 325, 337. It held that the anti-retaliation provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts do not apply to foreign conduct and that Plaintiff’s employment was not located in the United States. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that his access to Defendant’s web servers in California constituted domestic conduct. It also dismissed the state law claims, finding that insufficient relevant conduct occurred in California.

Full opinion

After striking Plaintiff’s FEHA claims due to her independent contractor status, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees under Gov. Code § 12965. Defendant then filed a cost memorandum seeking discretionary costs without filing a motion for those costs. Plaintiff attempted to file an untimely motion to tax costs, but the court denied relief and awarded costs to Defendant. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed. Citing Anthony v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1015-1016, the court held that a cost memorandum applies only to “cost items to which a party is entitled ‘as a matter of right.’”  Because Defendant did not file the required motion for discretionary costs, its cost memorandum was ineffective, and Plaintiff had no obligation to respond.

Full opinion

Defendant argued that the trial court erred in applying Gov. Code § 31461(b)(2) to employees who retired after January 1, 2013, and that the statute did not require excluding excess leave cashouts.

Following the Supreme Court’s analysis in Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1032, the Court of Appeal held that while Gov. Code § 31461(b) is ambiguous, its legislative intent to eliminate pension spiking is clear. Rejecting Defendant’s argument that the Supreme Court’s statements in Alameda County were dicta, the court held that “when the Supreme Court has reached well beyond the holding necessary to its opinion to express its broader view… dicta from the high court should be followed.”

Full opinion

Plaintiff brought putative class action claims and a representative PAGA action for Labor Code violations. The trial court initially certified a class and subclasses but later decertified two subclasses and dismissed the PAGA claim as unmanageable. The Court of Appeal reversed.

On review, the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial courts lack inherent authority to dismiss claims for manageability. Citing Lyons v. Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d 911, 916, the court emphasized that trial courts have only a “tightly circumscribed” power to dismiss with prejudice.  It found that Code Civ. Proc. §§ 583.150 and 581(m) do not grant broad discretionary dismissal power. The court held that PAGA claims are not subject to manageability considerations, disapproving Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 746. The court also rejected Defendant’s due process argument, holding that the evidentiary limitations established in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1 also apply to the defense of PAGA claims.

Full opinion